Why does the Khrunichev State Research and Production Space Committee stubbornly resist the revision of Angara?

I’ll say right away that I don’t oppose Angara, first of all Angara 1.2, I oppose the use of Angara-A5 because in the version in which it was designed it is not profitable.

In the article, I will not raise such questions as for example why the Khrunichev State Research and Production Space Center:

1. Outnumbled already decided competition.
2. He lied about the fact that it was impossible to recreate the RD-0120, it was necessary to close the zinit-like first version of the Angara.
3. I chose such a strange East / Soyuz-like layout, and even with URMs, which is not only outdated, but also creates difficulties (URMs reduce PN).
4. Wrong with the output from Plesetsk Mon to 4 tons (22 against the stated 26), to compensate for this error, it took as many as two engine speeds from 175 to 217 tons.
5. Despite the fat years, the creation of a rocket was carried out for more than 10 years, and this is despite the fact that the creation of a heavy rocket is really close to creating a light one (the advantage of a package layout), i.e. The simplest Angar 1.2 rocket has been made for more than 10 years.

Briefly and succinctly the meaning of the question can be explained by the following quote:
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“When Glushko gathered a second, extended meeting, at which he once again focused on his idea of ​​developing a unified family of carriers created from a different number of typical rocket units. Talking about this, as an illustration, Valentin Petrovich took a pack of identical pencils in his hand and began to show different versions of the future PH, clamping a different number of pencils in his hand. The audience present reacted negatively to this - the first speaker said: “We did this with M. K. Tikhonravov in 1953 when working on the“ Package ”topic at NII-4. Nothing will work out for you - it is impossible to create a family of carriers of different classes from the same blocks so that each of the carriers would be sufficiently effective in its class. "

Since the Angara district has already been created and created with great difficulty, and most importantly it already has a launch pad, to close it means to write off all the money spent on it. The military is left without independent access to space, albeit at a high price.

Making the start on the Vostochny means making the Angara the main rocket, which, given the service record of the Khrunichev State Research and Production Space Center, is expensive and dangerous, expensive because of the high cost of the rocket itself, and dangerous because the Khrunichev State Research and Production Space Center can still throw something away or delay development again.

The hopes for seriality of the rocket are rather illusory because serialization can be achieved only with the help of commercial launches, since Angara-1.2, which replaces Rokoty and Cyclones, is unlikely to be launched more than 3-4 times a year, the need for state grants is no more 3-4 per year. In total, the total equivalent Angara-A5 can be started no more than 4-5 times a year, i.e. serialization will increase long and painfully, just as long and painfully will reduce the cost of start-up.

The proposed plans for transferring production to Omsk, boosting engines, reducing hangars mass, starting at East, hydrogen second stage - will reduce the severity of the problem, but cannot solve it, because its solution is possible only by eliminating the flaws of the rocket, which despite the use of modern materials , in terms of design is very conservative, I would say archaic.

I am pleased to solve the problem of the Khrunichev State Research and Production Space Center, which the GKNPC cannot solve for many years:

1. Turning off the throttling during the first stage of the four accelerators should not only increase the UI, but also save fuel for the first stage at a height separate from the accelerators.
2. Installing the retractable nozzle nozzles and shortening the nozzle to a coefficient of 1 not only eliminates losses from over-expansion at the start and increases traction and UI, but also increases traction and UI by using retractable nozzle nozzles, this is equivalent to forcing the RD-191 by 10-15% over minimal money.
3. Powering the first stage from the side accelerators will allow the fuel to remain in the first stage, which will lead to a sharp increase in payload, according to calculations by 20-30%, which naturally leads to an equally sharp decrease in the price per kg.

All this will allow the military, the main customers of the rocket, to output satellites from the Plesetsk to the GSO, which the Proton can output from Baikonur, even though Plesetsk is not very profitable.

So that no one is upsetting, I can say that the package versions of the methane Phoenix, Rus-M, Energia-K (Energiya-K versus SLS and Energia-Buran does not look bad, but if Soyuz-5 cannot be made a workhorse, and if Mask will your monoblock BFR, then the package Energy-K will just as well lose the fight as Angara-A5 lost it to Falcon-9 and let Energy then not say that it was not warned), Falcon-9 Heavy (when I saw that Falcon-9 Heavy in multiple use option raises as much as the Falcon-9 in a one-time, but for 1.5 big money I I realized that this is a success, not like the Shuttle Space Shuttle, of course, but the same) and Delta-4 Heavy (Delta-4 Heavy has certainly stood out among them all due to ultra-green ultra-ecologically pure hydrogen and its super-green price of $ 600 million), look like same Ie, the GKNPT is not the only one - it is a general installation and, accordingly, the problem of our rocket production. Who gave the go-ahead for the creation of exclusively rocket pack layout is a separate topic that goes beyond the scope of this article.