A bold plan that could save the Columbia shuttle. Part 3
This is a translation of the end of the article by Lee Hutchinson. The first and second parts of the translation were published in March, but after two months the third part did not appear. Despite the fact that I did not contact the author, I still decided to fill this gap. Since I almost do not translate, it is unlikely that some number of errors and inaccuracies. You can tell about them in PM.
During the rescue operation several actions would be carried out for the first time.
- From Appendix D.13 of the report of the Commission for the investigation of the crash of the shuttle Columbia
Now ( after docking the shuttles - approx. Translator ) the complexity of the mission reached the maximum mark. Depending on fatigue and physical condition, CM1 and CM2 could help the pilot and commander of Atlantis in tasks related to keeping the spacecraft at the desired orbit (assuming that CM1 and CM2 would be commander Rick Husband and pilot William McCool from Colombia). However, two additional spacesuits would continue to be actively used.
')
Two crew members of Atlantis would remain outside, and while CM1 and CM2 would take off spacesuits, two from Atlantis would use their SAFER knapsacks to check the skin and leading edge of the wings (Colombia did not have such SAFER knapsacks, so the off-board crew would require where more sophisticated orbital techniques to take a look at the wing).
The spacesuits removed from CM1 and CM2 were being prepared for reuse. EV1 and EV2 returned them to Colombia in a lock chamber, in which pressure was then leveled off and it opened. Two more members of the crew of Colombia by this point should have already put on their spacesuits, which they were delivered on their first flight. Let's call them CM3 and CM4. They repeat the actions of CM1 and CM2 and go to Atlantis.
Another view of the movement of astronauts between Colombia and Atlantis. Source: NASA / CAIB Report
The report sounded the best possible scenario when the suits were worn and removed without delay. And in this case, all movements could be made without stopping. This means that EV1 and EV2 would be outside from 8.5 to 9 hours in one exit.
However, this is hard to believe. Putting on a spacesuit is not an easy operation even on Earth with full gravity and with many sharp-eyed helpers. Putting on a spacesuit in the central compartment, perhaps still trying to recover from carbon dioxide poisoning, is a much more complicated procedure. The fact that with each successful movement of crew members decreases the number of assistants also does not facilitate the task. It is likely that this stage could be stretched to several exits into space - instead of nine hours it could take three times more.
After the first two pair moves, the following would be single. The CM5 would move with Columbia alone with the helpers of EV1 and EV2. This was done simply because Colombia had seven people on board, and one had to be alone. Leaving the last two, CM6 and CM7, together, it is assumed that they will help each other in putting on the spacesuit. Ars (the site that contains the original article ) interviewed several sources to determine how difficult it was to wear a spacesuit without the help of someone without a spacesuit. Although no one spoke for the record, they all agreed in a generalized way that this is a task of incredible complexity.
Opportunities to fix Colombia was not.
- From Appendix D.13 of the report of the Commission for the investigation of the crash of the shuttle Columbia
Before leaving, the last two people from Colombia had to complete several final actions. The orbiter was supposed to be prepared to intercept control from Earth in order to remove the shuttle from orbit.
There was not a single chance to fix the shuttle. Even if the wing could be patched and cooled, while changing the configuration of the entrance to the atmosphere to increase the angle of attack and lower the temperature of the leading edge of the wing, it is unlikely that Colombia would have survived. In addition, even if successful entry into the atmosphere would have been possible, the shuttle could not be planted only from Earth - the PMU could not push the shuttle chassis and control the air intakes ( air probes , serve to determine the atmospheric pressure overboard - approx. Translator ) required to estimate the velocity in the atmosphere. These functions (as well as the inclusion of an auxiliary power unit) could only be performed by physically switching the toggle switch in the cockpit during the approach and landing.
The remaining shuttles were able to land under full control from Earth in 2006, using the 8.5-meter braided cable developed by the RCO IFM , which could be used by the crew to physically connect the cockpit to the shuttle electronics compartment and give the MCC access to the required switches.
Chassis switches (left) right in front of the command post. They are among several systems that could be controlled remotely from Earth. Source: Steven Michael
There was no such opportunity in Colombia. CM6 and CM7 would have to go into the flight bay of the shuttle and switch several toggle switches in place, giving the MCC from Earth direct access to Columbia’s navigation and maneuvering systems.
