In mid-September 2017, news about the settlement of the dispute between People for Ethical Treatment of Animals and PETA, an American non-profit animal protection organization People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, was settled in a number of media outlets.
The essence of the dispute is quite known. In 2011, photographer Slater filmed crested baboons in Indonesia and, in particular, allowed one of the monkeys (a macaque, supposedly nicknamed "Naruto") to press the remote descent. The result - a good, from an artistic point of view, "
monkey selfie ."
More or less successful commercialization of a photograph (and several of them like it) was interrupted by placing these pictures on Wikimedia Commons, which was accompanied by the refusal of Wikimedia, the owner of Wikimedia Commons, to pay for the use of photographs or remove them from there. Motivation - the picture was taken by the monkey itself.
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The situation could possibly remain at the level of exchanging bitter reproaches and threats of prosecution if PETA did not intervene in 2015, having decided, no less, to defend the copyrights of the animal in US federal courts.
Without going into details, I will note that PETA lost in the first instance in the federal district court, but appealed against the decision to the federal appeal district 9.
It must be said that the photographer had a hard time - in fact, he was left alone against a huge non-profit corporation (about 800 thousand supporters, including Hollywood celebrities), who had much more opportunities to hire lawyers or use the work of lawyers interns.
As Slater himself reported, in 2017, he was no longer able to
pay a lawyer and cover travel expenses in the United States for court hearings. Slater began to think about
changing his profession to a tennis coach or dog walker, he lost his motivation to continue working in photography, and spending on lawyers led to a drop in his income and depressed.
I will not unequivocally argue, but PETA’s tactics outwardly resembled the tactics of large corporations in dealing with small companies or individuals: using financial resources to push the necessary solution, taking advantage of the opportunity to conduct lawsuits involving highly qualified lawyers for an infinitely long time, which would not allow to identify the proceedings as a “unfounded claim” (frivolous action in the language of American law). In general, the war of survival.
With Slater, intentionally or unintentionally, this trick was a success. With a history of losing in the court of first instance, and going through the hearing in the second (where, on issues from the judges, it was easy to make a forecast on the future, most likely, the final decision on the case) PETA managed to conclude with Slater World.
Yes, what kind: Slater agreed to deduct PETA a quarter of the proceeds from sales of pictures for charitable purposes (protection of the Naruto type macaques), as well as both litigants filed a
petition to terminate their case in the appellate court, which was accompanied by a request to cancel the decision of the federal district court (JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL AND VACATE THE JUDGMENT).
And if the appellate court cannot do this (annul the previous decision) by itself, then it would not be right to allow it to the district one.
To understand PETA, in principle, it is possible.
By their efforts, they brought the question of animals, as subjects of copyright, to a federal court of appeal, above which only the US Supreme Court, which does not often satisfy requests for review of court cases that have passed through two lower instances.
Moreover, in such a clear case from the point of view of the applicable law. Especially, if the proceedings in the appellate court would have ended with the unanimous decision of the three, without any special, not coinciding opinions.
That is, PETA could, with its initiative, drive a nail into the coffin of the emerging animal rights institute.
Hence the request to annul the decision of the district court (1st instance), which made it clear that
the issue of empowering animals should be addressed to the President and Congress, and not to the court applying current legislation that gives a negative answer to the question of animal copyright .
The Federal Appeal took a long enough pause in the matter of resolving this petition, during which Slater also interceded: the amicus curiae brief (a
petition from a “court friend” ) came from the non-profit organization Competitive Enterprise Institute,
which questioned, in particular, the possibility of cancellation district court decisions.
The possibility of PETA representing a macaque was also disputed.
And on April 13 the Court of Appeal of the 9th district finally clarified the fate of the Joint Petition - by its
Definition (Order) refused to satisfy both requests: to terminate the case and cancel the decision of the first instance.
And this means that the appellate court will soon also express its opinion on animal copyrights, and, if possible, legal entities, act as animal representatives, as so-called “next friend” (representatives of incapable persons). At the moment, it is possible to predict the failure of PETA on both points.
When refusing petitions, the appellate court proceeded from the following legal positions of precedents:
- untimely - the petition was received after all procedural documents were received by the court, their oral examination in court and their lengthy discussion by the judges in order to resolve the legal conflict;
- a petition to terminate a lawsuit that could potentially end in the creation of an undesirable precedent, as an attempt to manipulate the formation of a body of certain precedents (an attempt to form a set of precedents in a certain area that looks more favorable than it actually is);
- public resource investments in legal proceedings must also have returns;
- a motion to discontinue the proceedings and cancel the previous decision, as a tactic to exclude the Court from participating in a particular case (the courts should not allow participants in the process to manipulate the precedents in a manner appropriate to their institutional preferences).
Thus, soon the Federal Court of Appeal will most likely put a fat point in the discussion on animal copyright, and the possibility of legal entities to represent their interests, in particular by collecting royalties in their favor.
And, paradoxically, all this is due to the zoo-defenders who, in their advocacy frenzy, “threw the child out with the water”.