This publication is the fourth part of the series, the beginning of which is here .

Summary of the previous series. At first, we figured out that information cannot be spoken of as matter, that matter be material and material information should not be. Then a logical construction was presented to the attention of the curious public, which allows one to speak of the existence of information so that if its “borrowing” on matter occurs, it is extremely accurate and correct. In order to move further, we had to invent a special tool to substantiate the existence of objects of reasoning, which was described in Chapter 3 . Now we come to the concept of "system". To whom it is interesting - you are welcome under the cat.

Chapter 4. Systems

In order to take the next step and approach the topic “why information?”, We need to learn how to talk about purposeful actors. And for this you need to learn to talk about systems. But first, we will consider a very curious subject of “objectification”, which is interesting to us not so much by itself, but rather as a way to get to the concept of “system” on the right side.

Objectification

It so happened that we are not very good at talking about the Universe in its entirety of its many aspects. Rather, it does not work at all. We have to grab pieces out of the all-encompassing reality, and consider them separately. Operate immediately with all reality in their own interests also fails. It is necessary to operate with separate fragments. The result of this unique piece-by-piece approach is our extremely strong illusion that the world in which we live is intrinsically composed of objects. Out on the street, we see houses, trees, people, animals, cars, stones and other objects. In the mirror we see ourselves, and we also consider ourselves as one of the objects existing in the world. It seems to us that the division of the world into objects that we are accustomed to using is an innate property of objective reality. It would seem, how could it be otherwise?

Of course, it could be otherwise. Suppose a stone lying on the road. We can see him, we can talk about him with a friend, and even if he is not too heavy, we can lift his hand and throw him out of the way. But still, the isolation of a stone is in some way an illusion.


There are two closely intertwined families of reasons that lead us to believe that stones as separate objects exist:

1. We regularly find ourselves in situations where we need to scatter or collect stones. Inside the situation, when we need to drive, and this thing lying on the road prevents us from doing this, it is very useful to have the fact that "stones exist." Thus, the existence of stones is easily justified by a situational-dependent rationale.
   
   
2. We ourselves are such beings for whom operating with pieces of reality that have such scales and properties is not only useful, but possible. A stone is such an object that is sufficiently stable so that we can see and comprehend it, and be hard not to crumble in our hands. In addition, it is safe enough so that we can take it in our hands without the risk of instantly burning or dying from the action of contact poison. There is nothing surprising in the fact that, probably, in all human cultures there is a special word for such objects.

We take for granted the seemingly natural objectivity of the pieces of reality, which are in a solid aggregate state of matter, especially if they can be separated from their surroundings without much effort. Much worse is the case with liquids, gases and fields, for which only very tentatively one can say where exactly the object begins and where it ends. The situation with the objectiveness of intangible objects is absolutely disgusting. For example, with types of income, types of offenses, genres of musical works and other such things.

Objectively, I will call the process, the result of which is the declaration of a certain piece of reality as a separate object.

Objectification is always a subject-dependent and situational-dependent process. Dependence on the subject is due to the fact that the subject can perform only the objectification to which he is adapted, and the situational situation is due to the fact that, depending on the situation in which the subject is located, he can separate different objects from the same reality. My favorite example is a glass of water. If I ask you to bring me a glass of water, I expect to get a vessel filled with liquid. And when I drink a glass of water brought to me, in this case only liquid is already a glass of water. I do not have the desire or the ability to use a glass vessel inside. Within seconds, the boundaries of the “glass of water” object changed, but for some reason this does not even surprise me at all.

The world itself is not made up of objects. Objects in the world “appear” only when a subject comes into the world and, based on its tasks and capabilities, performs objectification.

I would venture to suggest that objectification is one of the lowest-level operations performed by the brain. Until we have allocated an object, we cannot build any statements about it, and therefore objectification precedes any logic. As long as there is no object, we have nothing to ascribe properties, and on the basis of these properties include the object (which is not yet) in the classification. Therefore, objectification must precede any mathematics based on set theory. Objectification is in many ways similar to the problem of pattern recognition, but still it is not pattern recognition, because before starting to recognize anything, it is desirable to objectify this “something”. Even for making the simplest decision from the category of “chasing it or crawling away” it is advisable to “objectify” it first.

