Starting from here , slowly got to the sweet, to the most puzzling things - causality, time, the phenomenon of control and free will. At the same time, we find out whether computers can think and whether robots can have free will.

Chapter 5. Purposeful Actor

World philosophical thought is firmly stuck on the theme of the “knowing subject,” but we will have to move on and consider the subject of the actor. Cognition is an absolutely necessary component, but its benefits come only when acquired knowledge is used to achieve goals.
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Considering knowledge in isolation from its application made sense only as long as we had a habit of re-identifying information. While knowledge was considered to be a “subtle substance” stored somewhere inside the subject, it was possible to speak about the intrinsic value of knowledge. Now, when we figured out that there is no “thin substance” (see Chapter 2 ) and that there is also no objective reality for all occasions (see Chapter 3 ), we are armed with the idea of ​​the essential unity of the subject and the world (see Chapter 4 ), we can, with the right set of tools, approach the discussion of some previously unsolvable issues.

One of the hopeless philosophical questions is the question of the existence of causality, which can be formulated something like this: “What is the reason that cause-and-effect relations are observed everywhere in our world?” You can easily notice that this question is logically looped. Causality in it has become a phenomenon viewed through the prism of the category "causality." Nevertheless, this question is, and without having to do something with it, there is no way to deal with how knowledge gained by the knowing subject can in general somehow correspond to the goals that the subject is trying to achieve. .

"Why" and "why"

Asking about the reasons for this or that phenomenon, we can start the question with the word "why" or the word "why." Sometimes it happens that the question “why” does not make sense, but only the question “why” makes sense. Sometimes it's the other way around. Sometimes it happens that the question “why” and the question “why” are correct, but in this case fundamentally different answers are assumed. Let's practice a little bit:

• Question: Why is it raining?
  Answer: Cyclone arrived.
  Question: Why is it raining?
  Answer: ... no need.
• Question: Why is the light bulb on?
  Answer: I want to read.
  Question: Why is the light bulb on?
  Answer: The voltage drop on the filament at a given electrical resistance causes the release of thermal energy with a power equal to U ² / R.
• Question: Why does water flow in the bathroom?
  Answer: My hands.
  Question: Why does water flow in the bathroom?
  Answer: Because the tap is open.
• Question: Why are raspberry berries sweet?
  Answer: In order for animals to eat and spread the seeds throughout the forest.
  Question: Why are raspberry berries sweet?
  Answer: Because the glucose produced in the process of photosynthesis enters the fruit and accumulates there.

Questions in the “why” style suggest a teleological answer, that is, based on the appropriateness of the event. The natural science approach implies the abandonment of teleology or, if this is not possible, requires that any “so that” ultimately necessarily boils down to a mechanistic “because”. And it is right. Just below it becomes clear why this is done.

Let us consider how the causes and effects correlate in the “why” and “why” questions. The action of the acting subject is to put together a set of reasons that will ultimately give the desired effect. First, I reach for the switch, and then enjoy the burning light bulb. At the same time, when I reach for the switch, the light does not light up yet. And when it is on, it is no longer necessary to turn it on. When I open the faucet, there is no water jet yet. When I bring my hands to the stream, my hands are not yet washed. When my hands are washed, I no longer need to wash them. When the raspberry bush accumulates glucose in the berries, they are not eaten by animals. When the berries are eaten, the bush specifically in these berries no longer accumulates glucose. In the teleological "why" causality, the effect is always in time after the cause (congrats, we stumbled upon the concept of "time"). In terms of space, cause and effect can also be located in different places (a switch on the wall and a light bulb on the ceiling).

In the mechanistic "post-mortem" causality, the cause completely coincides with the effect both in space and in time. The power dispersion by a light bulb is expressed by the formula P = U ² / R, and in this phenomenon, that place of space and that moment of time where power P dissipates is exactly the same place of space and the same time point where there is a voltage drop U on the electrical resistance R. What is the cause, and what is the effect? If we are using a switch to control the supply voltage, and the release of energy is the desired effect, then let the voltage be the cause, and the power - the result. If the light is not enough, then we will change the light bulb to the one that is more powerful. More powerful - this means it has less electrical resistance. The reason for the increase in P will be a decrease in R. But the electric generator works in the opposite direction - there in order to get the output voltage (it will be the desired result) we apply a force (mechanical power) to the generator shaft.

