As an independent developer touched the legend. Part two
In those days, when the guys and I were just preparing to launch, spring was in full swing. Everything came to life, blossomed and smelled, and our inspiration with future achievements was young and audacious. We hid in anticipation of an independent jump into the market, about the income from which we knew only on stable wages in strong game development companies. Younger readers might think that we can succeed. Those who are more experienced, it was obvious the opposite. Both sides were right in their own right.
Lunch and modern traveltracker, what else is needed for indie happiness?
6
')
At first , when the project was carried out in his free time from work and family, it was easy. Stable income and predictability simplified a lot. One could allow oneself to take pauses to rest, to stop production for a long time, and not to feel that time was wasted. It was a hobby. Then, when the artist and I began to work full-time, moved to a separate apartment-office and began to have lunch with instant mashed potatoes, the sensations changed. Time became annoying and annoying, it began to put pressure and, along with money, turned into a resource that was only spent. The situation has become very reminiscent of the race for time, which I have always disliked, but the point is not in the race itself, but in racing with time. Agree, running in the mornings on Saturday for yourself without any obligations usually brings much greater pleasure. But it is competition that distinguishes hobby from professional activity.
Fortunately, we had the patience not to quit this run. The rainbow expectations, the lack of an objective assessment of the situation and the very fact of free flight throughout the course alleviated the alarm.
And now the development of the game itself is complete. For this event we got exhausted, and at the end of the production we removed unnecessary tasks from the plan once or twice. And this is despite the fact that almost all the rest of the time they were making the game at the maximum of their capabilities. For example, we could dig into a separate gameplay element for a week, although as a result the player might not even see it. Alas, only towards the end came the understanding that we lack the resources for such an approach. Surprisingly, at the same time, we did have a plan and deadlines, which we observed with more, and we tried to cut the features. But, apparently, due to a lack of experience and a lack of objectivity in looking at the situation, they did not cut enough. Although “Undergrounds” is a formed and integral product, you are not particularly willing here.
I would also like to note the painful experience learned from teamwork: there must be one person who makes the final decisions in any plane. However, this is true for most creative teams. Because, no matter how congenial people you are, no matter how ideally your views coincide, and conflicts happen, and in order to go through them without loss, you need a clear chain of command. Better before the start of the project, one awkward moment of figuring out who will be in charge, for example, in art, rather than a catastrophe because of the color of some interface element at the finish line.
7
Then began the process of creating our main distribution tool - a cinematic release trailer.
It was originally planned that we will use two channels for advertising: the existing Vkontakte group of game book lovers and a video. The group is small, just over 2 thousand people, but according to calculations these were very loyal players, ready to love and buy the game in absentia, contributing to getting into some tops. The video, in turn, was positioned as a word of mouth tool, because it had to be plot and unusual.
Our team has invested heavily in the release trailer. Instead of the planned two or three weeks, it was spent somewhere around a month and a half, if you do not take into account the first unsuccessful call. Of course, we worked in a free mode, often distracted, no one rushed anyone, and if you wanted, you could do everything faster. Especially it was possible to accelerate hard, if you hire professionals for different stages of work, but it did not work out.
At the very first entry we tried to work with a real director, but this attempt ended in refusal to cooperate on our part. First, the original script was rewritten and there was very little left of the initial idea, which was not very convenient for the team. Secondly, we wanted to make the trailer a minimal cost, even if it sacrificed quality somewhere, and the rewritten script incredibly complicated the technical and artistic parts, while at the same time boosting the budget. We broke up, paused, changed and at the same time simplified the concept of the movie, starting from the experience gained, and got involved in attempt number two.
This time everything went like clockwork, the already established contacts from the previous attempt were especially useful: the production director and part-time installation specialist agreed to work with us without any problems. According to the already reworked scenario, all the organizational and preparatory work was decided during the week, then three days of intense filming for the full working day, and after two leisurely weeks of work with the footage. Personally, we were very pleased with the result, it turned out succinctly, clearly and quite unusually. The video cost us 300-400 dollars of net expenses, plus the time of the team (one person month). They did everything on their own (one main person, one was attracted to shootings and consultations) and by the help of one attracted specialist.