A separate interesting question is whether objectification is an indispensable condition for any information process. On the one hand, of course, it gives the information objectivity (information becomes "ochemno"). On the other hand, objectification in no way follows from the “signal-context” construction, and therefore nothing prevents us from considering informational terms, for example, a process of simplest regulation for which the introduction of “objects” is not necessary or even harmful.


Centrifugal regulator that works, but does not objectify anything

If you pay close attention to our own interaction with the outside world, you can easily find that we objectify far from everything. For example, if you put a stone on your palm and keep it on weight without letting it slide, you can pay attention to the fact that at least all components of this situation can be described in words (stone as an object, hand as an object, holding on weight as an objectified action and . p.), but you can not do this. In our daily life, we perform quite a lot of actions quite meaningfully, but we do not need objectification for their implementation. Moreover, the attempt to deliberately decompose what is happening into its constituent parts and inside it all to “speak out”, can spoil everything by absolutely unnecessary weighting. Maybe when we learn to hold a stone on weight, it is useful for us to understand the angle of the arm as a separate measurable object, but when we have already learned how to do this, our already trained internal regulatory mechanisms begin to cope perfectly with the task without any objectification.

The subject of “objectification”, among other things, clearly demonstrates one serious problem that we should never lose sight of. Initially defining philosophizing as a search for a language suitable for use in various situations, we immediately found ourselves in a situation of the need to use objectification. We have no pre-objectification of the way of verbal communication, and this introduces a significant distortion. For example, if we argue about the centrifugal regulator shown above in the picture, we will first have to decompose this system into separate parts, and then describe how they interact. Even if we abstract away from the details of the implementation, we will still have to argue about how the speed of rotation of the shaft of the steam engine is stabilized by feedback through the mechanism for regulating the supply of steam. At the same time, both the “rotational speed” and the “feedback” and the “regulation of steam supply” are quantifiable, though abstract, “informational”, but still objects. From our external to the system of human point of view, we have a set of objects, but if we try to look at the situation of regulating the steam supply from the inside , we can find out that there are no objects inside this little information spacesuit. Or it can be found if the flap control is implemented using a microcontroller, the program for which is written in an object-oriented programming language.

Arguing about different things, we will try not to forget that, apart from the position of the contemplating, reasoning and, as a result, objectifying being, in which we are, by necessity, we can have the right to exist sometimes a much more adequate view from the inside , and there are no objects there not to be. The example given in the previous paragraph with a control program written in an object-oriented programming language illustrates an ideological trap into which, due to a misunderstanding of the differences of positions “from the outside” and “from the inside” , information technologies that we have now have fallen. Until now, it continues to be considered that information systems will be effective if they reflect as closely as possible what is happening in the real world. Since we do not know any other real world besides the one we perceive as objects, then, following logic, it seems to us desirable that the computer operate with the same concepts with which we ourselves operate. Thus, we ourselves carry out objectification and present its result to the computer in a finished form. After that, any system developed using object-oriented technologies turns out to be the materialization of the specific situation in which the designer was at the time of inventing the object model. When the situation changes (not “if”, namely “when”, because the situation changes constantly), that mountain of program code that was developed under the model that has not become adequate, either goes to the trash, or becomes a headache that is constantly fraught with problems the pains. As a result, we are surprised to see how the impressive progress of the hardware is more than offset by the increase in the heaviness and slowness of the software. The same tasks that used to be slowed down on the Pentium-100 are now similarly slowed down on the Core i7, and this is not always possible to explain this by increasing the functional richness of the programs, because in many cases the functionality has remained without visible changes. It is very difficult to explain why it is not at all necessary to try to drag inside the system in its original form that logic, which we expect to then observe from the outside .

In addition, by laying the objectification we had previously performed in the computer, we deprive him of the slightest chance to perform this basic operation ourselves. After that, we should not complain that the computer cannot demonstrate any understanding to us in principle. Following traditional approaches to building information systems, we are doomed to explain in detail to a computer what he should do and how . Some of the initial approaches to qualitatively new technologies that allow programming of goals, rather than sequences of actions, can be considered the rapidly developing topic of “deep machine learning”. It is there, in the inner layers of an artificial neural network, that something happens that you can quite confidently call your own objectification.