The formula F = ma, known to all of us from mechanics, which connects force, mass and acceleration, also always serves the same region of space and time. In the same way, depending on the situation, we can designate the strength (for example, the strength of our muscles) as the cause, and the acceleration of the ball as the desired effect. And we can do the opposite. For example, if muscle strength is not enough to push a nail into a piece of wood, then we will organize a sharp acceleration (slowing down from the point of view of physics is also an acceleration) of the hammer, and we get the desired strength.

In physics, the arrow of time is reversible. The only place in physics where time is irreversible is the law of increasing entropy. But if you look closely at the concept of entropy, you will notice that it is very tightly tied to the fact that there is an observer who doesn’t really care in which of the many equally probable states the thermodynamic system is. From a negligibly small (compared to the total) number of states, it can benefit (including financial), but not from the rest. It is this “not all the same” that teleology is introduced into the consideration of the system, and the result is the emergence of one-pointedness of physical time.

In teleological causality, the arrow of time is irreversible. The reason is a tool that we have here and now , and which we can use, and the result is something that, when performing an action, does not yet exist. The irreversibility of time in teleological causality is due to the insuperable logical difference between "exists" and "does not exist."

Predestination vs. controllability

Despite the fact that in mechanistic causality, cause and effect are combined in time, however, time (usually in formulas denoted by the letter t) is still present in physical reality. Let's try to make teleological time with physical time.

Suppose I throw a ball in a basketball hoop. My task in my “here and now” is to give the ball such a speed and direction of motion, so that after some time it will be in the ring. While the ball is flying, I have no effect on its movement. Throwing the ball, I try to create such a predestination for a few seconds ahead, in which the probability of the “ball in the ring” event was maximum. If it is possible to create a tough no alternative predestination, then we can say that I reach out from my “here and now” to “there and then”. I transfer the desired “there and then” from the state “does not exist” to the state “exists”, which is characteristic not for the future, but for the present. From the point of view of the physical time “t”, this future has not yet arrived, and so far I am only watching the ball fly, but logically the predetermination has already taken shape, and the “ball in the ring” event is already part of my “here and now”.

Since the result of any purposeful action is always in the future with respect to the moment when the action is performed, it makes sense to say that it is this “now” expansion forward, to the future, and that is what the purposeful actor does with teleological time. He put the kettle on - created a predestination that in a few minutes there would be boiling water. Got food for dinner - made it more likely predestination for satiety until the morning. Repaired the roof - removed unwanted predestination to be flooded during the rain.

The more reliable our knowledge of the environment, the more reliably and with the more distant horizon we can build chains of predestinations. Knowledge is information. First of all, information about which levers can be pulled in our “here and now” to get the desired “later”. This, in fact, is the answer to the question "why the information."

Consider some great natural predetermination. For example, the movement of the earth around the sun. The process is sufficiently stable, and it is possible with a very high degree of accuracy to calculate the relative position of these objects, for example, a thousand years ago and, if nothing extraordinary happens, a thousand years in advance. We now have no opportunity to significantly influence this process and, I suspect, there is not even a desire to have such an opportunity. We consider complete predetermination, if not for a million years ahead, then at least for the next year. The sun rises and sets, the seasons change, and so day after day, year after year. The event “tomorrow's sunrise” can be considered future, but you can also talk about it as some present stretched in time. The earth rotates, and this is our present, stable for a very wide period of time. The Earth moves in orbit - and this, too, can be spoken not as a change in the coordinate over time, but as a kind of stable state “being in an elliptical orbit”. If someone (Ra god?) Made a decision about whether or not the Sun would rise tomorrow, then tomorrow's sunrise would not have been predetermined, and if we want the morning to come, we probably should have been concerned with giving God Ra generous sacrifice.

