Limiting the spread of knowledge on the example of weapons technology

The 18th century Indian weapons were as complex as the European ones. And then the British Empire came and turned the industry into the past.

Indian musket with a wicker castle of the 18th century from the city of Lahore

In the middle of the 17th century, people in the most developed parts of northwestern Europe as well as in East and South Asia had comparable indicators of life expectancy, consumption, and potential for economic growth. But around the year 1800, what scientists called the "great discrepancy" happened, and the power and wealth of the West suddenly and radically overshadowed those of India, China and the Ottoman Empire .

In particular, Britain is known for justifying the expansion of its empire with ideas of cultural and racial superiority. Scientists from Edward Wadi Said to Kenneth Pomeranz have done a lot to refute such theories and discover their importance in motivating and justifying the conquest of Asia by Britain. European colonialism in Asia and the New World helped to strengthen the “divergence” between Europe and Asia, strengthening Europe’s access to unprecedented riches and the power of captured markets and resources.

However, some scientists continue to rummage through the huge "cultural" field in search of explanations for the influence of Europe. One of the most influential ideas of recent times is the theory ( popularized especially by economic historian Joel Mokir), suggesting that the Age of Enlightenment cultivated a unique culture of disseminating knowledge and microinventions, or “adjustments,” which served as the driving force of the British industrial revolution.
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The idea that the spread of knowledge was exclusively European in quality would have surprised the Enlightenment thinker Adam Smith , who was watching the world at that time. Concerned about Britain’s aggressive pursuit of imperial heights, he suggested that the universal ability to share knowledge would eventually correct all the mistakes of colonialism. Noting in a study in 1776, " A Study on the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations " that South Asians do not reap the fruits of discoveries made in the Americas, and suffer from "every kind of injustice" coming from the Europeans, Smith still retained the optimism that the dissemination of knowledge and improvements in life, conducted by commerce, will eventually put all countries on an equal footing and compel them to mutual respect.

We know that this did not happen. Why? Why the spread of knowledge did not bring equality to the world? Was Smith too generous or naive in believing in the cultural value of knowledge outside of Europe? Smith’s naivety was that he believed that the resulting political inequalities would not affect the dissemination of knowledge. Like today's liberal thinkers, he imagined that the exchange of knowledge would occur regardless of the relationship of the authorities.

In fact, in the XVIII century, the government determined the spread of knowledge. For example, in Britain, government supply officers often prohibited contractors from patenting their inventions: patents would slow the spread of innovation among other contractors and the production of urgently needed stocks. And although the British government was thus encouraging the spread of technology secrets within Britain, it actively suppressed attempts to penetrate the country. British industrialists copied Asian textiles and ceramics without any worries about “intellectual property”, but could rely on the fact that their government minimized the risk of competition for their own enterprises from the side of the colonies.

In 1737, for example, British iron producers demanded to ban the production of rod iron in America, worrying that this would stimulate American metallurgy and destroy British production, which would lead to a decrease in the population of the native country. In 1750, they achieved that the law allowing the duty-free import of American bar iron, at the same time, prohibited the American metallurgy, specifically to prevent the buildup of military power. Such inequality fueled anti-British sentiment in America.

In India, the concern was not new, but old manufacturing plants. Colonial officials tried to stifle the local production of weapons and block the access of Indians to the knowledge of British gunsmiths. They did this, realizing that the production of weapons is the heart of industrial progress. As a result, South Asia depended on British weapons, which fed Britain’s industrial development and suppressed Indian industrial potential.

The 18th century British understood the connection between military production and industrial development, especially in the West Midland . In a petition of 1752, the city of Birmingham from West Medland boasted that "more than 20,000 workers" were employed in "useful manufactories, which is very profitable for the government." In 1795-96, an influential arms manufacturer from Quakers of this city explained to his concerned friends that there was no industry that did not help military affairs in one way or another.