Consistency

When we talk about systems, we usually focus on the following points:

1. Systems are composite objects, that is, they consist of objects into which they can be decomposed.
2. Inside the system, elements interact. That is, we can speak not only about the constituent parts, but also about the relations between them.
3. The system as a whole has at least one property that is absent in its elements (a phenomenon known by different names as “integrative property”, “synergy”, “holism”, “emergence”, “system effect”).

We will move up this list from the bottom up, because the system effect is fascinating in it. My favorite example to illustrate this phenomenon is the ax. An ordinary carpenter's ax, which, as is known, consists of a sharp iron piece (it is also called an “ax”), a wooden ax and a wedge, with the help of which the iron piece is fixed on the ax. The ax as a whole has the property “it is convenient for them to chop wood”. If we consider the component parts, then with an iron thing, of course, you can also somehow try to chop wood, but this is completely inconvenient to do. Monstrously uncomfortable. Don't even try. Wood handle (ax) chopping wood is absolutely impossible. I don’t even want to remember about the wedges. But when all the parts are properly assembled together, the resulting product is very convenient to chop wood. Where is the property “convenient to chop firewood” when the ax is taken apart? It looks like nowhere. He simply does not. Where does it disappear if the ax is taken apart? It looks like nowhere. You can, of course, try to attract the law of conservation to this situation (“nothing comes out of nowhere and disappears into nowhere”), but the result will be deplorable. We'll have to assume that somewhere in the world there is some kind of twilight container, from which in the manufacture of an ax one of the ax shower “souls” infiltrates into the almost finished product (and then, after disassembling the ax, it returns there). It turns out so wild esotericism that even the most reckless mystics would be ashamed to voice it. And all this despite the fact that we know exactly how the ax works and works. It works very simply, and for a complete understanding of what is happening, we don’t need to involve extra entities at all. The only entity about which we still must not forget - this is the subject, which, in fact, it will be convenient to chop wood. While the subject is forced to objectify the constituent parts separately, he cannot get the integrative property useful for him on the disintegrated set of parts, but after the product is assembled, it is objectified with the existing (“arisen”) systemic object objectified.

You can play with the thought that the functioning of our thinking (consciousness, mind, soul, etc.) can also be referred to as a systemic effect arising on the totality of the constituent parts of our brain. If this is so, then in the discourse on the soul separate from the body there is no more sense than in the discourse on the introduction of separately existing convenience of cutting wood into the manufactured ax. In addition, it becomes clear why the great mystery of thinking does not allow us to unravel not the weakness of the microscopes, with the help of which we study the construction of nerve cells, but what we have not yet learned enough to talk about systemic effects. If consciousness is a macro effect, then, descending to the micro level, we inevitably release the macro effect from consideration.

Some philosophers like instead of the system effect to talk about the transition from quantity to quality. It seems to me that there is some non-saying. The system effect is not necessarily the transfer of quantity, and it is not necessarily the transition to quality. If, for example, we take at least a thousand piece of iron-ax, we will not collect from them an item that is convenient for chopping wood. Apparently, for the appearance of quality, sometimes it is not the quantity that is needed, but something completely different. The end point of the transition is not necessarily quality either. From the point of view of the lumberjack, it is the assembly of the ax that gives the quality, and from the accountant’s point of view, who keeps records at the factory that produces the axes, the assembly of the ax gives only +1 in the debit of the account “Finished goods”.

Let's look at the next in order (moving along the list from the bottom up) the moment at which attention is usually paid when considering systems, namely that the elements of the system interact with each other. Many examples of systems can be cited, parts of which do not interact with each other. For example, a word consists of letters and has an emergent property (word meaning) that is not a simple sum of the values ​​of the letters. At the same time it is meaningful to say that the letters in the word interact with each other somehow, there is no possibility. To this one can, of course, argue that systems, whose elements do not interact, are observed from the “outside” position. And if the system is objectified and is observed from the “outside” position, then it can always be said that in reality it is not a system at all and represents the illusion that has developed in the subject. There are two counter arguments to this:

1. If the existence of a system in a particular situation is the primary fact (situationally-based justification), then what “fact” can we talk about?
2. We can observe a system not connected by interactions not only from the outside, but also from the inside, being a part of it. For example, a security guard may perceive the security system as a whole even if the lack of interaction between its individual elements is obvious to him. The interaction is possible only between objects of the same nature. Elements of the security system can be installed on the windows of the lattice (material objects) and adopted in the organization regulations for the replacement of door locks (information object). The interaction between these objects is obviously impossible.