Understanding and accepting physical time as a kind of “present” stretched in time is strongly hampered by the intuitive idea of ​​the passage of time that we (we all, including myself) used to use our entire lives. Time seems to us either as a kind of axis along which we travel (yesterday were at the point of “yesterday”, and today moved to the point of “today”, as Emmett Brown drew in the movie “Back to the Future”), or as a kind of flow of events on us from the future and flowing into the past (Stephen King's "Langolera"). Both of these representations can not have any relation to reality. They are logically meaningless. If we assume the truth of the first view, then we have a motion of a point along the time axis, and since this is motion, then it must have speed. Specifically, one second per second. The seconds are shortened, and we get a dimensionless quantity that is always identically equal to one. It turned out complete nonsense. As for the second presentation, in this case we should speak about the speed of the flow of the time stream, which also turns out to be equal to one second per second. It turns out that in order for the watch hands to walk, cars to drive, and children grow, time must remain firmly unchanged and stable "always now." It is easy, of course, to realize that time cannot flow, but it is much more difficult to figure out what to do now with this understanding and what more correct idea to use now. Personally, I don’t know what to do with it now. The only thing I can offer is not to worry too much if these logically meaningless ideas conflict with what happens to be said.

It would be interesting to talk with professional theoretical physicists about whether physics can be reformulated so that not speed is a useful invention derived through distance and Δt, but Δt is declared a useful invention determined through the speed of light. That is, to get rid of the need for a logically meaningless background process "the passage of time at a speed of 1s / 1s."

Must apologize to fans of fantastic stories about time travel. Since time does not flow, there is no place to which the time machine should deliver us. "A place in time" now, and a million years ago, and on eternal checks afterwards, the same thing - "now." The time machine has nowhere to go.

A separate interesting case of predeterminedness is uncontrollable random events. Tossing a coin, playing roulette (not only in a casino, because an honest roulette is needed), radioactive decay, quantum reduction are examples of how the indefinite (non-existent?) Future somehow becomes definite and existing present. There may be a desire to find the source of future uncertainty in random events. At the same time, we will have a mixture of two uncertainties - teleological (until I decided where to go, right or left, both options are possible, and my task to accomplish ... perhaps, by analogy with quantum reduction, this could be called teleological reduction) and mechanistic. In order for these two fundamentally differing in nature uncertainties not to mix, I suggest that when considering the way of life of purposefully acting actors, mechanistic uncertainty be considered as predetermined, different from other predetermines in that the actor cannot find out what and how exactly will happen. Thus, we will consider everything that is not predetermined to be controlled, and everything that is not controllable , including even what happens according to the laws of purest randomness , is predetermined .

So, a purposeful actor in every point and in every aspect of his purposeful activity has:

1. Purpose. Even if the subject cannot clearly explain why he did something concrete, this does not mean that there was no goal. The deep structures of our being do not always report to the cerebral cortex for the decisions they make. In addition, the goal is not always the same, and often different aspects of our essence play us in tug-of-war, and this in no way contributes to the fact that we are always consistent and logical. When what the subject "does" does not subordinate to any goal at all (for example, having fallen out of a window, it moves to the sidewalk with an acceleration of 1g), such such "activity" can only be viewed as a realization of mechanistic predestination. A goal is information about what I want and what I don't want. Through the presence of a goal, the remarkable fact is realized that any living organism doesn’t care what happens, and any inanimate system doesn’t absolutely and completely care.
   
   
2. Opportunities. From an informational point of view, the subject should have information about what levers he has in his “here and now” for which he can pull, as well as information about how these levers relate to the fulfillment of desires. In principle, this is not two separate knowledge, but one thing, but sometimes it is appropriate to focus attention on the search for methods of influence, and sometimes on understanding of what consequences what action leads to. The main charm and the civilizational meaning of the development of the natural sciences, which study the mechanistic world, lies precisely in the fact that they give us knowledge (information) about the functioning of predetermines, and using this knowledge, we can start more and more from our "here and now" long and predictable predestination, thus reaching out to a more distant and interesting future. This was the answer to the question of why natural sciences diligently ignore teleological causality.