The result of this modest information company was not very good, at the end of the article I will share the numbers. This is especially bad, given the fact that a few days after the release, we advertised the game in the 300,000 profile game group on Vkontakte.
In general, the advertising campaign turned out, as it was conceived, - partisan. That is, the minimum cost of trying to maximize the result. But alas. If you do not take into account the fact that the approach itself could turn out to be wrong, as well as the fact that the quality of performance could not be up to par, I personally made a simple conclusion for myself: the meaning of social networks in my understanding is too exaggerated. For example, out of two thousand fans of books-games, only a little more than a hundred people migrated to the group dedicated to our “Dungeons” for all the time. And these are the most loyal people to the game books from the entire social network. And of the several thousand who learned about the release in the early days, only two or three dozen were tempted. Given the discount and positive feedback.
For some games, the cinematic video is asking for it very well.
Yes, I understand perfectly well that a paid product and an unpopular genre could fatally affect this. If you make a message of the past to yourself then you would definitely ask you to treat advertising as an instrument, to try various forms of it, and not consider your game unique or incredible, but starting from this simple fact to plan and act with a cooler head.
eight
Globally, the team and I personally believe that success has been achieved, considering that the main goal was still to launch my game and gain experience. Well, we did our favorite thing, along the way plunging into the memories of youth. It has value, yes. But then the launch moment came, the culmination of one and a half years of work (of which six months on full working days) - and here a terrible disaster awaited us. Commercial failure. I can not say that we were ideological fighters, no, of course, somewhere there was always the prospect of earning at least something on the project, even though it was not usually said out loud. But what happened as a result - it turned out to be much worse than even the most modest expectations.
So: since the start of sales to the present day - and this is a little more than two months - about 60 copies of the game have been sold, some of which are at a discount. Total profit was $ 78:
Dmitry Braslavsky was upset with us ...
After such a result, all further plans were frozen: porting to Android, the release of other game books based on the engine.
9
We found several reasons for this outcome. In general, the most useful thing that can be done at such a depth is to identify mistakes, and in the future try to repeat as few of them as possible. After all, one must be an incorrigible optimist in order to hope not to repeat them all.
A) The project itself - a game book - is not the most popular mechanics. Although the bet was made precisely on the conquest of a very narrow niche (we are doing a text game, and even exclusively on the Russian market), yet the scale of this niche can hardly be enough for a team of several independent developers to exist. And maybe enough, if you do not make all the other mistakes.
B) Directly implementation. Let me remind you that the project started exclusively as a hobby in a business free from work and family, therefore initially there was no bet on modern trends. Moreover, the colleague and the artist was chosen exactly the same: “Have free time? Let's do something. It turned out distinctively in art and strange in mechanics and effects, and the market could have (and as it turned out - had) completely different needs. Yes, probably some fans of books and games were satisfied with this implementation, but this was not enough.
C) Lack of deep research. This is partly due to the fact that the project was to be held for the sake of the project itself and the acquisition of related skills. Partly influenced by the fact that the project began as a hobby for evenings and weekends. As a result, a lot was done at random: somehow the tops were studied, statistics were spied on in some places, some articles and studies were read, and then the same conclusions were made - what if. Spice it up with excitement and optimism and never get such a team to answer the simple question: “Guys, how and how much specifically do you plan to make money on this game?”
D) The lack of an experienced person (producer, indie colleagues) to communicate. The simplest banal communication could be enough to soften the mistakes of A, B, and B. There were no such people inside the team, and with my doubts I didn’t rush to the outside. In vain. Of course, even the presence of a publisher and a producer does not guarantee that the game will be properly successful, there is also a lottery here. But a glance outside can refresh and encourage healing.