The concept of "system" was formed at the time when the systems were called composite material products. Speaking of a material product assembled as a whole, it is really difficult to do without recognizing that the parts must be physically connected into one whole. But if we talk about the non-material system (natural language as a sign system, legislation as a system for regulating social relations, the monetary system as the foundation of market relations, etc.), then it is quite possible to do without the requirement of interaction between the parts. If the analysis of the links between elements of the system helps to understand what is happening, then it can be recommended, but if it interferes, then you do not need to worry much about the fact that one of the central tenets of the past “system approach” inherited from the great cyberneticists has to be broken. After all, there are many interacting objects in the world that do not form systems by themselves simply because there are no situations in which their objectification as a whole could be something useful for us. Let us never worry again if it suddenly turns out that the elements of any of the systems we are considering do not interact with each other. The appearance of systemic effects often does not interfere.

The last (if upwards) essential point is that the systems are composite entities. In this regard, it makes sense to prove two statements:

Assertion 1: if we have observed the appearance of a system effect in an object, then the object in question is composite . Just by definition, the system effect as a property inherent in the whole, but absent in its component parts. If an object is indivisible, then it is impossible to speak of any system effects.

Assertion 2: if we have stated the fact that an object is a compound, then a systemic effect should be observed at this object . This follows from the fact that if we are inside such a situation in which we have a need to objectify a set of component parts as a single whole, then this need can be formulated only in terms denoting a systemic effect arising on the whole.

Thus, the decomposability of systems and the appearance of a systemic effect are a pair of properties that are mutually necessary and sufficient conditions for each other. Therefore, they are different formulations denoting the same phenomenon. For definiteness, let's call it systemic .

Interestingly, statements 1 and 2 formulated remain valid not only for the objectification of the system from the “from the outside” position, but also for the objectification from the “from the inside” position.

Sometimes, speaking of systems, hierarchicality is distinguished as a significant moment. That is, if something consists of components, then these components can also be decomposed, and therefore are also considered not as objects, but as subsystems, consisting in turn of sub-subsystems, and so on. It seems to be logical, but it is useful to remember that the mechanism of objectification, through the work of which we have both the system itself and its component parts, is situationally dependent. And this means that when we proceed to the decomposition of subsystems into sub-subsystems, we have already left the situation of the initial objectification of the system and its initial decomposition, and now we are held hostage to the choices we made then. The decomposition criterion applied in the first step cannot be applied in the second, since it has completely exhausted itself. At the second step, another criterion has to be applied, and as a result, the two-level hierarchical decomposition inevitably results from the mixing of two different principles, aggravated by the fact that the second criterion is voluntaristly placed in the "submission" to the first. Based on my extensive and varied experience of practical work with hierarchical structures, I can say that I have never met a single hierarchy, free from logical inconsistencies and related serious inconveniences.

Hierarchy is an imaginary property of systems, appearing as a result of logical errors in approximately one hundred percent of cases, and in approximately the same number of cases, it promises only trouble. The emergence of a hierarchy in any reasoning about systems is a good excuse first thing to do is search for errors. Even with tree trees, not everything is as simple as it seems. Those who claim that trees are certainly tree-like have simply never seen their roots.

Not systems

It may be the wrong impression that everything can be considered as a system at all, since the decomposability of any things is just a matter of having a suitable cutting tool. If this were the case, then the “is system” property would be applicable to everything, anything, and thus would be completely emasculated. It is permissible for poets to make general statements in the style of “all vanity and longing of the spirit”, but with sound reasoning we should understand that we have the right to use the term “vanity” only if we somehow find something that is not vanity, and even then with full right we can, in contrast with the vanity of no-vanity, consider the vanity of vanity. With the consistency of systems is about the same. For correct consideration of systemicity as air, we need to find objects that are not systems.