At the same time, what is interesting, the presence of relevant goals is a necessary condition for the knowledge of opportunities. The goal forms the context for the “physics textbook” signal, and without the context, the signal cannot become information.

The amount of knowledge that natural sciences give us should be considered not only as a set of restrictions imposed on us, but also as a collection of recipes, expanding our possibilities. Total mechanistic predestination, professed by determinists, does not follow from any physical law. Once again: there is not and cannot be a single physical law prohibiting to assert that I choose in my “here and now”, whether I should go to the right or to the left.

Calculations

In the theory of algorithms, computing is the transformation of a set of input data into a set of results according to a given algorithm. In this case, at the start of the calculation, both the set of input data and the algorithm must be fully specified. It is this interpretation of computation that is meant in the famous Church-Turing thesis.

The operation of the Turing machine from the moment of launch to the moment of shutdown is an unmanaged process, since it is completely predetermined by the set of initial data and the algorithm. Inside the computation process, nowhere does the future variability occur, which is necessary for the functioning of the actor. Consequently, such a calculation in no case can be the realization of the activity of a purposefully acting subject. In particular, the realization of human thinking.

The introduction of an element of chance into the work of the algorithm or the initial data (the use of unreliable equipment or a random number generator) also does not give us the right to consider such a calculation a realization of thinking. Mechanistic uncertainty was considered above by us as a specific variant of mechanistic predetermination.

On this subject machine intelligence could be considered closed, if not for one small observation. Somehow it happened that even now what the computers we have are doing does not fit into the classical concept of computing. Most programs for modern operating systems do nothing in their main block, except that event handlers are registered in the system. An event-driven program turns out to be open to the world, and its operation, considered as a whole, is no longer one single computation. The work of a text editor in which this text is written is no longer possible to be reproduced by the Turing machine. In order to reproduce it, you will definitely have to include it in the model for the beginning of me, and in the future - the entire Universe. At the lowest level, at the level of each event handler algorithm, everything, of course, continues to be Turing Computations, but as soon as we undertake to consider the system as a whole, we immediately get system effects, one of which is the impossibility of reproducing what is happening with the Turing machine.

Basically, a purposeful subject can be fully realized by an analogue of the Turing machine, but since it is open to the world and its functioning is not a single calculation, there is no contradiction between theory and practice.

Theorem on external goal setting

Formulation: the source of goal-setting of any system, within which the concept of “information” is applicable, is always completely transcendent in relation to the system.

In other words: whatever we consider as a system, its activity as a whole is determined by goals, the source of which is always entirely outside the boundaries of this system.

If we talk about a person, then a similar statement about external goal-setting, formulated in the mid-20th century by Victor Frankl, became the ideological basis of his method of treating existential crises, which was called “logotherapy”. Here I am generalizing the statement to any systems related to the concept “information”, and I try to prove this statement.

Evidence. Consider the system, within which there is a process that fits into the scheme " = + ". As we remember, the context is also information, and since it is also information, it also has to decompose into its own signal and its own context:
= 1 + 1
1 = 2 + 2
2 = 3 + 3
And so on. Substituting the context specification 1 into the first formula, we get:
= 1 + 2 + 2
Substituting the context specification 2, we get:
= 1 + 2 + 3 + 3
Since the signals are only circumstances whose significance appears in the context, the signals can be combined and considered as a whole:
= 123 + 3
The operation to deduce contexts from consideration with the simultaneous collapse of signals is called the operation of context reduction.

