The twenty-year experience of manned space flight did not lead to the disappearance of deadly situations. Despite the fact that cosmonautics has become a fairly familiar affair, the complexity of the technology and the hostility of the conditions of space flight for living organisms have led to the fact that there are still potentially deadly situations. The more interesting is the story of how and why these disasters did not occur.
STS-1
From the point of view of approaches to the testing of complex technical systems, the implementation of the first flight of the Space Shuttle at once in a manned version was the engineering impudence of a space scale. And the increased risk of such a mission naturally led to potentially catastrophic situations: The calculation of the shock wave from the launch of solid-fuel accelerators turned out to be erroneous . Four times more powerful than expected, the shock wave led to an ultimate load for the structure: the attachment of the forward fuel tanks of the orientation engines bent and the fuselage flap was thrown at an unacceptable angle:
')
The inadmissible angle of the fuselage flap meant, firstly, problems with pitch during landing, and secondly, damage or even rupture of the hydraulic system. If the astronauts knew about this damage, they would have catapulted in the process of landing, and the Columbia orbiter would have crashed. But the joke turned out: without knowing about the problem, Yang and Kripen made a successful landing, and calculations that promise a break in the hydraulics and loss of pitch control during landing also turned out to be erroneous. The reflection of the sound waves of the engines from the launch pad led to oscillations of the tail stabilizer . If the error in the calculations turned out to be more, the tail could have fallen off. At the withdrawal of the "Columbia" lost 16 heat-shielding tiles . Fortunately, they were all located on the upper surface of the shuttle in places with low temperature load, and their loss was not dangerous. But on Columbia, in this flight, there was no Kanadarm camera with a camera, and for inspecting the lower surface of the shuttle, it was necessary to involve the ground military satellite tracking station and the newest satellite optical reconnaissance satellite KH-11 ( last week nothing was done). flight "Columbia" ). Thermal damage to the bottom surface when braking in dense layers of the atmosphere . The following were damaged: a striker plate for the front access hatch of the external fuel tank (incorrect installation of the adjacent heat-shielding tile) and the right landing gear niche (protruding filler of the gap between the tiles directed the heated air inside).
Despite the overall successful flight, the risk was very serious, and the problems found required considerable effort to correct. The water depreciation system on the launch pad was changed the hardest, which reduced the shock wave ten times.
Soyuz T-10-1, aka Soyuz T-10A
September 26, 1983. The Soyuz T-10 spacecraft is preparing for launch. Cosmonauts Vladimir Titov and Gennady Strekalov should go to the Salyut-7 station. But 1 minute 48 seconds before the start (according to other sources in 48 seconds), a fire started on the launch vehicle. The launch control team quickly figured out the situation and made the only right decision - launching an emergency rescue system. Tcadatoplivny engines SAS ripped off the descent module with astronauts from a burning rocket and took them to a safe distance. The flight lasted only 5 minutes and 13 seconds, and after 15 minutes, the astronauts were already removed from the descent vehicle by rescuers who approached the landing site by helicopter. SAS work scheme:
The documentary footage of the accident (from 2:40) and the CAC testing footage (from 3:55) have been preserved:
The Soyuz T-10-1 accident is the only case of the “combat” use of the emergency rescue system. The CAC stands on all Soyuz, despite its rather heavy weight, the possibility of saving astronauts in the event of an accident during the first seconds of flight and the launch pad is priceless.
STS-9
The sixth flight of the shuttle Columbia ended successfully on December 8, 1983. The next day, the technicians began to service and with great surprise found that the auxiliary power unit compartment (APU) was black from the fire that occurred there, the valves of two of the three APUs were destroyed by a fuel explosion, and the wiring in the compartment was damaged by fire. Shuttle APU is a small hydrazine turbine that creates the necessary pressure for hydraulics, which turns the control surfaces - ailerons and rudder. APU and fuel tanks are located in the aft of the shuttle:
If the fire of the Armed Forces of Ukraine had started a few minutes earlier or was more active, the Columbia would have lost control several minutes before landing and had broken with the whole crew. The Space Shuttle did not have a special rescue system for landing accidents. Parachutes on the shuttles appeared only after the death of the Challenger and could only be used when leaving the guided ship. Falling with a tumble, inevitable with loss of control, made ordinary parachutes completely useless. Crew STS-9 very lucky.
