ENOG 15: "Why is the Internet still online?"

Hello, Habr! This is both a transcription and a partial translation of the hourly session entitled “Why is the Internet still online?” From the fifteenth meeting of the Eurasian group of network operators.

Qrator Labs thanks all the panellists: Alexey Semenyaka, RIPE NCC; Ignas Bagdonas, Equinix; Martin J. Levy, Cloudflare; Alexander Azimov, Qrator Labs and moderator Alexei Uchakin from the LinkmeUp podcast team for permission to publish this text.

Network research engineers are involved in this discussion, so the talk is mainly about cross-domain routing. Video at the end of the publication. Enjoy your reading.

Alexey Uchakin : Hello everyone, my name is Alexey, the LinkmeUp team is the first podcast for telecommunications operators. For me, in fact, a colleague from Qrator Labs talked a lot about how to defend against spoofing, but I would like to talk, in fact, more widely. Because the Internet is definitely decentralized and created, among other things, in order to survive after a nuclear explosion, but as practice shows, with cheap equipment and not having the right to configure BGP, you can break it all very successfully. Therefore, today I wanted to discuss with experts how to defend against this, how to monitor it and what to do with it all.
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Today there are: Alexander Azimov - Qrator Labs, Alex Semenyaka - RIPE NCC, Ignas Bagdonas - Equinix and Martin J. Levy - Cloudflare. Actually, colleagues, the first thing I would like to start with is the first question: how secure is the Internet now from the fact that a conditionally small regional operator will suddenly announce the prefixes of conditional Google, Yandex or anyone. Is there any assessment of how this is now?

Alexander Azimov : Well, then let me begin this sad story, because it is really sad. Unfortunately, large operators, including in Russia, have exceptions, i.e. they sometimes set up filters and sometimes not. I do not want to poke a finger at the entire large operator market in Russia, but a significant part of those whom we consider Tier-1 operators to have such exceptions. As a result, those for whom these exceptions are implemented have the opportunity to announce everything, anything, and this has already happened. Actually, we observed how last year Corbin flowed, how VimpelCom flowed. There are those to whom thunder has not yet struck, but there is potential.

Alexey Uchakin : So now everything is really bad, right?

Alexey Semenyaka : So, let's not escalate the degree of suspense - this is probably a little bit superfluous. Well, what does bad mean? Yes, there are holes. Sasha rightly said: someone filters, someone does not filter, i.e. all at this level. After all, let's start with the fact that the Internet was built on principles, let's say, mutual understanding, and to a sufficient degree it still exists on these principles. It is assumed that this is not only a technical construction, but also some companies that employ some people who perform some kind of conscious action. When a similar thing appears on the Internet, everyone else somehow reacts to this whole thing, something like this. Although, indeed, accidents happen regularly. A wonderful story about trust - when everyone trusted Google, and he took and left Japan ... well, in short, not so much with the Internet. The story is again last year, but this is a great example. I would prefer to talk about the technical side, and not about the wording: is everything good / is everything bad. Well, that is, this is too unprofessional approach.

Alexander Azimov : Well, okay, continuing this unprofessional approach, I would ask the question - can the network of collective trust not become a network of collective problems when there are 55,000 objects. Speaking about the technique, now within the IETF with the feasible participation of Qrator Labs, including, but not only, the topic of BGP security is actively moving. It is hoped that the situation will become better from the technical point of view, which will make it possible to patch a significant part of the holes in the BGP protocol and make it more secure, especially for beginners. So that they have less opportunity to kill themselves and others.

Alexey Uchakin : Is it necessary to issue the rights to configure BGP?

Alexey Semenyaka : I think Ignas has something to say.



Ignas Bagdonas : I would, I would say that there are 2 different parts of the problem or 2 groups of problems.

One is the very faces and other things that appear as a result of an error, an unintentional error. Fat, fat fingers - something like that. On the one hand, we are moving in the direction of automation, and it’s as if we can say that this will be a solution, but all automation systems work on data. If our data is corrupted or incorrect, it will be the same, only much more efficient.

