Healthcare IT: or how to exceed the budget by 420%
For the seed, so that there is a desire to read further: “ So far, ... has cost ... at least $ 115 million and annual maintenance costs are approximately $ 14 million. The project is five years late, incomplete, riddled with deficiencies. "
And so, as you might have guessed, it will be a fairly uncommon phenomenon, although the speakers at numerous conferences try modestly to hold back on such a thing when the IT project (not even at all) inflated a long time, but it took it and it suddenly burst.
- Ia, I brought you a gift! Balloon.
- Thank you, Piglet, you are a true friend, not that some! The ball is so big, beautiful!
- Interestingly, this is so loudly loud! And where is my balloon, and where did this cloth come from?
')
By the way, in the old times, your humble servant, participated in testing some of the modules of this project, when he went even in some beta. Even then, it was clear that something was wrong here, but to prove it to a very large and diverse project team, bearing certificates like the New Year tree, where MBA and PMP were simply must-have, by definition, was difficult enough if at all possible. Since then, I caught a glimpse of its development and I have a sufficient idea of its structure. And now, when there are publicly available data, you can tell more about it.
Let's start in order. In 2003, the whole world shuddered from the epidemic of yet another super virus, SARS or SARS. In Canada, which will be further discussed, about 400 people have become infected with the virus, 44 have died, and 25 thousand Toronto residents have been quarantined. In such circumstances, the Ministry of Health could not fail to respond, and it was decided to create a national early warning system for epidemics, the purpose of which was very laconic.
The project began in 2004, initially it was assumed that it will include 6 large modules, such as: immunization management (vaccination of the population), outbreak management (tracking of epidemics), communicable disease case management (tracking of sexually transmitted diseases), etc. The developer was IBM, which signed a fixed contract for $ 27.8 million (hereinafter Canadian dollars). Another $ 9.9 million was allocated for other needs, totaling $ 37.7 million for the project. According to this contract, IBM had, roughly speaking, to go shopping, collect on the shelves of all sorts of products and cook a taste of it, from which everyone would come to indescribable delight. Speaking of IT language, "it was a solution to meet the needs of the pan-Canadian system ".
It soon became clear that the semi-finished products on the shelves were somehow not at all suitable for the expected gourmet dinner by candlelight at the national level. After that, IBM, without thinking twice, offered to create the desired product from scratch. The Ministry of Health did not come up with anything better to agree (for the system was needed). Quickly rewriting the contract, breaking it down into a series of Change Orders, IBM, following all the newfangled agile and other technologies in both project management and development, had to provide a new system during the year (in 2007). The contract increased to $ 47 million.
And then came the financial outbreak (that is to say 2008). Funding for all projects has been revised. The new contract envisaged the creation of a system for $ 16.2 million by 2009. In reality, the ministry paid IBM $ 73.5 million.
By the way, IBM has signed a regular contract for the development of test scenarios and acceptance testing. But even this did not help much, at the time of system delivery (in 2010) 1200 errors were detected, although the terms of the contract assumed that " the system contains no severity 1 or 2 defects and 5 or less severity 3 defects ". Never will you guess what was decided to do with these errors:
• Seminity of qualification and minimization.
• changed severity deficiency levels, resulting in reduced severity levels ŠŠ
• A total of 1,450 annually and allowed jurisdictions to prioritize defects
Having taped all the ugly parts with scotch tape, in 2011 the system went into production. Immediately, another 11 thousand defects were found, among which 63 Severity 1 and almost 2 thousand Severity 2. Among these 11 thousand, 6 thousand defects made the work of medical personnel with the system impossible. By December 2014, 2.5 thousand defects remained open.
And so, thanks to the skillful computerization, the time for receiving one patientdecreased from 25-35 minutes to 35-52 with the new system. According to medical estimates, when using the system, they will lose up to $ 4.5 million in profits annually.
It is worth noting that the problem of the speed of the system, even with the simplest actions of the user, such as choosing a patient from the list, as well as very confusing logic to perform everyday actions, such as creating a patient and linking it to another patient, was obviously still in the earliest stages of testing. However, the desire to create a super-flexible system, every aspect of which can be customized to the wishes of the customer, has done its own insidious job.
What about finances? Initially, allocated $ 27 million for 6 + 1 modules of the system at the time of the audit turned into $ 113 million. At the same time, only a part of the agreed functions of the system was realized. The cost of annual system support is $ 14 million.