STS-51-F
The only shuttle that actually went into emergency flight mode (the so-called Abort Mode) was the Challenger in the STS-51-F mission on July 29, 1985. In the fourth minute of the flight, the temperature sensor of the turbopump of the central engine failed. Two minutes later, the second sensor of the same turbopump failed. Automatics, relying on incorrect sensor readings, emergency stopped the central engine. At about the same time, the temperature sensors of the turbopump of the second engine began to behave inadequately. MCC managed to navigate the situation and gave the command to ban automatic shutdown of engines. Challenger dropped out of the simplest emergency mode - “Abort to Orbit” - an emergency exit to a slightly lower orbit. If the MCC did not have time to react, the automatics would turn off the second healthy engine (all the engines were fine, the sensors would lie) and would have to land in Europe in the “Transatlantic Abort Landing” mode - a transatlantic emergency landing.
Union TM-5
Soviet cosmonauts Valery Polyakov and Vladimir Lyakhov and the first cosmonaut of Afghanistan Abdul Mohmand launched the Mir station at Soyuz TM-6 on August 29, 1988. Valery Polyakov remained at the station as part of the main expedition, and on September 6, Lyakhov and Mohmand, members of the short-term visiting expedition, undocked from Mira in the Soyuz TM-5. The landing procedure was modernized - in order not to waste the fuel on braking unnecessary mass of the domestic compartment, it was shot off not after braking, but before. But with the braking procedure itself, the trouble began. The orientation of the ship to the braking occurred on the border of day and night, so the infrared vertical sensor worked "uncertainly". The on-board computer (Soyuz TM had a full-fledged digital car) took it as a sensor failure and blocked the braking. After 7 minutes, the orientation was restored, and the computer turned on the engines. But by this time the flight of the landing point would have been 700-800 km and, instead of Kazakhstan, the ship would have boarded in China. Lyakhov quickly looked into the situation and, after just 3 seconds, turned off the engine. After the meeting with the MCC, the landing was postponed for two turns. A new landing program was handed over from Earth to Earth, but probably because of the rush, there was a mistake in it. The computer, instead of the landing program, began to try to make a correction for docking with the “Mir” - this program was written for the flight of the previous crew and was still kept in memory. As a result, the engine turned on in the estimated time, but instead of 230 seconds, it worked only 7. Lyakhov gave the command to turn on the engine manually, but he turned off again after 14 seconds. The second attempt to manually turn on the engine also failed - the engine worked only 33 seconds. In addition, the orientation of the ship was disrupted - it was clearly impossible to try to “re-direct” the computer. The situation from the unpleasant became deadly - due to the on / off of the engine, the thermal sensors for the separation of the descent vehicle and the instrument compartment turned on, and, worst of all, the timer for the automatic separation of compartments was activated. And without the instrument-aggregate compartment, the descent vehicle would be left without oxygen for breathing (an autonomous reserve was enough only for landing) and engines for braking. Given the lack of time to calmly understand what is happening with the MCC, and the unknown height of the pericenter (or maybe we still enter the atmosphere?) Lyakhov manually turned off the temperature sensors and blocked the separation of the compartments. The decision turned out to be the only correct one: a full braking impulse was needed for the landing. MCC analyzed the situation and began to prepare the landing in a day. And here the situation has already begun, which is not dangerous, but extremely uncomfortable - there is very little space in the descent vehicle, and the toilet flew away along with the household compartment. Vladimir Lyakhov recalls:
“The most difficult was the inconvenience of everyday life.Suits were not removed, so as not to freeze.The chair is cast exactly on a figure, it is impossible to turn.The total volume of CA is only three cubic meters, it is filled with returnable instruments, equipment, film and photo materials, documents, even fish were.Feet twitched, very much like to eat and drink, but did not touch the emergency reserve.To the difficulties was added the fact that the cesspool device remained in the fired domestic compartment ... I do not deny myself blame, that after the repeated failure I tried to turn on the engine again, because there was an option - to enter the correct setpoint already during the engine operation.I really wanted to Earth ... "
The landing on September 7 was automatic and completely normal. But after this incident, the separation of the compartments of the "Union" is made only after braking. It is better to spend some fuel in vain than to endure such inconveniences.