CM6 and CM7 would then leave the shuttle, closing the atmospheric gateway behind them and leaving Colombia to search for their own way home. Atlantis would have been slowly moving away from the fraternal ship, and its crew of 11 people would have been busy preparing for the difficult test of entering the atmosphere with a crowded apparatus — the orbiter had never landed with 11 crew members before, and even such simple things as seating would have been complicated. A few people would have to literally sit tied to the floor while entering the atmosphere.
At some point in the course of several hours or days, terrestrial operators would have ordered Colombia to close the doors of the cargo hold and orient themselves for the latter task. The shuttle would turn the damaged thermal tile to Earth and produce a braking impulse with its large OMS ( Orbital Maneuvering System, orbital maneuver system - approx. Translator ) engines. After a while he would have crossed the atmosphere border ( “entry interface”, the entry point to the atmosphere at an altitude of 121 km - interpreter ).
Contrary to popular opinion, the heating of a spacecraft when entering the atmosphere is the result not so much of friction as of drag - a fast-moving shuttle forces air in front of itself, forming a massive impact zone in which air molecules ionize and fly apart. During the descent of Colombia, an observer in the flight bay would see windows glow and plasma glow. After a short time, this plasma would have penetrated the structures of the shuttle through a hole in the wing.
Colombia’s last appearance would be a glow in the sky over the South Pacific, first as one luminous star, and then split into many. The remains of the oldest shuttle would dot the surface of the Pacific, and nothing more.
Glowing ionized trail from the entrance of Atlantis to the atmosphere during the last flight in the Space Shuttle program. Photographed from the ISS, July 21, 2011. Source: NASA
It should be noted that although each individual element with the best development of events could be executed in such a way that the rescue mission would be successful, but the overall risk of reducing training and training time is higher than for individual elements.
- From Appendix D.13 of the report of the Commission for the investigation of the crash of the shuttle Columbia
We all love the endings like in the movies, but it's hard to imagine that the rescue mission would have passed with the necessary level of impeccability. For example, during the study for this article, I did not encounter a single case when the shuttle went through the Orbital Processing Facility ( here the author has a mistake, the hangar is called Orbiter - approx. Translator ), the Vehicle Assembly Building and the launch complex procedures without errors and failures. Given the complexity of the device, I suspect that this has never happened.
Yes, and again, when faced with a challenge of such magnitude and with such dire consequences, the picture in which NASA takes on this task is imagining an incredibly attractive one. NASA, as a government agency, at the same time represents the best and worst of the United States — several of the greatest engineering achievements in the history of mankind and a long list of achieved goals that were initially considered impossible to fulfill. At the same time, the agency is crippled by a lack of leadership and initiative. It has evolved from an organization capable of delivering humans to other worlds, into an organization that does not even have the ability to get people into low Earth orbit without any help.
Thus, the rescue mission of Colombia shows the type of tasks for which NASA, from its very foundation, has expressed unshakable confidence in their accomplishment. It should have become a clear goal, a tight timeframe would exist, and the agency’s vast engineering talent staff would have to be authorized to complete this goal at any cost and without restrictions.
The desire to win would not be a problem, but technical challenges are not aware of the desires and motivations - take a look, for example, at the explosion of a tank with liquid oxygen that mutilated the Apollo 13 command and service modules in 1970. This explosion was the result of a combination of events that occurred before launch, with the possible fault of personalities ranging from employees of the manufacturer of the tank up to the crew members themselves . The unmistakable rescue of Colombia would have to depend not only on the flawless work of the team at NASA, but also on an unknown number of events that occurred days, weeks, months or even years before the start of this mission.
In the study for this article, I spoke with a large number of people working and working at NASA who are both inside and outside the mission management directorate. Everyone was polite, but no one agreed to speak under the record of the feasibility of Colombia’s supposed salvation mission. The official response I received from NASA’s public relations department, respectfully but firmly informed me that the CAIB report is the full and official position of NASA on this case:
Ultimately, Application D.13 is an assumption based on the research and the entirety of the information developed by those engineers who are intimately familiar with the program of the Shuttle missions. My story about the rescue story does not have a goal to criticize or blame NASA for their actions, nor do I try, with a backward mind, to reconsider the choice of decisions by those responsible who now have to live with consequences in the form of graves because of these very decisions. Colombia and its crew almost certainly could not have been saved without the many "ifs" turned in their direction. I can tell the story of what might be the most awe-inspiring moment among all man-made space flights, but I’m too unqualified to reason beyond the scope of the CAIB report.
This is an amazing story, but it is only a story.