In the material world to look for such items is useless.In the material world, everything is sawed into pieces, and the question, as mentioned above, is only in the presence of a suitable saw. Even that which cannot be physically separated can be logically separated. Truly indivisible (atomic) are objects having a zero size. That is the point. Inside the point nothing fits, so the point cannot be divided. And since it is impossible to separate it physically or even logically, then there can be no talk about any system effects (properties that are present in the whole point but absent in ... what?). Examples of points:

1. Geometrical point in space. For example, the vertex A of a triangle ABC. Or the center of the circle. Or the point of intersection of two straight lines. Interestingly, a point, despite its zero size, may have properties. For example, the property of equidistance from all points of the circle.
   
   
2. . , , . , . , – , . , . - : «10». -, . , , .
   
   
3. . - ( ), , « » « ». « » – , « » – . « , , » – . « , » – .

Examples with geometric points and numbers were needed only to show that the search for atomic things is not such a hopeless task as it seemed at first. The real interest is, of course, identity. Let us dwell on them in more detail.

There are situations that require handling identities. "Call your phone to your employee, who yesterday came to us", "Bring the piece of paper on which is written", "it comes from the same city as me," "RISE UP! The cost of the samean article that was written off last month. ” Replacing the operator “the same” with “the same” in these statements completely distorts the meaning. There are situations when identity is not important, but properties are important. In the phrase “may the same intelligent employee come to us tomorrow as he was last week” you can replace “the same” with “the same”, but this will be an extra restriction narrowing the circle of possibilities. There are situations when handling identity is impossible. In the phrase “buy the same tomatoes as yesterday” it is impossible to replace “the same” with “the same”. "Those" tomatoes are already bought and eaten, and once again they can not be bought in any way.

When considering any system for the period of our attention to it, we will certainly fix its identity. If at each next moment we assume that this is not the samethe very object that was a moment ago, we will only stunned to look at the kaleidoscope in no way connected with each other frames. Even if an object is changeable (for example, a jet of water in which water itself is replaced every second), this does not prevent us from stabilizing it with identity, and as a result we can have an opportunity to reason about this object. For example, about a stream of water we can say that it is too strong, and we should make it a little quieter. In this situation, we are not at all confused that the water molecules are constantly changing. The “water jet” object itself turns out to be the object with which it is possible to interact and which can be controlled with the help of a water tap. The identity of “this stream of water”, which we attribute to an objectified piece of reality, is in its essence a logical point, an object of zero size.The water jet is a constantly changing system, and the logical point “this particular water jet” assigned to it is a stable non-system.

There is no mysticism in the concept of identity. Mysticism appears as soon as we try to re-establish identity. Where is the water jet? Right here, it flows out of the faucet and goes into the sink. Where does the identity of “this stream of water” exist, which has the properties of a point of zero size? Eeee ... In the center of the exit section of the pipe? Or put it in the center of mass of the jet? And the one and the other is completely superfluous voluntarism. Perhaps a logical point is better placed in the head of the observer? Maybe, but in whose head we will put it, if two are looking at the jet? In general, the logical point is logical and that it does not need to be placed anywhere in space. We are perfectly able to operate with logical points without any placement in the physical space.

To operate with logical points is to use them when constructing statements. We know that the Volga flows into the Caspian Sea. In order to say this, we took the logical point “Volga River” (the Volga itself is, of course, not a single point, but a huge system, but the identity of the Volga River is a point) and linked it to the logical point “The Caspian Sea »Logical (predicate) bundle" flows ".


Systems: Volga and the Caspian Sea


Logical points: the Volga and the Caspian Sea.

We cannot use the objects themselves in the statements. Only their designations. Logical points. Identity.

Identities have no concrete physical incarnation. Any physical incarnation implies a non-zero size and, as a result, internal content. The logical point has no size. That is what it is valuable to us. All attribution of properties to an object thus fixed is performed by predicate constraints.