STS-27
The STS-27 mission of the space shuttle Atlantis was the second after the resumption of flights interrupted by the Challenger crash. It was a military mission, during which a spy satellite (presumably, the Lacrosse radar reconnaissance satellite) was to be delivered to orbit. On solid-fuel boosters were new, lighter, nose fairings. And at 85 seconds of flight, the nose fairing of the right TTU began to collapse, and its fragments struck the heat-shielding coating of the shuttle. What was happening was recorded on ground cameras and did not go unnoticed. After the launch, the crew unrolled the “Canadarm” manipulator with the camera and began to inspect the lower surface of the Atlantis. The spectacle was unimportant - it seemed that the heat protection tiles were fired from anti-aircraft guns (and commander Robert Gibson fought in Vietnam and saw the result of the work of anti-aircraft guns). But, strangely enough, the Houston MCC did not see the problem. The image from the camera was transmitted via an encrypted communication channel (recall, this is a military mission), encryption greatly reduced image quality, and engineers on Earth decided that damage was just a play of light and shadow. And, for a completely incomprehensible reason, the astronauts who verbally describe the problem did not believe it! Worse, the Houston MCC took no steps to obtain additional information. STS-27 was not monitored from Earth, no spy satellites were used, the problem was considered insignificant. The landing went well, but the engineers were in for an unpleasant surprise - on personal inspection, the damage to the heat-shielding coating looked even worse. "Atlantis" received 707 shocks, had to change from 125 to 175 tiles of thermal protection, and one tile from the bottom surface was completely broken, and the aluminum under it began to melt when braking on the dense layers of the atmosphere:
The STS-27 astronauts were lucky - it was in this place that the antenna was attached, and the hull was thicker than usual. But pofigizm TsUPa almost guaranteed that such a problem would turn into a catastrophe. This is exactly what happened to the “Columbia” - we will never know the extent of damage to its wing in 2003, and whether it was possible to save the shuttle and seven crew members.
STS-37
One of the most terrible dangers that threatens a person who has gone into outer space in a spacesuit, occurred in this flight. A small pin in the glove suit Jerome Epta moved from his seat and pierced the fabric of the suit. But the joke turned out - the hole turned out small, the astronaut's skin quickly stuck to it, and the air leakage was not even noticed by automation. Only after returning to board, Ept noticed a slight rubbing under the knuckle of his right index finger. Easy off!
EO-23
EO-23 is the twenty-third main expedition to the Mir station, which lasted from February to August 1997. The permanent composition of this expedition was Vasily Tsibliev and Alexander Lazutkin, and it also temporarily included: German astronaut Reinhold Ewald and NASA astronauts Jerry Linenger and Michael Foul. Many expeditions fell to the share of this expedition, two of them were so serious that the MCC considered the emergency return of the crew to Earth, and in one of these incidents the cosmonauts rescued Mir, acting contrary to the instructions. The Americans present in the MCC of Moscow even called it “Russian“ Apollo 13 ”, stretched for half a year”. Fire February 23 . The oxygen regeneration checkbox caught fire (they are used in addition to the Electron equipment that receives oxygen by water electrolysis). Alexander Lazutkin recalls:
“In the evening, at 10:30 pm, I flew to burn the saber.I did everything as usual.The checker did not start right away.I checked that it works.Already going to leave.The guys sat at the table in the BB, and I really wanted to them.Suddenly I hear that new sounds have appeared against the background of ordinary noises.I look at THC and I see an unusual picture.Dark bag - the filter is covered with red lights.I see this bag burnt through.“He must not burn!” - my first thought.Lights appear more and more often.The crackling of a running checker is intensifying ... A small Vulcan begins to work in front of me.I feel his hot breath.I can hardly tear myself away from this sight, turn off the TGK fan.Shock starts to let me go.Grab a fire extinguisher.Smoke has already gone to the BB.Together with the wail of the emergency siren, Valera Korzun flew towards me.I grabbed a fire extinguisher and demanded more.I flew to the BB.All the guys rushed all over the station looking for fire extinguishers and gas masks. ”
The crew quickly put on gas masks, armed with fire extinguishers and quickly extinguished the fire. But there was a risk that the fire would become uncontrollable, and one of the Soyuz ships could be cut off by fire. Even after the fire, the problems did not end - until the end of the work of the commission investigating the causes of the fire, the crew worked in conditions of a potential lack of oxygen, the Electron equipment was not working reliably, and had to use oxygen cylinders stored for spacewalks. The Commission on Earth successfully burned several pieces, the defect was recognized as a single, and the regeneration pieces were used again. The clash of "Progress" with the "World" on June 25 . The crew of the EO-23 worked out the fully manual mode of docking of the Progress cargo ships - the trucks were brought to the Mira area by ballistics, and then moored at the remote control (TORU teleoperator control mode) manually by the crew. And both tests were unsuccessful. For the first time, in March, Progress just flew past the station. The second attempt with another “Progress” in June ended much worse. The trajectory of the truck began to differ from the calculated one (“Progress” did not appear in a particular window as it should have been). Tsibliev braked the ship, realizing the danger of a collision. But due to the fact that it was necessary to turn, keeping the “World” in the viewfinder screen, the turning pulses almost extinguished the braking ones, and the “Progress” almost did not lose speed relative to the station. As a result, at 12:09:51 Moscow time, Progress, at a speed of ~ 3 m / s, crashed into the Spectr module, damaged its solar panels and, what is most terrible, broke through the module casing. Began depressurization. According to the instructions must be evacuated - sit in the "Union" and undock. But “Peace” cannot be reanimated if left unsealed. The astronauts rush to the hatch connecting the “Spectrum” with the “Mir” and begin to prepare it as quickly as possible for closure - they disconnect the air ducts and cables. Cables that cannot be disconnected are cut. Falling pressure threatens with loss of consciousness and certain death. But Lazutkin and Tsibliev (Michael Fowle, according to the instructions, took a place in the "Union") had time. With a pressure of 670 mm. Hg Art. the hatch was closed and sealed. I had to print out the spacesuit tanks again - to increase the pressure. In the “Spectrum” module it gradually dropped to zero, the area of ​​the hole was calculated from the rate of fall, turned out to be not very large - 3-4 cm 2 . Subsequent expeditions restored the power supply from the solar panels of the module (a special adapter was delivered with cable connectors) and repeatedly tried to repair the hole, but in vain - the “Spectrum” module has since been depressurized.
I recommend to watch a good movie about these events:
Now it is less, but sometimes the question still arises - was it necessary to sink the Mir station? My opinion - it was done on time. The station exceeded its service life three times (5 years instead of 15), survived a fire, partial depressurization, problems with thermal conditions (the EO-23 expedition still repaired pipes flowing with toxic ethylene glycol) and was already dangerous for further operation. And what frightened us the opponents of flooding - the loss of access to space - did not happen. On the ISS, in quantitative terms, still most of all Russians (now usually 3 of ours, 2 Americans and Japanese / European / Canadian).
Union TMA-11
On April 19, 2008, Soyuz TMA-11 with a crew from cosmonaut Yuri Malenchenko, astronaut Peggy Whitson and South Korea’s first cosmonaut Lee So-young was in a situation similar to the problem of Soyuz-5. One of the pyrobolts connecting the instrument-aggregate compartment and the descent vehicle failed, and the SA took the wrong orientation - hatch forward. Fortunately, PJSC burned off and fell off after some time, and the thermal protection coped. But the violation of the trajectory led to the fact that the ship went into the ballistic descent mode and landed 420 km from the calculated landing point. The landing was tougher than usual. Lee So-Yong was even taken to the hospital upon her return to South Korea (fortunately, they did not find anything terrible).
Yuri Malenchenko, in the background you can see the smoked surface of the hatch:
Peggy Whitson (in blue):
Lee So Yong doesn’t lose optimism even on stretchers:
EVA-23
ESA astronaut Luke Parmitano was unlucky during his first spacewalk — about 45 minutes after opening the hatch, he felt that water was flowing into the back of the helmet along with oxygen for breathing. Due to the surface tension, the water poured the front glass of the helmet, turning it into a "fisheye," and began to envelop the head, flowing into the eyes, ears, nostrils and mouth. Parmitano seriously threatened to drown at an altitude of 450 kilometers above the Earth. The spacewalk had to be urgently interrupted, Luka, with the help of his partner Chris Cassidy, returned to the gateway almost blindly. Fortunately, the situation did not deteriorate further, and, after filling the airlock with air (which is not a quick operation), Parmitano in a spacesuit was quickly taken out of the airlock, opened the helmet and dried with towels. In general, everything turned out well. As it turned out later, the most terrible danger was the inability to see normally, the risk of choking was small. But the water of Luke swallowed.
ESA has released a video with shots with a VCD and an explanation of what was happening and how:
Conclusion
So the long story about the disasters that could happen, but were prevented, came to an end. On the one hand, space is hostile to life. On the other hand, humanity with the help of technology is able to conquer hostile elements - people dive under the water and fly in the air. The hostility of the environment means that potentially dangerous situations will necessarily arise, and some, unfortunately, will end in disasters. But the efforts of designers, the labor of workers and engineers, and the high qualifications of astronauts may well make the risks of space flight comparable, for example, to aviation, when flying between cities on an airplane is statistically safer than traveling by car.
List of used sources
In addition to Wikipedia, the encyclopedia “World Manned Cosmonautics: History. Equipment. People ”ed. Yu.M. Baturin.