D) Too long and expensive production. Of course, I wanted to do it right away in the best possible way so that it would be direct ah But in fact, it would be worth somewhere to simplify something, not to finish it, because time is a valuable resource and it should be saved. Fans would forgive us our flaws, having received, for example, 15 illustrations instead of 20, and would have waited for the correction of bugs in the updates, I'm sure of that. But the time spent on polishing and filling with content cannot be returned. No one has yet canceled MVP and combat research.
I can not call paid-monetization a failure factor. Most likely, even starting from free-to-play, we would get nothing, the game is not so popular in principle. And the fans, those to whom we still got through, were not a premium game, but, let's say, advertising, we could only disappoint. Of course, this is also an assumption.
ten
After launching a lot has changed. For example, the attitude to making money from games: it used to be some strange abstract goal number N, but now it is a harmonious natural component of the whole process. And even if you work on a project in a large company, this thought will always make you think about the appropriateness of certain processes. This is useful for the company, and it is vital in those cases where you are trusted to lead a direction and make decisions.
I think this is the typical mood of any novice independent developer: to say that this is a business, but to treat what is happening as a lucky hobby. Because I haven’t got any real problems yet, and I read various success stories. And success stories, as well as attacks of sharks on humans, are few, but they give a very bold informational occasion. In turn, much less is said about failure stories, but there are thousands of more of them, as well as deaths in the same car accidents.
In fact, it is more worth fearing just such sharks.
Summing up the line and answering the question posed in the first article, I will say: to do an unusual project that is based on unpopular mechanics, an independent developer stands, but only in two cases. First: the developer is ready to suffer financial failure. Second, if you have a clear plan, marketing budget and good experience. In all other cases, this is hardly justified. We had option number one, but we really believed that in the realities of business, with weak resources and experience, it is not worth doing.
But I do not exclude any third scenarios. In the end, personal creative self-realization is also important, the opportunity in old age to tell an interesting story to grandchildren about how grandfather risked and fought, was an excitable and energetic villain, even if sometimes he lost. But it is worth a lot, as well as the fact that the touch to the legend took place !
Lunch and modern traveltracker, what else is needed for indie happiness?
6
')
At first , when the project was carried out in his free time from work and family, it was easy. Stable income and predictability simplified a lot. One could allow oneself to take pauses to rest, to stop production for a long time, and not to feel that time was wasted. It was a hobby. Then, when the artist and I began to work full-time, moved to a separate apartment-office and began to have lunch with instant mashed potatoes, the sensations changed. Time became annoying and annoying, it began to put pressure and, along with money, turned into a resource that was only spent. The situation has become very reminiscent of the race for time, which I have always disliked, but the point is not in the race itself, but in racing with time. Agree, running in the mornings on Saturday for yourself without any obligations usually brings much greater pleasure. But it is competition that distinguishes hobby from professional activity.
Fortunately, we had the patience not to quit this run. The rainbow expectations, the lack of an objective assessment of the situation and the very fact of free flight throughout the course alleviated the alarm.
And now the development of the game itself is complete. For this event we got exhausted, and at the end of the production we removed unnecessary tasks from the plan once or twice. And this is despite the fact that almost all the rest of the time they were making the game at the maximum of their capabilities. For example, we could dig into a separate gameplay element for a week, although as a result the player might not even see it. Alas, only towards the end came the understanding that we lack the resources for such an approach. Surprisingly, at the same time, we did have a plan and deadlines, which we observed with more, and we tried to cut the features. But, apparently, due to a lack of experience and a lack of objectivity in looking at the situation, they did not cut enough. Although “Undergrounds” is a formed and integral product, you are not particularly willing here.