It is unlikely that launching spacecraft into space will ever be the same routine as commercial flights — definitely, this will not happen during the lifetime of someone who reads these lines. Scientists and engineers continue to work on the best opportunities, but if we want to continue to go out into outer space, then we must continue to take all the risks.
- From the report of the Commission for the investigation of the crash of the shuttle "Columbia"
Return to flights took NASA 907 days after the destruction of Colombia. STS-114 - Discovery flight instead of Atlantis - rose from Cape Canaveral on July 26, 2005. I remembered it very well - now, as a non-junior system administrator, I watched helplessly as a significant number of Boeing employees looked at the countdown and the launch video on NASA TV, scoring our local Internet channel. A bit funny is that it almost led to an attempt by our management to request a take-off delay (the Boing office in Houston provided support for the shuttle, and some of these support activities required an Internet connection). The launch was successful.
Starting with STS-114, not a single shuttle took off without a rescue vehicle in standby mode. Such planned emergency flights (STS-3xx numbering) were called LON-mission , which means “Launch On Need” ( launch if necessary - translator’s note ). In case of problems of the main mission of the shuttle, the crew had to make a rendezvous with the ISS and take shelter there for up to 50 days, while the LON shuttle would be made ready for flight to pick them up.
The only exception was the last Hubble maintenance mission, STS-125. The height of the orbit and its inclination for Hubble made the mission completely incompatible with the possibility of an emergency meeting with the ISS in case of problems, so a rescue plan was drawn up, partly based on the Atlantis / Colombia scheme. The STS-125 LON mission was duplicated by the STS-400 . Due to the fact that the option with the ISS was unavailable, the endeavor from the STS-400 would have to be ready to launch in a short time, and this has already led to an exceptional case: the two shuttles were loaded on the LC-39 at the same time
.
Source: NASA / WikiMedia Commons
No LON mission was ever required, and the shuttle program was completed without other significant incidents. The blows of the breakaway foam were not eliminated, but the amount of post-launch analysis of each shuttle was increased. This is undoubtedly, in fact, what will return the future manned astronautics NASA to its rightful place at the top of the spacecraft launches faster than if everything remained in its place. NASA culture continues to evolve. It is impossible to say at the moment whether all the lessons of Colombia were studied in the agency.
I was here while studying the consequences and returning to the flights, but the changes in the policy of the entire agency are far beyond my competence. The only most vivid memory was the memorial service after the destruction of Colombia.
The path of exploration and discovery is not the choice that we made - it is a destination written in human hearts. We are the part of creation that tries to understand creation itself. We are looking for the best among us, sending them forward to unexplored darkness and praying for their return. They rest in peace for all of humanity, and all of humanity is in their debt.
- President George W. Bush, in a message to Johnson Space Center staff
We arrived at Johnson Space Center around 9-30 am, informed that the number of places would be limited to the service that starts at noon. After half a mile of walking and checking by the security service, we took a place in the center of Building 16, losing ourselves among the sea of ​​people. The platform and the podium were far away at the other end of the grass field, and we spent two and a half hours on our feet in uncomfortable silence. After a long wait, the Board Number One, followed by three F-15S, circled downhill to Ellington Field airport. The crowd grew to its maximum immediately after 11. At noon, without fanfare, President Bush and First Lady Laura Bush walked together to their seats on the platform. They held hands that were imprinted in my brain — even the most powerful man in the world holds his wife by the hand.
After the prayer, the director of NASA and the head of the Astronaut Corps spoke. Both paid tribute to each astronaut individually, and the head of the Corps apparently struggled with tears. The President came to the podium next and spoke eloquently about the human spirit. The only words close to politics that left his mouth were absolutely relevant - he said that the space program would continue. After that, he also spoke about each cosmonaut personally, praising their courage and dedication.
The ship's bell rang seven times, according to the number of crew members of Colombia, and after that 4 NASA T-38s flew in the “Missing Man” formation. Planes flew low and fast, rushing past us wedge less than a hundred meters above the ground. As soon as they passed above us, the second plane from behind on the left side of the formation went up at a sharp angle, right at the moment when the roar of the engines hit us. “Missing Man” - the plane made a steep arc and rushed up while the formation continued to move, now with an empty space, meaning that there were men and women in this place who are no longer among us.
I have never witnessed anything so deeply touching as this trio of airplanes flying low over the rest of the campus with my lost comrade thousands of meters higher and soaring higher and higher. I remember it forever.
Have a nice trip, Colombia.
Thimbles
During the rescue operation several actions would be carried out for the first time.
