Apple does not follow, but helps users, using hidden services on mobile devices

Recently, Jonathan Zdziarski, at the Hackers On Planet Earth conference in New York, published a report in which he spoke about several hidden, not documented background processes running on all iOS devices. The expert suggested that these functions are needed by Apple in order to organize surveillance of users when they receive requests from the authorities.
Jonathan Zdziarski, also known as NerveGas, was actively involved in the development of jailbreaks for the first iPhone models. He is the author of several books on iOS application development. Those. man is clearly "in the subject."

Surprisingly, Apple did not ignore this report, but described the objectives of each process. What, in their opinion, are these services.

Yes, the theme is yellowish of course. Therefore, do not take the text below as some slogans and attacks of paranoia.
Actually, what's wrong with that? Just think, hidden services ... Yes, in mobile devices, only the lazy did not look for any bookmarks.
And the strange thing is that Apple does not deny their presence, but only says that it is not for surveillance, but to help users.
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What is the essence

On each iOS device, there are several undocumented services that allow you to get all the information from the device (it, in theory, should be encrypted) in open form. It is also possible to install applications. Well, full control of the traffic of course to the heap. For example, the background services com.apple.pcapd and com.apple.mobile.file_relay are mentioned. Some of these services were previously known, but their functionality is constantly growing.
If in previous versions of the platform, the sources for File Relay were AppleSupport, Network, WiFi, UserDatabases, CrashReporter and SystemConfiguration, then in iOS 7 the list already includes 43 sources, including Accounts, AddressBook, Caches, CoreLocation, FindMyiPhone, MapsLogs, Photos, Voicemail and so forth

Details can be gathered directly from the work of Jonathan. It is also important to note here that services can be operated locally, via USB, and remotely, via Wi-Fi or even (presumably) cellular communication. All that is needed for a successful attack is “pairing” with the attacked device. Prior to the seventh version of iOS, “pairing” was performed automatically when connected to any external piece of hardware (computer, other smartphone, “charging”), starting with iOS 7, this requires direct user permission. However, according to Jonathan, even in the case of iOS 7, it is enough for an attacker to steal once from any of the devices with which the pairing has ever been successfully produced, a cryptokey, after which it will be possible to exploit the above-mentioned services without much difficulty.

Apple claims that these services are needed by developers themselves primarily for debugging. Or to help support users.
And here actually the dog also rummaged.
Jonathan doubts that these services were made for debugging. Because they give out data, it’s obviously superfluous for developers, and they function constantly, without requiring switching to debugging modes. Indeed, why do the overwhelming majority of users always have debugging mode turned on? For technical support? It is also unlikely, since many data are not issued as files, but “raw”, unsuitable for quick analysis or return to the device. In addition, the services are not mentioned in the documentation and are not addressed by any other Apple software (at least from the well-known Jonathan, but he knows a lot about it). Plus, obviously not invented by mistake, and then forgotten: they exist in iOS at least from version 4 (some longer), they are regularly updated and supplemented, and Zdziarski even managed to write to the Apple management asking for clarification of what and why, but the answer not received (but knows that the letters reached the addressees, because he answered the less important questions).
And if the information was collected only and exclusively by the authorities, by a court decision. But, according to Jonathan, third-party intermediary companies specializing in digital forensics (including Elcomsoft Russia) are also involved: they are also aware of the existence of undocumented services and offer services and tools for their operation.

PS Actually, I think many have already accepted the fact that manufacturers collect various non-personal information about their users. But here we are talking about full access to the encrypted device. With that, apparently, and third parties. Interestingly, it will result in at least something other than discussion on specialized resources?