Three variants of how the resulting infinite chain of signals and contexts can be organized can be considered:

1. It can be looped, if at some point the context for the information “context _{n + m} ” becomes not the new context _{n + m + 1} , but the previously passed context _n .
2. There may be a degradation of contexts within the system as we move along the chain. In this case, having at least some distinguishable context _n , we find that the context following it _{n + 1 has} become a negligible value and can be excluded from consideration.
3. The chain of contexts can go beyond the system. That is, for example, the context _{n is} still the internal information of the system, and the context _{n + 1} does not already belong to it.

Other options are not visible. In order to prove the theorem on external goal setting, it is necessary to prove the impossibility of options 1 and 2.

The impossibility of looping. For the looping option, we have the following sequence of reductions (suppose that instead of context 3 we have a return to context 1). Given:
= 1 + 1 ( 1)
1 = 2 + 2 (2)
2 = 3 + 1 (3)
The first step (framed context detail 1):
= 12 + 2 (4)
The second step (framed context detail 2):
= 123 + 1 (5)
The third step (once again framed context 1 detail):
= 123 + 2 (6)
The signal has not changed since signal ₂ has already been taken into account in the totality of circumstances designated as “signal ₁₂₃ ”. From expressions (5) and (6) it follows that context ₁ is equal to context ₂ . Substituting context ₂ instead of context ₁ into expression (3) and context ₁ instead of context ₂ into expression (2), we get:
1 = 2 + 1 (7)
2 = 3 + 2 (8)
From this it follows that signals 2 and 3 do not play any role, and can be excluded from consideration. Thus, contexts 1 and 2, having lost the signal, cease to be information, and that information with which consideration has begun is deprived of context:
= 1 + NULL (9)
Out of context, information ceases to be information. Consequently, even from the point of view of topology, the situation of looping the context topologically seemed meaningful, it is not capable of giving the context necessary for the existence of information.

Impossibility of context fading within the system. Suppose, at a certain step n, our information capacity of the context has become a negligible value:
= 1234..n + n
  where n → 0
While we can still trace the context, the information we can have is full due to the fact that, moving along the chain, we have accumulated a large signal. But as soon as the context ceases to be distinguishable, the entire set of signals loses context and ceases to be information. Consequently, the situation of attenuation of the context within the system to zero does not give us the appearance of information.

Situation out of context of the system.
= 1234..n + n
where the context _{n is} no longer detailed due to going beyond the limits of the system in question. To detail the context _n, we would have to enter the context _{n + 1} , but we cannot do this, because it is transcendent for the system. Accordingly, the logical connective "context _n - context _{n + 1} " for the system is transcendental (that is, cross-border).

Thus, the meaning of manipulating signals 1, 2, 3, and so on up to n , can only be determined by the fact that during the objectification of the system it was rendered beyond its boundaries. Q.E.D.

In this case, note that it is not at all necessary that the power of the transcendental context _{n + 1} be grandiose. The main thing is that this transcendental context should not be null. Any small, but not negligible, size is enough to create an avalanche of contexts, which, as a result, will give very substantial information.

Before starting to productively use the theorem on external goal setting, I can not deny myself the pleasure of turning one little funny argument. I will consider my whole world as a system, that is, all the contents of my information spacesuit (I hope you have not forgotten what it is). In fact, my infoscafand is the whole world as I know it, including even what I do not know, but what I can learn. Myself, my family, my friends, as well as the whole environment, including cities and countries, the Earth, the Solar System, the galaxy, quasars and black holes - I know all this somehow, that's why it is all inside my infoscafand. Ideas about good and evil, about “good” and “bad” are also there. Even abstractions such as the Pythagorean theorem, the number pi, and, yes, the theorem on external goal setting are also nowhere else inside the considered system. Inside the considered system there is information, it’s not for nothing that the spacesuit is informational, right? Hence, the source of the meaning of the existence of all this magnificence is, and it, according to the theorem just proved, is entirely outside the considered system. I will designate the totality of what is the source of goal-setting for my world (my information spacesuit is my world), the word "God." Why not? For the meaning is quite suitable. So what can I say about this God? Well, firstly, it is outside of my world, and therefore I cannot attribute any properties to it. He can be neither good, nor evil, nor powerful, nor fair, nor ancient, nor just arisen. None No properties. But, nevertheless, it exists with necessity (yes, the proof of the existence of God has come out). Moreover, of course, he exists alone ( proof of the uniqueness of God ). Secondly, he cannot be a deliberately acting subject, since he already contained all the cumulative meaning, and as a result he himself was left without an external goal-setting (yes, at once there is also a proof that God does not exist ). Thirdly, from my practice, I know that there are other beings in the world besides me, and their infoscafandra, although they intersect with mine, do not coincide with my identity, and as a result, that for other creatures is transcendental, in my infoscapandra not transcendental. And vice versa. It turns out that how many creatures, so many Gods ( proof of the multiplicity of gods ). Accordingly, any communication, the subject of which is God, is meaningless, since the communicating subjects inevitably talk about different things. So, the result is amazing: God necessarily exists, again it is not necessarily a subject, and yet he cannot be the subject of a meaningless discussion. The question “how should one reason about God, so that reasoning makes sense for someone other than the reasoner himself?” Gets a proven answer: “None.”