When we classify an object or a phenomenon, we thereby construct a link connecting the identity of the object with the set. This apple is tasty, it belongs to many tasty things. Angelina Jolie - beautiful, she belongs to many beautiful creatures. Socrates is a man (like Angelina Jolie), he belongs to a multitude of "people." There is no reason to think that the nature of the set at the moment when this set is used in the predicate bundle is somewhat different from the nature of the object on the other side of the bundle. Thus, each set is also not only something big and complex, but also a logical point to which the ends of connections are attached. The ligament instance, in turn, is a composite entity (a point at one end, a point at the other end, the meaning of the ligament),but as soon as we want to somehow characterize this instance itself by some characteristic (for example, “this is true” or “this is a lie”), we do this again with the help of the predicate connective, at one end of which we have an instance of the predicate connective, and on the other - the value of the characteristic. The most interesting and frequently used values ​​in this plan are “truth” and “false”. Which, naturally, are logical points with this use. By identities. “What is truth?” Philosophers inquire. I do not know what truth is, but then I know what truth is. This is a logical point to which the predicate cords, which characterize the reliability of statements, are attached.at one end of which we have a copy of the existing predicate ligament, and at the other end, the value of the characteristic. The most interesting and frequently used values ​​in this plan are “truth” and “false”. Which, naturally, are logical points with this use. By identities. “What is truth?” Philosophers inquire. I do not know what truth is, but I know what truth is. This is a logical point to which the predicate cords, which characterize the reliability of statements, are attached.at one end of which we have a copy of the existing predicate ligament, and at the other end, the value of the characteristic. The most interesting and frequently used values ​​in this plan are “truth” and “false”. Which, naturally, are logical points with this use. By identities. “What is truth?” Philosophers inquire. I do not know what truth is, but I know what truth is. This is a logical point to which the predicate cords, which characterize the reliability of statements, are attached.This is a logical point to which the predicate cords, which characterize the reliability of statements, are attached.This is a logical point to which the predicate cords, which characterize the reliability of statements, are attached.

It may seem that by virtue of their internal emptiness, identities are completely useless things in the household. We, in the end, may be interested in the Volga River itself, and not some abstract internally empty logical point “Volga River”. But the sense in the ability to operate with the concept of identity is already if only because as soon as we try to assert at least something about the Volga River, we are already starting to use this strange pinpoint object. The very fact of the universal use of identities in the predicate connectives allows, through a situational-dependent rationale, to assert that identities exist. Of course, not as tangible (it would be a reification), but as intangible objects.

There are a number of phenomena that cannot be adequately discussed without the involvement of the notion of “identity”. For example, love. True love, going through the years, circumstances and the variability of the properties of the object of love - this is an intention for identity, and not a set of properties. The intention to set a property is just a momentary combination of consumer preferences, and such a desire is not love, of course. Whatever love we take - a man's love for a woman, a woman for a man, a parent for a child, a child for a parent, for his family, for his city, for his people, for the country, for his business, or even a dog's love for his owner In any case, this inwardly empty logical point must be considered as the object of love in the first place.Otherwise, directly and reliably observable facts do not add up to the system and appear before us as some kind of absurd phantasmagoria. The adoption of identity as an object of love can be argued that the mother who loves the child, and even more so the dog who loves the owner, does not think about any clever things like logical points of zero size and the applicability of the predicate calculus. Of course it is. But it is not important.The planets also have no idea about the masses or the squares of distances, but this does not prevent Newtonian mechanics from giving an accurate and adequate description of their movement.

Of particular interest to us is our own identity, denoted by us as our own "I." Is it possible to consider this very “I” as an inherent self-identity of each of us? I do not see a single obstacle to this. If we have to speak of “I” as a logical point, then immediately a series of very funny consequences arise, of which the most curious to me are the immortality of this very “I” and the solution of the problem of self-awareness. If the "I" is regarded as a logical point, then this point does not cease to exist when the body is destroyed. Predicative connectives change significantly (supplemented by the predicate “died”, and a number of predicates, for example, “you can invite to tea”, go out of use), but the logical point itself remains intact. The logical point is indestructible.