The other group is specific deliberate attacks, and from my point of view most of these attacks are carried out, and they are successful, only because there is a fairly large level in the entire network, let's face it, a mess. This is operational hygiene, which only results when all the participants, or the majority of the participants, participate in it and do it more or less correctly. This is a matter of education. You are here, in this room, you know what filtering is, you know how it works, but you represent a small part of those people who are engaged in technical work and support, and you cannot conclude from this that everyone has the same level of understanding . Of course, there are situations where someone read in the documentation from some vendor that fill the team and you will be happy. They do it and get happiness, only in the process of it, they do damage to others, not on purpose and not understanding it. The issue of learning is really important in this situation. I see it moving in a good direction, but this is not a quick process.

Alexei Semenyaka : A brief remark about education - education is really a completely critical thing here and exactly the same as in the part of the problems that we discussed after the Sasha report, just now. There is such a vivid example that concerns our organization RIPE NCC, we are, as you understand and well know, the RIPE DB database. We have raiding objects there, I remember the time well, it was recently - 20 years ago - when the rule of good tone was to build filters on RIPE DB. Now this is absolutely not true - there are organizations that do it at their own peril and risk, but quite a few complain that if you just believe what is written in the RIPE DB, then you can shoot yourself. We only lead, we are technical operators of RIPE DB, we cannot force to write you the truth, i.e. there are no rights, it was you who did not give us such rights, you didn’t tell us: “please, make sure that there is something correct written there”. And you, actually, dear participants, write nonsense there regularly. Yes, this is the problem of scaling and the problem of education, superimposed on each other. Not because you are stupid or not because you lack education in part of the BGP protocol. No, it's just really messy. You don’t get your hands on it, you don’t have time to figure it out, you don’t understand why it is needed, and to form a strongly growing number of participants, this is a really big challenge that, in fact, is effective nowadays, in my glance, not solved. This is really an education problem, but not in the sense of an education problem that someone could do and not do, it is really not clear how to do it in the context of a growing Internet, a growing number of participants, etc. etc. This is more or less a system problem. Martin?

Martin Levy : You knocked me a little off the original topic - I’ll first go back. I already have gray hair, see? This is because I have been doing networking for a very long time. And as the basis of the entire Internet, we have protocols that were created long before it acquired its modern scale. Who among those present knows who first began offering an internet connection in Russia? It doesn't matter who it was, how many people know this is important and what you know is important. And if you needed to pick up the phone and call somewhere - you knew who to call. And who among those present controls ASN and does not know me or does not know other people who raised their hands? The protocol simply does not keep pace with this growth rate. And all that we talked about at previous ENOGs, and 10 minutes ago or at other conferences, was about one thing. About how to catch up with the growth rate. Because one of the most amazing things about the Internet and the protocols is that they do not go out of the process 100%, but mostly inside the IETF.

There is such a phrase as “permissionless innovation” (innovation without permission) - the existing protocols “did not ask permission” from telecom operators or Internet providers. They were created by the type of people who are here today - and these things work. Much of what you said here is about how to catch up with progress, or what is missing, or what we all need to agree on. Things are of a philosophical order, and I would like to remain mundane. And at this moment I have to say that you are wrong. I will explain: the only way modern Internet works is to support these databases of routes, which we are lazy, I will repeat once again - lazily we use so that someone cannot interfere with the normal connectivity of another. Today during lunch we discussed: I am the owner of the network, which someone tried to manipulate no further than 5 days ago. And although the rout was only 30 or 40 seconds long - it continued on Twitter and other social networks for several days. So I have a real biased interest in convincing you and everyone else present that this is a very important topic. So let me explain where, in my opinion, you were wrong and why I reacted so. Someone at a certain moment should be responsible for being the owner of precisely such data that would allow one to assert a legitimate or illegitimate announcement. Because specifically in this environment “without permission” does not work very well. And since you are the RIR member of this discussion, I roll back to you and ask: “Is it difficult for you to keep the IRR in a clean and correct state?” It's difficult for everyone. Someone should stand up and say: “Enough. I will find ways to fix it and do better. ” The second part of my answer is that some of those present will have to start this process and now I will select you, as a RIR, for this task. Let's see where this discussion goes.