I would also like to note the painful experience learned from teamwork: there must be one person who makes the final decisions in any plane. However, this is true for most creative teams. Because, no matter how congenial people you are, no matter how ideally your views coincide, and conflicts happen, and in order to go through them without loss, you need a clear chain of command. Better before the start of the project, one awkward moment of figuring out who will be in charge, for example, in art, rather than a catastrophe because of the color of some interface element at the finish line.
7
Then began the process of creating our main distribution tool - a cinematic release trailer.
It was originally planned that we will use two channels for advertising: the existing Vkontakte group of game book lovers and a video. The group is small, just over 2 thousand people, but according to calculations these were very loyal players, ready to love and buy the game in absentia, contributing to getting into some tops. The video, in turn, was positioned as a word of mouth tool, because it had to be plot and unusual.
Our team has invested heavily in the release trailer. Instead of the planned two or three weeks, it was spent somewhere around a month and a half, if you do not take into account the first unsuccessful call. Of course, we worked in a free mode, often distracted, no one rushed anyone, and if you wanted, you could do everything faster. Especially it was possible to accelerate hard, if you hire professionals for different stages of work, but it did not work out.
At the very first entry we tried to work with a real director, but this attempt ended in refusal to cooperate on our part. First, the original script was rewritten and there was very little left of the initial idea, which was not very convenient for the team. Secondly, we wanted to make the trailer a minimal cost, even if it sacrificed quality somewhere, and the rewritten script incredibly complicated the technical and artistic parts, while at the same time boosting the budget. We broke up, paused, changed and at the same time simplified the concept of the movie, starting from the experience gained, and got involved in attempt number two.
This time everything went like clockwork, the already established contacts from the previous attempt were especially useful: the production director and part-time installation specialist agreed to work with us without any problems. According to the already reworked scenario, all the organizational and preparatory work was decided during the week, then three days of intense filming for the full working day, and after two leisurely weeks of work with the footage. Personally, we were very pleased with the result, it turned out succinctly, clearly and quite unusually. The video cost us 300-400 dollars of net expenses, plus the time of the team (one person month). They did everything on their own (one main person, one was attracted to shootings and consultations) and by the help of one attracted specialist.
The result of this modest information company was not very good, at the end of the article I will share the numbers. This is especially bad, given the fact that a few days after the release, we advertised the game in the 300,000 profile game group on Vkontakte.
In general, the advertising campaign turned out, as it was conceived, - partisan. That is, the minimum cost of trying to maximize the result. But alas. If you do not take into account the fact that the approach itself could turn out to be wrong, as well as the fact that the quality of performance could not be up to par, I personally made a simple conclusion for myself: the meaning of social networks in my understanding is too exaggerated. For example, out of two thousand fans of books-games, only a little more than a hundred people migrated to the group dedicated to our “Dungeons” for all the time. And these are the most loyal people to the game books from the entire social network. And of the several thousand who learned about the release in the early days, only two or three dozen were tempted. Given the discount and positive feedback.
For some games, the cinematic video is asking for it very well.
Yes, I understand perfectly well that a paid product and an unpopular genre could fatally affect this. If you make a message of the past to yourself then you would definitely ask you to treat advertising as an instrument, to try various forms of it, and not consider your game unique or incredible, but starting from this simple fact to plan and act with a cooler head.
eight
Globally, the team and I personally believe that success has been achieved, considering that the main goal was still to launch my game and gain experience. Well, we did our favorite thing, along the way plunging into the memories of youth. It has value, yes. But then the launch moment came, the culmination of one and a half years of work (of which six months on full working days) - and here a terrible disaster awaited us. Commercial failure. I can not say that we were ideological fighters, no, of course, somewhere there was always the prospect of earning at least something on the project, even though it was not usually said out loud. But what happened as a result - it turned out to be much worse than even the most modest expectations.
So: since the start of sales to the present day - and this is a little more than two months - about 60 copies of the game have been sold, some of which are at a discount. Total profit was $ 78:
Dmitry Braslavsky was upset with us ...
After such a result, all further plans were frozen: porting to Android, the release of other game books based on the engine.