During the long wars with France that unfolded in those days, military contractors prevailed in the city. The artillery department was in charge of the arms industry and monopolized its work. From 1804 to 1815, 7,660,229 units of weapons and their components were manufactured in Birmingham. The city rejected any laws threatening the arms trade. The townspeople knew that any damage to weapons manufacturers would harm the entire West Midland and leave “a significant proportion of the population” out of work. The industrial decline that occurred after the end of the wars in 1815 confirmed this point of view. Already in 1857, opponents protested against the John Bright election to the parliament due to the fact that his pacifism in no way corresponded to a city whose economy depended on "various military metal accessories."

In the Indian subcontinent there were similar local military-industrial economies. In the 16th century, the sale of weapons was part of Ottoman-Mogul diplomatic relations in India. Babur , the first Mughal emperor , borrowed Turkish weapons, which were later adopted by Mughal rivals, Rajputs and Afghans. Trade with Portugal and Egypt helped to consolidate the position of technology in the subcontinent. The Mughal emperor Akbar I the Great was extremely interested in the production of firearms and attracted craftsmen for his manufacture to his court.

By the 17th century, the Mughal had already had state foundries and arsenals. From Malabar to Bihar , kingdoms throughout the subcontinent developed the arms industry. The increased involvement of Europeans in Indian conflicts increased the demand for weapons. Indian artisans copied and European weapons. Peasants in the plains of the Ganges used cheap pistols made by local blacksmiths. Military production was deployed in Travankor , Kashmir , Rajasthan , Punjab and Sind provinces. Indian weapons and spare parts were sold in Persia, Oman and around the coast of the Indian Ocean. The British military noted the superior firing range and speed of the wick weapon in India. Also, Europeans appreciated the muskets from Golkonda . Indian weapons schemes were thoughtful and effective by the British; subcontinental weapons emerged from a dynamic and rich in technical knowledge of culture.

The British East India Company (BOIC) [East India Company, EIC] —the commercial component of the British state — sold British weapons on the Indian subcontinent. To get the privileges in this trade, they also donated weapons. “A rare ship [in the 1760s] came to the port, not intending to sell cannons and small arms,” one colonel in Parliament was surprised. The French and the British competed with each other, making deals on the supply of weapons to the subcontinent. With each success of the British, the BOIK weapon became more and more prestigious and therefore a more effective basis for diplomatic exchange. In 1815, the customs administration reported supplying 151,572 weapons per year to South Asia, Indonesia and China, for a total of £ 103,463 [ approximately £ 7.5 million for today's money / approx. trans. ].

Naturally, the British were worried about arming their enemies. In 1765, the BOIK office in Madras [now Chennai] hurried to take steps against the weapon "falling into the hands that could turn it against us." BOIK also wanted to make sure that the weapons supplied to Arkot's trusted Nawab were not in "inappropriate hands." But short-term commercial gain often prevailed. Officials worried about the irresponsible sale of weapons, faced with the logic that a complete ban on such a sale would simply give an advantage to their European rivals, which would reduce the profits and influence of the British. This calculation was used in dealing with Hyder Ali, ruler of the Principality of Mysore [see Anglo-Mysore Wars / approx. trans.]. The British believed that by selling weapons to him, they made a profit and his good attitude, since he fought with their common enemy, the Marathas . In any case, they noted that he had access to both French and Spanish weapons.

BOIK bought British weapons for their own needs. With the growth of her territorial gains in India, she needed massive supplies of weapons for her expanding professional army. In 1764, she predicted that next year she would need 5,000 weapons. In 1765, officials from Calcutta requested 10,000 weapon sets, and increased their requests by 4,000 each year — the same manufacturers that served the British government also had to supply them. In the same year, BOIK acquired the right to collect taxes in Bengal , which guaranteed her ability to pay for weapons. With its own army and the right to collect taxes from the colonies, BOIK turned into a colonial state.