Alexei Semenyaka : First, I cannot agree with disagreement because it in no way contradicts what I said. I did not say that our data is absolute nonsense, I spoke about the fact that there are many cases when there is nonsense written there. Fortunately, not always. The rauting part of the database is quite an important part, yet somehow it works. Especially where there is enforcement - especially maintaining the relevance of these data works especially well, especially if we are talking about a responsible operator who works with his downlink. Or almost always it works - these records are relevant for traffic exchange points, because traffic exchange points are very careful about what is written in their database. Let's just say, in its mass. There is a mess there - a mess, unfortunately, not pinpoint, it is more or less distributed, but, fortunately, this is a problem, not a catastrophe. Martin, I apologize, let's say, this is a stolen continuation of the conversation. I absolutely agree that we should deal with this matter. So Sasha just wants to take away the microphone from me and say that he is the person who will do this, I understand correctly? But I still agree. Another Sasha from the audience suggests that there is someone else. That's right, but in the Internet community, as we understand the pressure from the RIR does not work. If the RIR starts simply to put pressure on the participants and say: “Well, well, everyone quickly lined up and started to build” - nothing will happen. The discussion works, the crystallization of the problem works, the creation, in fact, of awareness works. This is the same part of education, in a sense, and when it is completed, the very people appear with whom you can work and with whom we, as the RIR, will contribute in every way. We do have a system that allows us to monitor how things are happening - and we are ready to promote this problem, but we cannot replace the community. We can work with the community - we can, we will and we are ready, but we cannot replace the community - we cannot create those who will do it.

Alexander Azimov : Let's go back a little bit - we need to find the root of evil after all, and try to prove that this is a RIR. Usually, when you add an autonomous system number to your SET, if you are in transit, you do it for what purpose? In order to provide them with service. Not to protect them tomorrow or so that everything worked well for them, but for the higher ones to add their prefix to the SET, and to continue to work. And how often do you delete what was added there from your SET? Please raise your hand those who do not, or rarely do? (raises her hand) I'll be honest here. (question from the audience: “Quite rare?”) Yes, occasionally. In essence, laying on AS-SETs protection from faces, hijacks, we all mixed up, in fact. This mechanism was developed for a different purpose. They are connected, but his case is different. In this case, in essence, security is delegated, since your number can be added by anyone to other players. And the BGP protocol can be structurally corrected only if, in response to what Martin said, it is only if your security depends only on your actions. And from anyone else. Actually, in my opinion, it is in this direction that the protocol and its change should evolve.

Martin Levy : Protocol - it depends only on the data. If the cesspool is inside, then the cesspool is outside. Crap inside, crap out, that's all.



Alexander Azimov : I'm confused. The problem is that garbage can always be created, but I want to live in a situation where only I myself can create garbage for my networks. I will be responsible for creating the trash. The situation when other players create trash for my network is a dead end. And, back, I want to be responsible for the security of my network.

Martin Levy : I agree with this, I understand, well. Let us then try something new and on the other hand come to this issue. Where can I send an invoice or prepayment request when something comes to my network? And it comes there - something I did not ask for, something that went through many players and has no value for me. I can send a lot of requests for payment myself, how will I process all this volume? This is to some extent a rhetorical question, because we know that it cannot exist. But at the same time, this is an excellent argument against this. We are all in the same boat now because of the limited number and quality of filters. And this is a fairly large amount of traffic that could not exist. We can also discuss this not in terms of data, but of management (meaning data plane / control plane) or in terms of the quality of BGP routing and talk about excessive de-aggregation - but this is a different matter.

Alexey Uchakin : Well, that is another question. But we have a RIPE DB, we have a database of other LIRs, and we give an honest pioneer that we will behave well and write the correct data there. And how to protect yourself from spoofing - from the fact that we can announce someone else's autonomous number and with the same addresses valid for this autonomy, but for some purposes. Can BGPSec with RPKI or something else help us in this?

Alexander Azimov : BGPSec can't help us, sorry.

Alexey Uchakin : So it will be like with DNSSec, that the idea is good, but no one applies?

Alexey Semenyaka : I think about BGPSec we should ask the representative of the future, that is, Ignas. Here, who is responsible for the future, we are about the present. BGPSec is not currently in support plans for any vendor. I'm not talking about hardware - so far no vendor has added to the roadmap. We, people who are more or less related to the present BGPSec, probably find it difficult to discuss. In an ideal world, let us imagine that we have RPKI, there is an absolutely accurate database, and everyone validates everything — everyone checks RPKI, and everyone checks the consistency of what comes to what they see in the database. Then everything will work. I doubt that this was a question - but I agree that everything will work in an ideal world.

Alexey Uchakin : And if not in the ideal?