As for self-consciousness, if we consider the “I” as an identity, nothing prevents us from considering the subject’s ability to operate with the concept of self-identity as self-consciousness. This immediately removes from the problem of self-consciousness all the adherence of stilted mysticism that has stuck to it and translates the reasoning into a purely constructive course. Do other people exist beings that can operate with the concept of their own identity? Obviously, yes, because having an understanding in the style of “this is me, and this is no longer me” is useful for organisms in many different situations, including even such a banal thing as eating. Are there creatures that do not have self-awareness? It is difficult to say, but if operating with one’s own identity does not come in handy for the functioning of any system, then it is quite possiblethat she has no mechanisms for that.

Examples of technical systems that operate and do not operate with the concept of self-identity:

• The Wi-Fi adapter knows its MAC address and, listening to the broadcast, accepts only those packets that are intended for this address. It is not unreasonable operating its own identity.
• Desktop calculator. To perform calculations, it is not necessary for him to operate with his identity. If the identity of the calculator is still needed for some reason (for example, to account for a low estimate), then the accountant will paste the inventory number. The glued paperwork, although it will add identity to this subject, but the internal mechanisms of the calculator do not “recognize” this. External identity will appear, but the handling of one’s own identity will not.

It’s a pity, of course, to reduce such a sacred thing as our precious self-consciousness to the fact that in the simplest case it is implemented by two lines of program code (I myself have done this many times), but it is even worse when a simple and useful solution of the question is embedded in the verbal swamp of mystical conjectures.

Boundaries

So, we have a very interesting picture. At the output of the process of objectification, we have systems (for example, the Volga River), which are immediately supplied with identities (respectively, the “Volga River”). Immediately we have two in one. The basis is a logical point, but all the operation with this point is in manipulations with the predicate connectives attached to it. As well as predicates tied to mates of the original predicates. And more predicates of ligaments. The forest of ligaments is growing, and if we do not stop in time, it will swallow the whole world, because already at the second step we reach the logical point “truth”, from where we can go anywhere wherever we go through the question “what is truth?” But what can we say, even at the first step through the question “why do I need this object?” We reach our endless and comprehensive “me”.

If we each logically expand to the whole world, then this, of course, is a dead end. We have to stop somewhere. But where? In the minimal case, we have the identity itself, but identity is not a system. The system appears only when something else is attached to the point. Perhaps, the system should consider only a set of predicates directly attached to the identity under consideration? Not very good either. Why only them? Why the chain "ABC" is not considered a link "A-C"? In general, finding the unique and only true boundary of any system is a task that initially had no solution. Fortunately, usually at the output of the process of objectification, we get not only identity, but also a lot of clues as to how in this particular situation we should draw a boundary. It’s time to remember that objectification always functions as a subject-dependent and situational-dependent process, and if we now clearly and correctly draw the border as we had, it doesn’t follow that in a minute in a slightly changed situation this border will remain so same correct.

Consider a system like the cat Murka. First, it has a fluffy body that takes place in physical space. If we just want to stroke her, and she does not run away from us, then this can be limited to. Here is a cat, come and iron. If we want to feed it, then it’s necessary to take into consideration, first of all, not the body (it can walk somewhere, but where it’s specific - it’s not even important), but information about what food is suitable for cats. If we have a desire to shelter her, then we must first be interested in whether the predicate “ownerless” applied to this cat is true. And, of course, a lot of other predicates describing the nature, health (worms !!!), accustoming to cleanliness, possible pregnancy (do you want a kitten problem right away?) And so on. Taking a cat into a house is not just dragging a few kilograms of live weight across the threshold. This is the entry into symbiosis, and, perhaps, not only with the cat, but also with Toxoplasma. To confine in this case the presence of a physical body is an unpardonable frivolity.

If you ever see in the popular science news headline “Scientists have created a cat model,” be sure to ask whether this model takes into account relationships with people, mice, dogs, symbiosis with microflora, the development of the cat food industry, the progress of veterinary medicine, and so that surprises do not arise, especially in some countries, the features of legislative regulation of pets. And then, you know, without taking all this into account, any cat model is not substantially complete. If you ever read the same news that “in 50 years it will be possible to create a model of the human brain,” just laugh. The brain in isolation from his brain, habitat - is about nothing. And the habitat of the brain is the whole world, as we know it, without exception, including the brains of hapless experimenters.