In 1766, the BOIK office in Madras decided to provide each of its soldiers with a spare musket. In addition, she needed 17,000 new weapons, and an additional supply of Arcot Nawabu. Until 1765, BOIK’s expenditure on small arms exceeded £ 10,000 only three times, but after 1765 annual expenditures on weapons from £ 20,000 to £ 50,000 became the norm. In 1767 and 1769, payments exceeded £ 60,000. In the Indian climate, weapons required replacement three times more often than was the case in Britain. In addition, BOIK had a relatively extravagant approach to the replacement of damaged weapons, compared with the Artillery Department. If the latter ordered several weapons during its brief peaceful respite in the early 1770s, the BOIC orders remained constant, in particular due to changes in the design of the weapon, which consolidated the classical " Indian model " of a musket in 1771.



In that year, BOIK wanted to get 40,000 muskets for Madras and another party for the Nawab of Arcot, Bengal, Nawab of Oudh , the Bombay fleet and King Travancore. Thousands of units went to the short-lived militia that formed from time to time throughout the continent. When the American war of independence began in 1775, the Artillery Department could hardly tear off the Birmingham blacksmiths from their Indian orders. After this war, on orders from BOIK, at least 20,000 muskets were permanently on the way to India, except for the 75,000 that were and were serviced on the spot.

During the wars with France from 1793 to 1815, the British Artillery Department could not receive weapons as quickly as he wanted, and BOIK became one of the most important suppliers of weapons for Britain. By the end of 1794, BOIK transferred about 30,000 weapons for use by British armed forces around the world. In the Indian army there were enough British weapons to share that amount, despite the fact that its numbers grew from 88,000 in 1793 to 192,000 in 1805. By the end of the war, the Artillery Department purchased more than 162,000 guns from BOIK.

The guns of the Indian model were lighter, and simpler in the style of the standard muskets of the Artillery Department - so it was easier to make them massively. Its adoption as a standard infantry weaponry in 1797 arbitrarily revolutionized the production of weapons in England. From 1804 to 1815, more than 3 million barrels and flint rifle locks were manufactured in Birmingham, and another million were commissioned by BOIK. More than 1.7 million sets of weapons were collected for the soldiers. The Indian model has become the most numerous military muzzle-loading rifle : more than 2.8 million such rifles were produced. During the fall in demand in 1812, the company helped with orders to manufacturers of the Midland, assuming the number of orders for military equipment that would be needed next year, and ordering 4,000 - 5,000 tons of Midland iron in this way. In general, the industrial transformation of Birmingham is highly indebted to BOIK and its imperial activities in India.

By helping the industrial revolution take place at home, BOIK actively suppressed industrial progress in India. She produced some military goods and ordered tents of local production, as well as swords and saber-talvaras . Local craftsmen repaired weapons. But the company drew a line before producing weapons, fearing that stimulation of industrial capacity would threaten Britain and its influence in India.

From time to time, British officials assumed that the presence of industry in India could have a certain effectiveness. In the 1770s, complaints about the quality of English weapons caused a proposal to minimize the import of goods that can be produced in India. But the BOIC board of directors rejected the subsequent proposal for the production of drums and flutes in India. Similarly, BOIC rejected a proposal to develop the mining of lead, iron, copper, and tin in Bengal, arguing that this would lead to loss of profits and control over the situation. BOIC noted that all steps towards industrial development could have made the colony even more independent from the “parent country”. There was also the risk of “providing neighboring authorities with military equipment and teaching them new ways of maintaining independence and opening the way to new sources of wealth”. In general, the proposals that advocated the industrial development of Bengal were regarded as "unreasonable and contrary to the principles of our government." And indeed, they could have provided the “greatest and most important advantages” of Bengal, “which was considered independent.” Of course, Bengal was not independent, it was part of the British Empire.

The wealth of natural resources and the technical knowledge of Bengal were a threat from BOIK’s point of view, since they could stimulate the industrial development of the region, which “would lead to serious losses” of British state interests. As noted officially, Bengalis are "not completely ignorant of the use of iron ore." If additional mines were opened and they began to give out good quality metal at a price lower than European imports, "their curiosity and greed would be awakened and they would at least be engaged in experiments on this basis." Like Adam Smith, this official knew that curiosity and experimentation were not a unique part of European culture.