Alexey Semenyaka : And if in reality, it will not.

Alexey Uchakin : Why then RPKI?

Ignas Bagdonas : I, as looking at the future, will answer shortly: “The future will be bright.” But until this moment comes, there will be a lot of darkness, mess and other things. BGPSec and other related matters? Nothing bad at all, speaking of the academic community, BGPSec, for the most part, is an academic experiment. Yes, it looks as if it’s complete, it can theoretically work and theoretically it can solve the problems that are superimposed on it, but if we look from the practical side, then everything looks a little different. A very simple aspect: if, let's say, performance tests were done, simple performance, how validation works quickly. If I can validate 50 prefix updates per second, I get full feed. It will take me a lot more time until I fill up everything, and during this time half of everything has already changed several times. Yes, it is almost perfect all resolving mechanism. Do we need him? Probably.On the other hand, if we had a mechanism that would solve at least 80% of everything, well, well, 85%, well, at least 85.5% of the problems of those that we have practical, but did not work in some difficult and exceptional cases . I think that such a mechanism and approach would be much more practical, and vendors would implement it all and it would all be used. If we speak on the part of vendors, their answer is very simple: “Are you ready to pay as much as it will cost when we do it, as a product?” And the answer from the same operators is very non-obvious. I heard someone say "yes" in the hall, but many say "of course not." “Do not even think about it - this is your problem, you and realize it, we will buy your platform, and what it does - why should we pay something? We just think that this should be all. ” It turns out a vicious circle.Yes, we have all the protocols, all the mechanics and other things. We have databases - they are rubbish. If we add all this, then the solution seems to be there, but it cannot work purely technically when all the components are connected together. And even if it can work with the data that is in the system, again there will be no positive result. This is such a cycle and it is not very obvious how to get out of it. Yes, the IETF and other organizations have been working on BGPSec for more than a decade and it turns out that many people gave a lot of time and effort, but it turned out to be some kind of semi-finished product, if you can say so, that seems to work, but it cannot be used. What to do now? Try to bring BGPSec to the mind, practical mind, or just say that yes, it was a mistake / victory, depends on your point of view, throw it all out and do it all over again.



Martin Levy : If you take into account the 50 seconds that you called, you get about 4-5 hours to validate the complete table, which is simply unacceptable if you are an operator.

Ignas Bagdonas : Yes, yes. This is the data that was obtained at the IETF - BGPSec performance tests on modern equipment were conducted there.

Alexey Semenyaka: Modern equipment! There was a question that did not receive an answer. I will briefly say. I absolutely agree with what Ignas said about the fact that if you can filter out a large number of some simple cases, this is very useful. Looking for a silver bullet is not a method in the industry, it does not work. Work practical approaches. The story about RPKI is exactly this story. This is a story to filter out cases that are caused by thick finger syndrome. Of course, an attacker does not get around RPKI protection, approximately, nothing. But in the overwhelming majority of cases, people who measure this, who know the numbers, sit to my right and to my right. I will now give Sasha Azimov a microphone, Martin, I think, will also comment on this. The number of incidents that we see in the BGP protocol and which is caused by the “fat fingers” syndrome is huge.If it is possible to reduce it, then it should be done. As a matter of fact, it was precisely this approach that was the basis of RPKI - it is not a silver bullet and not an attempt to protect integrity from an attacker, i.e. a person who is trying to do something specifically. But, in any case, if you need to clean a whole dumpster or a small box to search for something, some kind of evidence, then the second case is much simpler. This, in particular, can help in identifying those cases when something is done intentionally, if, nevertheless, the number of unintentional cases in us will decrease, because in the current heap they are very difficult to see. Attribution of some rating attacks began quite recently. I am sure that they were before, but some proven cases of attribution, they are quite new. When it was clear that yes, it was a raiding attack,which was really carried out by intruders and they got this and that. In recent years, such cases are already the nth number, and earlier it was only at the level of suspicion, for the most part.