- From Appendix D.13 of the report of the Commission for the investigation of the crash of the shuttle Columbia
Now ( after docking the shuttles - approx. Translator ) the complexity of the mission reached the maximum mark. Depending on fatigue and physical condition, CM1 and CM2 could help the pilot and commander of Atlantis in tasks related to keeping the spacecraft at the desired orbit (assuming that CM1 and CM2 would be commander Rick Husband and pilot William McCool from Colombia). However, two additional spacesuits would continue to be actively used.
')
Two crew members of Atlantis would remain outside, and while CM1 and CM2 would take off spacesuits, two from Atlantis would use their SAFER knapsacks to check the skin and leading edge of the wings (Colombia did not have such SAFER knapsacks, so the off-board crew would require where more sophisticated orbital techniques to take a look at the wing).
The spacesuits removed from CM1 and CM2 were being prepared for reuse. EV1 and EV2 returned them to Colombia in a lock chamber, in which pressure was then leveled off and it opened. Two more members of the crew of Colombia by this point should have already put on their spacesuits, which they were delivered on their first flight. Let's call them CM3 and CM4. They repeat the actions of CM1 and CM2 and go to Atlantis.
Another view of the movement of astronauts between Colombia and Atlantis. Source: NASA / CAIB Report
The report sounded the best possible scenario when the suits were worn and removed without delay. And in this case, all movements could be made without stopping. This means that EV1 and EV2 would be outside from 8.5 to 9 hours in one exit.
However, this is hard to believe. Putting on a spacesuit is not an easy operation even on Earth with full gravity and with many sharp-eyed helpers. Putting on a spacesuit in the central compartment, perhaps still trying to recover from carbon dioxide poisoning, is a much more complicated procedure. The fact that with each successful movement of crew members decreases the number of assistants also does not facilitate the task. It is likely that this stage could be stretched to several exits into space - instead of nine hours it could take three times more.
After the first two pair moves, the following would be single. The CM5 would move with Columbia alone with the helpers of EV1 and EV2. This was done simply because Colombia had seven people on board, and one had to be alone. Leaving the last two, CM6 and CM7, together, it is assumed that they will help each other in putting on the spacesuit. Ars (the site that contains the original article ) interviewed several sources to determine how difficult it was to wear a spacesuit without the help of someone without a spacesuit. Although no one spoke for the record, they all agreed in a generalized way that this is a task of incredible complexity.
Shooting star
Opportunities to fix Colombia was not.
- From Appendix D.13 of the report of the Commission for the investigation of the crash of the shuttle Columbia
Before leaving, the last two people from Colombia had to complete several final actions. The orbiter was supposed to be prepared to intercept control from Earth in order to remove the shuttle from orbit.
There was not a single chance to fix the shuttle. Even if the wing could be patched and cooled, while changing the configuration of the entrance to the atmosphere to increase the angle of attack and lower the temperature of the leading edge of the wing, it is unlikely that Colombia would have survived. In addition, even if successful entry into the atmosphere would have been possible, the shuttle could not be planted only from Earth - the PMU could not push the shuttle chassis and control the air intakes ( air probes , serve to determine the atmospheric pressure overboard - approx. Translator ) required to estimate the velocity in the atmosphere. These functions (as well as the inclusion of an auxiliary power unit) could only be performed by physically switching the toggle switch in the cockpit during the approach and landing.
The remaining shuttles were able to land under full control from Earth in 2006, using the 8.5-meter braided cable developed by the RCO IFM , which could be used by the crew to physically connect the cockpit to the shuttle electronics compartment and give the MCC access to the required switches.
Chassis switches (left) right in front of the command post. They are among several systems that could be controlled remotely from Earth. Source: Steven Michael
There was no such opportunity in Colombia. CM6 and CM7 would have to go into the flight bay of the shuttle and switch several toggle switches in place, giving the MCC from Earth direct access to Columbia’s navigation and maneuvering systems.
CM6 and CM7 would then leave the shuttle, closing the atmospheric gateway behind them and leaving Colombia to search for their own way home. Atlantis would have been slowly moving away from the fraternal ship, and its crew of 11 people would have been busy preparing for the difficult test of entering the atmosphere with a crowded apparatus — the orbiter had never landed with 11 crew members before, and even such simple things as seating would have been complicated. A few people would have to literally sit tied to the floor while entering the atmosphere.