Colonial officials in particular feared that the Indians would gain knowledge leading to improved weapon production. Facilitating or simply allowing the dissemination of metal processing knowledge in the colonies of South Asia represented a danger. "The transition from knowledge of smelting metals and methods of casting them in certain forms to casting cannon shells and bullets is so small that if local people ever had the first art at their disposal, they would soon become masters of the second," the company official wrote. The BOIC leadership insisted that their weapon laboratories at Fort William remain secret:

No Indian, black or mixed-race subject, and no Catholic of any state at all, under any circumstances, out of curiosity, or for a job search, are not allowed access to the laboratory or to any military storehouses, or what is being done or stored inside them.

Such was the European culture of knowledge dissemination.

In 1831, BOIK considered closing the foundry in Fort William out of fear of the possibility of spreading knowledge about casting. Thus, while the purchase of BOIK weapons stimulated the industrial revolution in England, BOIK prevented by all means the stimulation of metallurgy in the subcontinent, and took various steps to slow it down. BOIK officials were confident that the production of weapons was at the heart of industrial progress and that they helped create the difference between East and West. In their immediate solutions lies the beginning of global industrial inequality. It was for this purpose that the empire was created. British industry flourished, and the Indian economy was reoriented to its service.

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Production continued after the defeat of Nawab in 1764, but already as a supplier for BOIC. The guns made there had a reputation for high-quality products, better than the British military muskets, especially in terms of the metal of the barrel and flints made from the agates of the Rajmahal hills. The wealth of the French rich began to decline in the second half of the century, and French mercenaries began to offer their knowledge to Indian industrialists. Government arsenals and armories in Agra , Delhi, Gwalior , produced weapons and ammunition according to the same standards that were used in Europe. Factories in Lucknow , Pondicherry , Hyderabad , Lahore and Srirangapatnamproduced most of the guns used by those who fought with the Mughals, and those who fought with Britain.

BOIK sold its guns to forces beyond its control, partly in order to suppress their development of the arms industry. In the late 1760s, Britain several times refused to supply Nawabu to Aud Shuje ad-Daul , and then watched with concern as he opened weapons production in Faizabad . Captain Richard Smith noted the excellent quality of the eight-pound cannon.cast from the Dutch model, and almost 1000 shotguns with wick locks and bayonets. But the production of high-quality rifle locks went slowly. Two Bengalis were in charge of casting guns, and a French engineer produced chassis for them and trained workers in the use of a drilling machine. Influenced by the growing ambitions of Shuji ad-Daula, the British gave him 2,000 muskets.

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The British also prevented the spread of knowledge of the Maratha empire. By 1785, Shinde had weapons factories in the Agra region. The Maratha military culture grew out of a complex military economy, similar to the one that was in Birmingham - experienced blacksmiths could equally well make jewelry for temples and cannons. In the cities of Maratha, blacksmiths and wheel masters made both components of carts and artillery chassis. As in the West Midland, the regional economy profited from military contracts. Chinde made high-quality flintlock gun locks. One of the mercenaries described them as locks of "excellent quality, superior to ordinary European weapons." The Maratha small arms were better adapted to the climate and local powder; Maratha cannons combined iron and brass in an ingenious way.because of what they were easier and stronger than the British. British military observers admired the lifting screw of the big guns.

From the third Anglo-Mysore war in 1792, Shinde returned with captured British weapons. Despite the fact that the British were trying to disassemble the defective weapon to pieces before selling them at auctions for the manufacture of nails and arrows, he restored the decommissioned weapon to BOIK. His secret smuggling chain included Indians and Europeans. Marathi was looking for a weapon that was decommissioned by BOIK, despite the presence of its own production facilities - possession of British weapons meant not only firepower, but also certain certainty.

After the victory over the Marathas in 1805, the British, without losing time, destroyed the military production and took control of the production of small arms themselves. Bengal, Mysore and Maratha are just three of the many places in the Indian subcontinent where Britain, with great effort and expense, limited, reduced or prevented the spread of knowledge and the use of production facilities for weapons production in India. The almost equal position of India and Britain in the field of small arms made the conquest of the Indian subcontinent by the British slow, expensive and difficult, which made it necessary to suppress local weapons production.

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