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"God Mode for the Internet": tracking users through extensions Chrome and Firefox

Many have browser extensions installed. At a minimum, ad blocker. But when installing extensions, you should be careful: not all of them are useful, and some are used for surveillance at all.

Even if a particular extension does not “steal” any information right now, there is no guarantee that it will not begin to do so in the future. This is a system problem.

Recently, experts uncovered the activities of the "analytical" company Nacho Analytics , which offers the service under the ambitious motto "God mode for the Internet", tracking the actions of millions of users through the Chrome and Firefox extensions in almost real time delay).

The researchers called DataSpii (pronounced data-spy) a catastrophic leak of personal data. They note that the analytic firm and its clients not only receive the history of visited pages, but extract various personal information from URLs and page headers.
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Nacho Analytics customers can search the general traffic for various parameters, for example:




For $ 49 per month, the service allowed you to track the actions of employees or users of a particular company / site: for example, Apple, Facebook, Microsoft, Amazon, Tesla Motors or Symantec.







The DataSpii leak has affected more than 4 million users. Researchers have identified a number of extensions through which surveillance has been carried out. They are listed in the table below:

Extension nameNumber of usersBrowserChrome extension ID (if any)
Hover zoomMore than 800,000Chromenonjdcjchghhkdoolnlbekcfllmednbl
SpeakIt!More than 1.4 millionChromepgeolalilifpodheeocdmbhehgnkkbak
Superzoom329,000+Chrome and Firefoxgnamdgilanlgeeljfnckhboobddoahbl
SaveFrom.net HelperUp to 140,000FirefoxN / a
Fairshare unlockMore than 1 millionChrome and Firefoxalecjlhgldihcjjcffgjalappiifdhae
PanelMeasurementMore than 500,000Chromekelbkhobcfhdcfhohdkjnaimmicmhcbo
Branded surveyseightChromedpglnfbihebejclmfmdcbgjembbfjneo
Panel Community
Surveys
oneChromelpjhpdcflkecpciaehfbpafflkeomcnb

The last four extensions clearly informed that they were collecting data from the browser, the rest did not.

The following table lists the companies targeted by the Nacho Analytics analytics service and what specific information was displayed. The relevant data was either provided directly, or there were links to them in the interface.

CompanyNacho Analytics Data
23andMePublished reports 23andMe
AlienvaultJIRA data from alienvault.atlassian.net
Amazon web servicesAWS S3 Authentication Request Strings
American airlinesPassenger information: name, confirmation number from the ticket
AmgenCorporate Network Data
AppleThe last 4 digits of a credit card when ordering Apple products, type of card, place of receipt of the order, name of the customer, iCloud mailing address
AthenaHealthCorporate Network Data
AtlassianAlmost real-time update of tasks for company employees with thousands of sub-domains atlassian.net
Blue originJIRA data from the domain blueorigin.com
BuzzfeedJIRA data from domain buzzfeed.atlassian.net
CapitaloneZoom Conferences URL from capitalone.zoom.us
CardinalhealthJIRA data from cardinalhealth.atlassian.net
DellZoom Conferences URL from dell.zoom.us
DrchronoPatient names, prescription drug names
Epic systemsNetwork data LAN of corporate network visitors
FacebookFacebook Messenger applications, including tax returns
FireyeJIRA data from fireeye.com domain from the corporate network
IntuitQuickbook invoices
Kaiser permanenteNetwork data from a corporate LAN

KareoPatient Names
MerckNetwork data from a corporate LAN
Microsoft OneDriveFiles from OneDrive hosting, including tax returns
NBCDigitalJIRA data from nbcdigital.atlassian.net
NestVideo Recordings from Nest Security Cameras
NetappZoom conferencing URL with netapp.zoom.us
OracleZoom Conferences URL with oracle.zoom.us
Palo alto networksCorporate Network Data
PfizerCorporate Network Data
RedditJIRA data from reddit.atlassian.net
RocheCorporate Network Data
ShopifyAWS S3 parameter leakage victim
SkypeSkype Chat URLs
Southwest airlinesInformation about passengers: it was possible to track passengers on board almost in real time, and there was enough confidential data in the service to cancel a flight or change a flight
SpacexCorporate Network Data
SymantecCorporate Network Data
TeslaCorporate Network Data
TmobileJIRA data from tmobile.atlassian.net
Trend microJIRA data from visitors to the internal subdomain trendmicro.com
UberCoordinates of taxi pick-up and drop-off points, Zoom conference URLs from uber.zoom.us
UCLAZoom Conferences URL from ucla.zoom.us
Under armorJIRA data from underarmour.atlassian.net
United airlinesPassenger last names and their flight confirmation numbers
WalmartZoom Conferences URL from walmart.zoom.us
ZendeskApplication for tickets in the support service, among which you can search for a specific client
Zoom video communicationsZoom Conference URL

After the researchers reported a data leak in Google and Mozilla, the listed extensions were removed from the official catalogs, and Nacho Analytics suspended the “God Mode for the Internet” service. Maybe not forever.

Some extensions explicitly reported data collection from the browser and performed it only with the consent of users, but others did it secretly. Interestingly, individual extensions (Hover Zoom and SpeakIt) for additional masking did not start sending the collected data immediately, but only 24 days after installation.

Surprisingly, Nacho Analytics positions itself as a legal “analytic service”. She claims that data collection is carried out with the consent of users. But it is known that about 99% of people do not read the agreement on the use of the software during installation, so such a “consent” is just a convention. Moreover, theoretically, a company can buy an existing popular extension from its current owner - and modify it a bit in the new version to start collecting data. Most users are likely to agree to the new usage agreement without reading it.

As mentioned above, the ecosystem of browser extensions in their current form is a systemic security issue. Browser developers should consider how to solve it.


Source: https://habr.com/ru/post/460987/


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