At some point in the course of several hours or days, terrestrial operators would have ordered Colombia to close the doors of the cargo hold and orient themselves for the latter task. The shuttle would turn the damaged thermal tile to Earth and produce a braking impulse with its large OMS ( Orbital Maneuvering System, orbital maneuver system - approx. Translator ) engines. After a while he would have crossed the atmosphere border ( “entry interface”, the entry point to the atmosphere at an altitude of 121 km - interpreter ).
Contrary to popular opinion, the heating of a spacecraft when entering the atmosphere is the result not so much of friction as of drag - a fast-moving shuttle forces air in front of itself, forming a massive impact zone in which air molecules ionize and fly apart. During the descent of Colombia, an observer in the flight bay would see windows glow and plasma glow. After a short time, this plasma would have penetrated the structures of the shuttle through a hole in the wing.
Colombia’s last appearance would be a glow in the sky over the South Pacific, first as one luminous star, and then split into many. The remains of the oldest shuttle would dot the surface of the Pacific, and nothing more.
Glowing ionized trail from the entrance of Atlantis to the atmosphere during the last flight in the Space Shuttle program. Photographed from the ISS, July 21, 2011. Source: NASA
To the stars through the thorns
It should be noted that although each individual element with the best development of events could be executed in such a way that the rescue mission would be successful, but the overall risk of reducing training and training time is higher than for individual elements.
- From Appendix D.13 of the report of the Commission for the investigation of the crash of the shuttle Columbia
We all love the endings like in the movies, but it's hard to imagine that the rescue mission would have passed with the necessary level of impeccability. For example, during the study for this article, I did not encounter a single case when the shuttle went through the Orbital Processing Facility ( here the author has a mistake, the hangar is called Orbiter - approx. Translator ), the Vehicle Assembly Building and the launch complex procedures without errors and failures. Given the complexity of the device, I suspect that this has never happened.
Yes, and again, when faced with a challenge of such magnitude and with such dire consequences, the picture in which NASA takes on this task is imagining an incredibly attractive one. NASA, as a government agency, at the same time represents the best and worst of the United States — several of the greatest engineering achievements in the history of mankind and a long list of achieved goals that were initially considered impossible to fulfill. At the same time, the agency is crippled by a lack of leadership and initiative. It has evolved from an organization capable of delivering humans to other worlds, into an organization that does not even have the ability to get people into low Earth orbit without any help.
Thus, the rescue mission of Colombia shows the type of tasks for which NASA, from its very foundation, has expressed unshakable confidence in their accomplishment. It should have become a clear goal, a tight timeframe would exist, and the agency’s vast engineering talent staff would have to be authorized to complete this goal at any cost and without restrictions.
The desire to win would not be a problem, but technical challenges are not aware of the desires and motivations - take a look, for example, at the explosion of a tank with liquid oxygen that mutilated the Apollo 13 command and service modules in 1970. This explosion was the result of a combination of events that occurred before launch, with the possible fault of personalities ranging from employees of the manufacturer of the tank up to the crew members themselves . The unmistakable rescue of Colombia would have to depend not only on the flawless work of the team at NASA, but also on an unknown number of events that occurred days, weeks, months or even years before the start of this mission.
In the study for this article, I spoke with a large number of people working and working at NASA who are both inside and outside the mission management directorate. Everyone was polite, but no one agreed to speak under the record of the feasibility of Colombia’s supposed salvation mission. The official response I received from NASA’s public relations department, respectfully but firmly informed me that the CAIB report is the full and official position of NASA on this case:
From the point of view of NASA, there is nothing more to add to the report of the Commission for the investigation of the crash of the Columbia shuttle (Chapter 6 and its appendices) regarding what-if-the STS-107 crew rescue scenario. As you know, it was very clearly stated that there should have been a very large number of known facts in order to fulfill the mission of salvation or repair of Colombia at that time.
...
In conclusion, we respectfully refuse to give any interviews on this particular topic and refer you to the CAIB report for a detailed analysis conducted during the investigation of the Colombian accident.
Ultimately, Application D.13 is an assumption based on the research and the entirety of the information developed by those engineers who are intimately familiar with the program of the Shuttle missions. My story about the rescue story does not have a goal to criticize or blame NASA for their actions, nor do I try, with a backward mind, to reconsider the choice of decisions by those responsible who now have to live with consequences in the form of graves because of these very decisions. Colombia and its crew almost certainly could not have been saved without the many "ifs" turned in their direction. I can tell the story of what might be the most awe-inspiring moment among all man-made space flights, but I’m too unqualified to reason beyond the scope of the CAIB report.
This is an amazing story, but it is only a story.