: I will now continue what Alexey and Martin said. Recently, they began to accuse me of having a very depressed look at BGP. In part, perhaps this is true. However, this year an event occurred which, in my opinion, will be very, very significant for the industry. For many years, there have been attempts to launch ROA validation, what we call RPKI, massively. Why is it important? Because it cannot solve the problem of faces, cannot solve the problem of malicious activity - it only solves the problem of accidental hijacks. This solves the problem of the very static leak that happens all the time. What happened in Russia not so long ago, what Cloudflare now hooked with their DNS service, fortunately, not for long. And this is a way to fight. And the good news is not that RPKI itself has been released for a long time. The problem is not onlythat an anomaly occurs, but in that it spreads. If the anomaly does not spread, the level of trouble will decrease dramatically. And, finally, the good news is that major European IXs, such as MSK-IX, including DEC-IX, including AMS-IX, are about to start dropping invalid routes in the near future, according to ROA. What does it mean?This means that if you sign your address space, that is, think about your own security, you will increase the chances that the next time an anomaly occurs somewhere, it will not carry off all or a significant percentage of your traffic, and perhaps be localized. Therefore, I strongly recommend that you sign your address space - it is not difficult. Today, with Alexey Semenyaka, after this section we will do a work shop and will try to help those who have technical questions, how to do it. Yes, we will work here exclusively for the RIPE region. In fact, RIPE did a great job and it's very, very easy to do, it took me 10 minutes. I think you can do it faster.

Alexey Semenyaka: In any case, the workshop is for those who can enter the LIR portal. If you do not have access to your LIR portal, I'm sorry. You can come too, but then you only have to watch from behind, unfortunately. For those who have access to the LIR portal, this is an opportunity to do it right today, now, here.



Martin Levy : I have nothing left but to support — this is the right direction. Update for you - AMS-IX now 100% filters announcements according to RPKI, two weeks as. All IX operators should also know about this, those who maintain the route base in their IX. You can do this using the example of AMS-IX — first, softly collect and analyze data, and then implement filtering in hardware on the RPKI and RIR data.

Alexander Azimov: This is just great news! It's one thing to say that they will only be, and another when it has already begun. There is still a significant point that, together with the beginning of active use, there is an experience of operational use of ROA validation. Accordingly, after the IXs, after the first mistakes are made, the transits will begin to tighten - I really want to believe in it.

Martin levy: And this is a key point. You invited people to study and said it was easy. Let me show the other side. For every network in this region that uses transit providers that in some way have peering in other cities in Europe, such as Amsterdam, Frankfurt or London ... I will now talk about Amsterdam, because I believe that any large network connects to Amsterdam at some point. If such a network does not have a valid IRR record, or, perhaps more importantly, RPKI records, the route will not pass through the route server. That is why you will not get the optimal traffic path. Today you can go through Frankfurt, but that will change soon. Someone here in the audience can probably say "when." Maybe the traffic will go through London, Warsaw - this is already a trend.Even if we have only one additional point, we can already say that this is a trend. And thus, getting accurate data on routes in the interests of such a network is much more now than it was 2 weeks ago. I hope that this will continue in the future, but the motivation to say: “Hey, this is easy, come and we will show” - this is one thing. In my opinion, it would be better if you say: "If you do not come to the master class, your network will not work effectively enough."your network will not work efficiently enough. "your network will not work efficiently enough. "

Alexander Azimov : In general, it is always good when we have the motivation. I'm afraid Martin will not understand this joke, but when we have a carrot both in front and behind. In our region, it works especially well.

Alexey Uchakin : Well, then this question: I correctly understand that basically the same RPKI and ROA validation and everything else - is this such an inevitable thing? The BGP protocol, which is originally trust-based and, initially, has grown so quickly, in fact, also because the protocol is based on trusting each other, as members of the community trust each other. And now we are talking about things that in general limit freedom, so to speak. Will this not be a brake on the development of the Internet in general, or is it a direct necessity-necessity, which is long overdue?

Alexey Semenyaka: Well, tell me, do the door locks severely restrict people from visiting each other?

Alexey Uchakin : No, well, I understand.

Alexey Semenyaka: Well, this is exactly what we are talking about. About the mechanisms that do not interfere with people who lead a normal activity, build networks. What we are discussing is fairly cheap technology. BGPSec and what Ignas said - in the future, but for the present it is too heavy technology. What we are discussing now is cheap technology that is similar to a door lock. Yes, in order to go on a visit, we need, first, to go out here, that is, to open the lock, to close the lock, to come, to call the lock - there they will open it for us, then they will close us. It's cheap compared to the whole trekking history, right? About the inevitability - I would like to believe. Excuse me, Arno Dniper, is he in the audience now, or has he gone out? He, like a DE-CIX representative, would like to know if there are any plans? Not?Well, MSK-IX, they definitely are here. MSK-IX Tell me, do you have plans to introduce validation?