Now consider as a system itself. As a basis, of course, we take our identity, that is, the logical point denoted by the word "I". I have a physical body. Immediately an interesting question arises, what should I consider the physical body of my "I". In some cases, you can limit yourself to the brain, or even to the cortex of its large hemispheres, because it is there that the apparatus, which is thought to be located, is located. It turns out beautifully - signals on the nerves at the entrance, signals on the nerves at the exit, but something is missing. For example, if I say "I was sitting in a chair, and then I moved to the sofa," then it would be nonsense, because I was sitting in a warm, dark and strong bone box, and continued to sit. In a situation with a chair and a sofa, I should expand to the size of my body. I leave the house, walking down the street. A passing truck splashes my pants and coat with mud from a puddle. Now I'm dirty. Or not me, but only my clothes? No, still I. I want to look decent, and therefore I need to clean myself. Imperceptibly, the inside of the border of my “I” also included clothes. Having cleaned, I get into the car, drive, park unsuccessfully. He crushed his bumper. Wait, but I don’t have a body part like a bumper. Nevertheless, I crushed it exactly to myself. It turns out that when I'm driving, inside the system, which I call “I,” I turn on the car. Why not? And if, hammering a nail, I miss the nail and hit myself on the finger, then it will not be possible to say that it is a hammer, so bad, I hit on the finger. I got it on my finger. Yes, the physical contact of the finger was with a hammer, but at that moment the hammer was an extension of my hand and, therefore, was part of a system denoted by the identity of "me".

As expected, the boundary of my “I” is situationally dependent. Let's see how far it can be wide. In principle, depending on the situation, we include everything inside the system of the “I” that we denote by the word “mine”. My body, my clothes, my home, my family, my friends, my enemies (like this, yes), my city, my country, my planet. My world. My ideas about good and evil. When something hurts me, it is my pain, and if I want to eat, then it is my hunger. I know some flaws behind me, and these are my flaws, and my ideas that they would not have been better cause me to worry about them. My ideas about the perniciousness of my flaws, of course, also can and should be considered a part of me. Somehow it turns out that I have no limits for expanding my “I”. In different situations, I, of course, draw the line “here I am, and there is no longer I”, but sometimes it is useful to remember that talking about me and the world in which I live is, in principle, talking about one and the same subject. And the point, of course, is not only in me. You, the reader, and the world in which you live - this is also one and the same thing. However, this is not news. The essential unity of the subject and the world in which he lives is a key point of a very ancient philosophy, denoted as "Zen." We just came to this ancient truth in a strange way, not through meditation in a high mountain monastery, but through arguments about objectivization, systems, identities, and situational dependence of boundaries.

Chapter Summary

The main concepts and concepts discussed in this chapter are:

1. Objectification is a process that results in the declaration of a certain piece of reality as a separate object. The operation of objectification precedes (is implicitly implied, the “zero” operation) of any logic.
2. Objectification is always a subject-dependent and situationally dependent process. There can be no single true separation of the integral reality into separate objects.
3. A system is anything (an objectified piece of reality) with the property of consistency.
4. Systematic - merged logical continuity ("two in one") two properties: decomposability and the presence of emergent properties. If the subject in question can be decomposed, it has at least one emergent property. Conversely, if the presence of a property that can be defined as emergent, the object can be decomposed into its component parts, which do not have this property.
5. Hierarchy is an imaginary property of systems. Our habit of building hierarchies is a consequence of a defect in perception.
6. Objectification besides the very isolation of a system from the reality surrounding it, results in identity. Identity is a logical point. Internally empty (zero size) intangible entity used to denote an object.
7. Self-consciousness can be defined as the ability of a system in an indispensable way to operate with the concept of its own identity.
8. One should not forget that there can be at least two points of view on any considered object: from the “outside” position and from the “inside” position. All the concepts considered — objectification, systemicity, and the use of identities — are applicable from both these positions.
9. The subject and the world in which he lives is essentially the same thing. In most cases, it is convenient to forget about it, but there are situations in which you need to remember about it.
10. The essential unity of the subject and the world makes impossible the full-scale modeling of any subject.

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Continued: Chapter 5. A Targeted Actor