Long way home
It is unlikely that launching spacecraft into space will ever be the same routine as commercial flights — definitely, this will not happen during the lifetime of someone who reads these lines. Scientists and engineers continue to work on the best opportunities, but if we want to continue to go out into outer space, then we must continue to take all the risks.
- From the report of the Commission for the investigation of the crash of the shuttle "Columbia"
Return to flights took NASA 907 days after the destruction of Colombia. STS-114 - Discovery flight instead of Atlantis - rose from Cape Canaveral on July 26, 2005. I remembered it very well - now, as a non-junior system administrator, I watched helplessly as a significant number of Boeing employees looked at the countdown and the launch video on NASA TV, scoring our local Internet channel. A bit funny is that it almost led to an attempt by our management to request a take-off delay (the Boing office in Houston provided support for the shuttle, and some of these support activities required an Internet connection). The launch was successful.
Starting with STS-114, not a single shuttle took off without a rescue vehicle in standby mode. Such planned emergency flights (STS-3xx numbering) were called LON-mission , which means “Launch On Need” ( launch if necessary - translator’s note ). In case of problems of the main mission of the shuttle, the crew had to make a rendezvous with the ISS and take shelter there for up to 50 days, while the LON shuttle would be made ready for flight to pick them up.
The only exception was the last Hubble maintenance mission, STS-125. The height of the orbit and its inclination for Hubble made the mission completely incompatible with the possibility of an emergency meeting with the ISS in case of problems, so a rescue plan was drawn up, partly based on the Atlantis / Colombia scheme. The STS-125 LON mission was duplicated by the STS-400 . Due to the fact that the option with the ISS was unavailable, the endeavor from the STS-400 would have to be ready to launch in a short time, and this has already led to an exceptional case: the two shuttles were loaded on the LC-39 at the same time
.Source: NASA / WikiMedia Commons
No LON mission was ever required, and the shuttle program was completed without other significant incidents. The blows of the breakaway foam were not eliminated, but the amount of post-launch analysis of each shuttle was increased. This is undoubtedly, in fact, what will return the future manned astronautics NASA to its rightful place at the top of the spacecraft launches faster than if everything remained in its place. NASA culture continues to evolve. It is impossible to say at the moment whether all the lessons of Colombia were studied in the agency.
I was here while studying the consequences and returning to the flights, but the changes in the policy of the entire agency are far beyond my competence. The only most vivid memory was the memorial service after the destruction of Colombia.
February 4, 2003
The path of exploration and discovery is not the choice that we made - it is a destination written in human hearts. We are the part of creation that tries to understand creation itself. We are looking for the best among us, sending them forward to unexplored darkness and praying for their return. They rest in peace for all of humanity, and all of humanity is in their debt.
- President George W. Bush, in a message to Johnson Space Center staff
We arrived at Johnson Space Center around 9-30 am, informed that the number of places would be limited to the service that starts at noon. After half a mile of walking and checking by the security service, we took a place in the center of Building 16, losing ourselves among the sea of ​​people. The platform and the podium were far away at the other end of the grass field, and we spent two and a half hours on our feet in uncomfortable silence. After a long wait, the Board Number One, followed by three F-15S, circled downhill to Ellington Field airport. The crowd grew to its maximum immediately after 11. At noon, without fanfare, President Bush and First Lady Laura Bush walked together to their seats on the platform. They held hands that were imprinted in my brain — even the most powerful man in the world holds his wife by the hand.
After the prayer, the director of NASA and the head of the Astronaut Corps spoke. Both paid tribute to each astronaut individually, and the head of the Corps apparently struggled with tears. The President came to the podium next and spoke eloquently about the human spirit. The only words close to politics that left his mouth were absolutely relevant - he said that the space program would continue. After that, he also spoke about each cosmonaut personally, praising their courage and dedication.
The ship's bell rang seven times, according to the number of crew members of Colombia, and after that 4 NASA T-38s flew in the “Missing Man” formation. Planes flew low and fast, rushing past us wedge less than a hundred meters above the ground. As soon as they passed above us, the second plane from behind on the left side of the formation went up at a sharp angle, right at the moment when the roar of the engines hit us. “Missing Man” - the plane made a steep arc and rushed up while the formation continued to move, now with an empty space, meaning that there were men and women in this place who are no longer among us.
I have never witnessed anything so deeply touching as this trio of airplanes flying low over the rest of the campus with my lost comrade thousands of meters higher and soaring higher and higher. I remember it forever.
Have a nice trip, Colombia.
Source: https://habr.com/ru/post/223303/
All Articles