Alexander Ilyin, Technical Director, MSK-IX: We have been conducting these experiments since last year, we simply have the task to work it out correctly not only from the point of view of validation, but also what to do with those who either signed the wrong one or did not sign at all. We want to make a toolkit that would immediately carry out explanatory work with them, as we now do for any errors that we encounter in route objects. If there is any inconsistency now, then immediately a letter is automatically sent with a request to correct this matter. In particular, the other day we even found a loop in the description of AS-SET among participants, that is, such things are quite important. This, in my opinion, is no less important than validating - and also conduct outreach work with those who do not, or do wrong.

Alexey Semenyaka : Just a question about the accuracy of information in RIPE DB. Thank you very much.Here we are witnessing history, when there is someone to control, where it is controlled - there accuracy is somehow ensured. Due to, in particular, these mechanisms, which are locally, they greatly assist the accuracy of the Routing parts of the RIR databases. Yes, the approach here, of course, should be more systematic, in my opinion. In my opinion, about “as far as it is inevitable” - I think that penetration will increase, but to expect that in the next 1-3 years this technology will get penetration close to 100%, this is very naive.

Martin levy: Yes, close to 100% - unlikely, no need to even aim. I can only say good things about MSK-IX. This is a difficult journey - you know, and I know, but if you do not start, you will never see how this path ends and where it leads. In reality, going back to the very early parts of the conversation, that once the network was very easy to join the global community, it has now become much more difficult. In the late 1990s. when you first set up BGP - it was so easy and, in most cases, just announced and working, and now we have grown up and this “naive child” should grow and start building much more complex systems. Traffic exchanges, large portions of it, are important portals to the network and at the same time tested. If you, for example, as a member of IX'a, you get a letter, where you say:"Your routing here is not very correct, the base of the paths or the RPKI settings." Very easy today to do so. You see mistakes or you see success. In this case, you generally have good chances for effective communication with the audience. At large traffic exchange points, this is just as important as at small — sometimes small ones, simply because of the scale, where it is easier to contact all exchange participants. But let's roll back a bit and talk about technology. I have not yet had a chance to say what I think about BGPSec, but Ignas expressed himself quite fully. This is an excellent academic protocol, but as a network operator, I will never use it - it is too complex and not built for real operators, but as an academic exercise. So now we, as a community, need to come to an understanding of what will be the next thingwhich we will do at the IETF. We have only one problem - lack of time. RPKI is already ten years old, if we count from the first drafts - at the end of this year there will be 10. Now we don’t have ten years to deal with improvements - we need to somehow deal with problems using what we have. I said this a bit earlier, perhaps in an ironic tone, now I will repeat it seriously: “It costs something to all of us,” such an approach. There are standard counting methods for ecommerce, let's say you are some kind of bank or payment operator, you go online and are unavailable for 5 minutes. This is absolutely real losses, in any currency, anywhere in the world - this is money. Hence our need to grow, as a community of network engineers, to the realization that today the Internet is no longer that innocuous playground,what she was 30 years ago. Now there are almost all people around the world, almost all companies in the world. We can no longer behave playfully in it - we need to become more serious, explaining to consumers why something turned off for 5 minutes. And we, it turns out, do not want to do this.

A: About 100% and striving for 100%. Is this necessary and is this not evil? Suppose we are trying to solve a problem with BGPSec or to make a new BGPSec, which solves 100% of the problems that are imposed on it. And if we don’t have the same thing that we already have, it’s also functioning in the same way? Not at all obvious. If there was a mechanism that solves most, well 80%, of fundamental problems, but what remains is solved somehow. But if in the entire global network it’s like this, let's call it the “critical mass” that most players on the network do validation, filtering - in general, they do the operating hygiene that needs to be followed - it would greatly reduce the chance of problems and those who do not. And the attacks, they would be more localized potentially with less threat,with less harm and other matters. Another comment about changes in BGP protocols, architectures and other matters: the current Internet, it is too big to change anything without breaking everything else. Yes, 30 years ago it would be possible to replace BGP with something else that solves all problems. First, at that time we did not know, did not even foresee all these problems. Secondly, now to replace BGP with something else, I personally don’t feel feasible due to the fact that we rely too heavily on BGP.at that time we did not know, did not even foresee all these problems. Secondly, now to replace BGP with something else, I personally don’t feel feasible due to the fact that we rely too heavily on BGP.at that time we did not know, did not even foresee all these problems. Secondly, now to replace BGP with something else, I personally don’t feel feasible due to the fact that we rely too heavily on BGP.