9
We found several reasons for this outcome. In general, the most useful thing that can be done at such a depth is to identify mistakes, and in the future try to repeat as few of them as possible. After all, one must be an incorrigible optimist in order to hope not to repeat them all.
A) The project itself - a game book - is not the most popular mechanics. Although the bet was made precisely on the conquest of a very narrow niche (we are doing a text game, and even exclusively on the Russian market), yet the scale of this niche can hardly be enough for a team of several independent developers to exist. And maybe enough, if you do not make all the other mistakes.
B) Directly implementation. Let me remind you that the project started exclusively as a hobby in a business free from work and family, therefore initially there was no bet on modern trends. Moreover, the colleague and the artist was chosen exactly the same: “Have free time? Let's do something. It turned out distinctively in art and strange in mechanics and effects, and the market could have (and as it turned out - had) completely different needs. Yes, probably some fans of books and games were satisfied with this implementation, but this was not enough.
C) Lack of deep research. This is partly due to the fact that the project was to be held for the sake of the project itself and the acquisition of related skills. Partly influenced by the fact that the project began as a hobby for evenings and weekends. As a result, a lot was done at random: somehow the tops were studied, statistics were spied on in some places, some articles and studies were read, and then the same conclusions were made - what if. Spice it up with excitement and optimism and never get such a team to answer the simple question: “Guys, how and how much specifically do you plan to make money on this game?”
D) The lack of an experienced person (producer, indie colleagues) to communicate. The simplest banal communication could be enough to soften the mistakes of A, B, and B. There were no such people inside the team, and with my doubts I didn’t rush to the outside. In vain. Of course, even the presence of a publisher and a producer does not guarantee that the game will be properly successful, there is also a lottery here. But a glance outside can refresh and encourage healing.
D) Too long and expensive production. Of course, I wanted to do it right away in the best possible way so that it would be direct ah But in fact, it would be worth somewhere to simplify something, not to finish it, because time is a valuable resource and it should be saved. Fans would forgive us our flaws, having received, for example, 15 illustrations instead of 20, and would have waited for the correction of bugs in the updates, I'm sure of that. But the time spent on polishing and filling with content cannot be returned. No one has yet canceled MVP and combat research.
I can not call paid-monetization a failure factor. Most likely, even starting from free-to-play, we would get nothing, the game is not so popular in principle. And the fans, those to whom we still got through, were not a premium game, but, let's say, advertising, we could only disappoint. Of course, this is also an assumption.
ten
After launching a lot has changed. For example, the attitude to making money from games: it used to be some strange abstract goal number N, but now it is a harmonious natural component of the whole process. And even if you work on a project in a large company, this thought will always make you think about the appropriateness of certain processes. This is useful for the company, and it is vital in those cases where you are trusted to lead a direction and make decisions.
I think this is the typical mood of any novice independent developer: to say that this is a business, but to treat what is happening as a lucky hobby. Because I haven’t got any real problems yet, and I read various success stories. And success stories, as well as attacks of sharks on humans, are few, but they give a very bold informational occasion. In turn, much less is said about failure stories, but there are thousands of more of them, as well as deaths in the same car accidents.
In fact, it is more worth fearing just such sharks.
Summing up the line and answering the question posed in the first article, I will say: to do an unusual project that is based on unpopular mechanics, an independent developer stands, but only in two cases. First: the developer is ready to suffer financial failure. Second, if you have a clear plan, marketing budget and good experience. In all other cases, this is hardly justified. We had option number one, but we really believed that in the realities of business, with weak resources and experience, it is not worth doing.
But I do not exclude any third scenarios. In the end, personal creative self-realization is also important, the opportunity in old age to tell an interesting story to grandchildren about how grandfather risked and fought, was an excitable and energetic villain, even if sometimes he lost. But it is worth a lot, as well as the fact that the touch to the legend took place !
Source: https://habr.com/ru/post/266645/
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