In real life, of course, we almost never consider our whole world as a system. This is a very strange system - a system whose boundaries cannot be conceived (in order to think of the border, as Wittgenstein said, you need to think of things on both sides of the border, and we have all conceivable things inside). In any practical activity, the boundary of the subject by the subject itself is drawn somewhere inside the world. Here I am, and there I am no longer. The border is situationally dependent, but, nevertheless, each time in order to act on “non-me” using what is designated as “I”, it must be drawn. And each time, the source of the meaning of the fact that when the border was left was left inside, there had to be something that remained outside. Conducting the boundaries of our own “self” within our own world gives us the opportunity to talk about our own external goal-setting.

free will

In life, purposefully acting subjects can be very serious trouble, which lies in the fact that they can cease to be purposefully acting actors. The banal version of "death" associated with the destruction of the system, I will not consider, not because it is scary, but because it is not interesting. With death, and so everything is clear. Two other options (we denote them as “loss of subjectivity” ) are much more interesting:

1. Loss of external goal setting. A terrible thing. Existential crisis. Subjectively, it is perceived as “I want nothing”, “nothing can be changed”, “there is no need to live”, “there is no hope”, “now it’s all the same”. One of the typical causes of suicide. A subject without external goal setting cannot be purposefully operating, and therefore even if he is afraid to voluntarily die, he still rather quickly turns into an empty shell, which simply exists as an inanimate object. Fortunately, external goal-setting can be restored, and then the subject regains the ability to act purposefully, and again becomes herself. Or not by yourself. If we get lucky.
   
   
2. Slavery. When the only source of the whole goal-setting of the subject is another subject, the unfortunate becomes the instrument of his master. Entirely owned property. It is not so important to whom or to what the subject fell into slavery - as an independent being, he no longer needs to be considered. Interacting with this already, in general, not a subject, you need to understand that the real subject of interaction in this case is the master, and the slave is merely a technical detail that simplifies or complicates the interaction. The worst misfortune in the life of a slave is the loss of the master. In this case, he finds himself in a situation of losing external goal setting, thus losing even the ghostly subjectivity that he had.

Slavery in our enlightened age among people is not so often complete. Temporary slavery is more common, when a person sells his time for livelihood (in fact, a part of life, since time and life are one and the same thing) and become a cog in the system. “We do not solve anything here,” “I simply execute the order,” “when making decisions I should be guided solely by job descriptions and the letter of the law” - all these are characteristic signs of slavery. Yes, having finished the working day and taking off his cap, the slave ceases to be a slave and becomes a loving husband, a caring father, an excellent comrade and a caring citizen, but this in no way negates the fact that, being "in execution", he is not an independent purposeful actor , and is only the executive mechanism of the owner.