The results of the system audit can be found at: www.bcauditor.com/pubs/2015/audit-panora-public-health-it-system
And so, as you might have guessed, it will be a fairly uncommon phenomenon, although the speakers at numerous conferences try modestly to hold back on such a thing when the IT project (not even at all) inflated a long time, but it took it and it suddenly burst.
- Ia, I brought you a gift! Balloon.
- Thank you, Piglet, you are a true friend, not that some! The ball is so big, beautiful!
- Interestingly, this is so loudly loud! And where is my balloon, and where did this cloth come from?
')
By the way, in the old times, your humble servant, participated in testing some of the modules of this project, when he went even in some beta. Even then, it was clear that something was wrong here, but to prove it to a very large and diverse project team, bearing certificates like the New Year tree, where MBA and PMP were simply must-have, by definition, was difficult enough if at all possible. Since then, I caught a glimpse of its development and I have a sufficient idea of its structure. And now, when there are publicly available data, you can tell more about it.
Let's start in order. In 2003, the whole world shuddered from the epidemic of yet another super virus, SARS or SARS. In Canada, which will be further discussed, about 400 people have become infected with the virus, 44 have died, and 25 thousand Toronto residents have been quarantined. In such circumstances, the Ministry of Health could not fail to respond, and it was decided to create a national early warning system for epidemics, the purpose of which was very laconic.
The project began in 2004, initially it was assumed that it will include 6 large modules, such as: immunization management (vaccination of the population), outbreak management (tracking of epidemics), communicable disease case management (tracking of sexually transmitted diseases), etc. The developer was IBM, which signed a fixed contract for $ 27.8 million (hereinafter Canadian dollars). Another $ 9.9 million was allocated for other needs, totaling $ 37.7 million for the project. According to this contract, IBM had, roughly speaking, to go shopping, collect on the shelves of all sorts of products and cook a taste of it, from which everyone would come to indescribable delight. Speaking of IT language, "it was a solution to meet the needs of the pan-Canadian system ".
It soon became clear that the semi-finished products on the shelves were somehow not at all suitable for the expected gourmet dinner by candlelight at the national level. After that, IBM, without thinking twice, offered to create the desired product from scratch. The Ministry of Health did not come up with anything better to agree (for the system was needed). Quickly rewriting the contract, breaking it down into a series of Change Orders, IBM, following all the newfangled agile and other technologies in both project management and development, had to provide a new system during the year (in 2007). The contract increased to $ 47 million.
And then came the financial outbreak (that is to say 2008). Funding for all projects has been revised. The new contract envisaged the creation of a system for $ 16.2 million by 2009. In reality, the ministry paid IBM $ 73.5 million.
By the way, IBM has signed a regular contract for the development of test scenarios and acceptance testing. But even this did not help much, at the time of system delivery (in 2010) 1200 errors were detected, although the terms of the contract assumed that " the system contains no severity 1 or 2 defects and 5 or less severity 3 defects ". Never will you guess what was decided to do with these errors:
• Seminity of qualification and minimization.
• changed severity deficiency levels, resulting in reduced severity levels ŠŠ
• A total of 1,450 annually and allowed jurisdictions to prioritize defects
Having taped all the ugly parts with scotch tape, in 2011 the system went into production. Immediately, another 11 thousand defects were found, among which 63 Severity 1 and almost 2 thousand Severity 2. Among these 11 thousand, 6 thousand defects made the work of medical personnel with the system impossible. By December 2014, 2.5 thousand defects remained open.
And so, thanks to the skillful computerization, the time for receiving one patient
It is worth noting that the problem of the speed of the system, even with the simplest actions of the user, such as choosing a patient from the list, as well as very confusing logic to perform everyday actions, such as creating a patient and linking it to another patient, was obviously still in the earliest stages of testing. However, the desire to create a super-flexible system, every aspect of which can be customized to the wishes of the customer, has done its own insidious job.
What about finances? Initially, allocated $ 27 million for 6 + 1 modules of the system at the time of the audit turned into $ 113 million. At the same time, only a part of the agreed functions of the system was realized. The cost of annual system support is $ 14 million.
The results of the system audit can be found at: www.bcauditor.com/pubs/2015/audit-panora-public-health-it-system
Source: https://habr.com/ru/post/266093/
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