Alexey Uchakin : What to do with those who do not have facilities in RIPE? My uplink works in Europe, but it does not have any objects in the RIPE DB — it does not use it as an alternative database. What to do with those who for various reasons do not use RIPE DB?

Martin Levy : How in Russian is "Name and Shame"? "Name and Shame". Because it is the easiest answer to this. We must use the community, convince the community, of the need for improvement. This is a collective Internet - stick a finger so that someone can feel ashamed. Perhaps this is the only right way to move forward - to voice, who is bad and who is good, and how to comply.

Alexander Azimov : A counter question: is your superior operator, is he from the European region?

Alexey Uchakin: Well, formally, yes, but it works in Europe and in America.

Alexander Azimov : No, he has no objects at all? Or does it have no objects in the RIPE DB?

Alexey Uchakin : He has an object in AS, but no route objects in RIPE DB.

Alexander Azimov : Does he have objects in other bases?

Alexey Uchakin : In RADB.

Alexander Azimov : Well then, in fact, this is not such a dramatic situation as it seemed at first glance.

Alexey Uchakin : No, he simply does not use RIPE DB.

Alexander Azimov: RIPE DB is remarkable for its authorization. It has authorization for members only. There is no authorization for any external networks. It turns out, in fact, the same inscription on the fence - create objects of any kind, anyone, and so on. And this discussion is going on at RIPE meetings within the database groups: “What do we do with foreign objects?”, Continues now. We agreed to label them at least separately, so that it was immediately clear that these objects should not be trusted as much as the rest. And RADB ... in a situation when different registrars in different regions have different rules of what is and what is not, and there is such a large and fast-growing region as LACNIC, where there are no route objects at all, RADB is good. And the presence of objects there - well, well, let there be objects. Certainly better than nothing.

Alexey Semenyaka : The question was first to me, it is very pleasant for me to see exactly what is the perfect example of interaction between the community and the RIR. At first, the community vomited a microphone and said: “What do you mean, they fooled up at all?” And then I, like the RIR, can take a microphone and say that: “Yes, I completely agree.” In general, it would be nice to ask the question, for what reason, those objects that belong to the RIPE region - why they are not in the RIPE DB. Is this a religious reason, or why?

Alexey Uchakin : It is just from their experience that a lot of garbage is written in the RIPE DB, and they simply do not trust it.

Alexey Semenyaka : Wait, i.e. Do they trust themselves?

Alexey Uchakin : No, they do not trust RIPE DB.

Alexey Semenyaka: Look, the position “I do not write anything to my object, because I do not trust RIPE DB” - this sounds schizophrenic, honestly.

Alexey Uchakin : I don’t want to speak for another now, but as it is.

Alexei Semenyaka : Let's put off this discussion now, but in general it would be nice to sit down, maybe call us, and discuss everything together, how it turns out. This is a subject for discussion, but not for the whole hall.

Alexey Uchakin : Another second point: should the RIR monitor interceptions, and the correct use of objects in its region, or should it set a note for BGPMon, Qrator.Radar, for someone else?

Alexey Semenyaka: Well, look. Exactly what I said, we have to do what, strictly speaking, we were entrusted by our members. Roughly speaking, what we do costs some money, this money is somehow taken into account by membership - we bear some responsibility. We, as the RIR, see that this problem is hot, and we are ready to expand our activities in this direction. It requires, let's say, warming up the community and some kind of reaction from our working groups, from our membership, which will say: “Yes, guys, this is an important question - let us work more here. We - your members - agree that you will spend money on it. We, the working group, are ready to create appropriate policies for this. ” And we are ready. But here it cannot be a voice crying in the wilderness, there cannot be an RIR organization, an organization of 150 people, the RIPE NCC,which is registered in Dutch law, which suddenly begins to do everything and it turns out. It will not work.

Alexey Uchakin : Okay, then, in general, my themes are over, maybe someone from the audience has questions?


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