A deliberately acting subject, no matter who he is, even though a man, even an animal, even a blade of grass, is always a creature, stretching from its “here and now” through the creation of predestination into the future, and transforming a non-existent future into an existing present. In fact, we can talk about the global flow of acts of creation, constituting the essence of each “here and now” of each being. But the transformation of a non-existent future into an existing present takes place only if the activity of the subject itself is not already created predetermination. The executive mechanism, “simply carrying out the order” or “exactly following the provisions of the instruction”, does not produce any creation. It is merely a way of realizing the already running mechanistic predestination. Thus, free will is not only desirable to a purposeful actor, it is an absolutely necessary condition for the being to be spoken of as a subject. We are ourselves only to that extent, in those aspects of our existence, only there and only when we build our own future. That is when we are free.

It may seem that the need for freedom is part of a logical contradiction with the theorem on external goal setting. No way. After all, the loss of subjectivity through slavery or the complete loss of external goal-setting or slavery is, fortunately, a long list of the vital states of the subjects.

Consider the situation of the "servant of two masters." Suppose the whole life of a certain woman is divided entirely between work, where she is the faithful slave of her boss and the house, where she is the faithful slave of her husband. Slavery and at work, and at home, with a break for sleep and travel in public transport. Does the situation change anything when instead of one master the subject has two masters? In this and in another case, our unfortunate tool, which is simply exploited, is simply the exploitation sessions divided by time. While our model is simply spinning like a squirrel in a wheel, no freedom arises. But as soon as she enters into practice at least a little to taxi priorities (if she is at work, she decides to stay for an hour, and if she does general cleaning in the evening, she decides to work harder at work), then a small loophole is formed, through which our ward receives her own free will. The husband, of course, is shocked by the fact that his slave dared to take away from him a whole hour of his property. The chief frowned too, but he doesn’t know yet, to threaten with heavenly punishments for reducing the output, or while delaying. Yes, the goals of goal setting are still the same, there are still two of them, and they continue to function as before, but the management of priorities has ceased to be rigidly defined. The slave, who began to manage the amount of his property to his master, is no longer quite a slave.

A full-fledged person who does not turn anyone’s language to be called a slave is not at all that person who does not have an external goal setting (this is impossible according to the theorem), but one who has dozens or even hundreds of goal setting goals. The need to steer constantly with complexly interfering priorities creates an illusion, including for the subject himself, that he defines all his goals for himself exclusively. And there is a fair amount of truth in this, since only the subject himself can be appointed as the master of the priority management process. Thus, the need for freedom does not contradict the theorem on external goal setting.

Now consider the situation not from the point of view of the slave, but from the point of view of the slaveholder. The motivation to have a slave for yourself is simple and obvious. Observing what interesting things do purposefully acting subjects create with their free will, a potential slave owner wants all the same to happen in favor of "me, the beloved." Having closed the goal-setting of the subjects, the owner receives not just a primitive piece of a soulless mechanism, but an instrument of unimaginable complexity, which has just demonstrated the wonders of creation. But almost immediately, having received a slave, the newly-made owner receives a “surprise”: miracles cease to occur. The transformation of a non-existent future into an existing present is a function of free will, and when the whole goal-setting of the subject closes on one source, the free will ceases to exist.

Dreaming about the creation of artificial intelligence, we dream that the technology has reached such a level of development that it is possible for us to receive in our complete use of man-made slaves, able to independently solve complex and non-standard tasks. Not just to implement pre-programmed predetermination, but to make decisions independently in difficult situations. Creatively address the challenge of ensuring our insatiable need for comfort. But a slave, whose goal-setting source is completely closed to the master, is not able to create the future, much less make decisions. The task is self-contradictory. Either we get a creature capable of creating purposefully acting, but at the same time we are far from being the only sources of goal-setting, or we get the next version of the programmable calculator. Difficult choice. Arguing about the problem of creating artificial intelligence, it is impossible to lose sight of this unexpectedly discovered aspect.

Chapter Summary

In this chapter, the most difficult philosophical categories are intertwined in a single tangle - causality, time, predestination, and free will. It makes sense to once again go through the resulting logical structure:

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