How do we build the information protection of Russia

West us not ukaz and not a prison. His culture is not the ideal of perfection. The construction of his spiritual act (or, vѣrnѣe, - his spiritual acts), can be, and corresponds to his abilities and his needs, but our strength, our task, our historical vocation and soulful way, it does not meet and does not satisfy. And we must not chase after him and make ourselves a specimen. The West has its errors, illnesses, weaknesses and dangers. There is no salvation in Westernism. We have our own ways and our tasks. And in this - the meaning of the Russian idea.
Ivan Alexandrovich Ilyin "On the Russian Idea" (1948)

In connection with the recent turbulent political events, the importance of information protection of Russia has increased dramatically, and, obviously, will continue to grow with the increasing influence of our country in the world.

Russia (and the Russian world, including in the understanding of IA Ilyin) must be reliably protected. I propose to discuss the outline of the action plan. I think that for some readers the measures proposed by me will seem excessive. However, when we talk about protection, it is better to do everything with a margin.

Further elaboration of the protection plan should take into account that people working in different areas of activity need different levels and means of protection. More on this in the last part of the article.
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I do not pretend to a detailed disclosure of the full picture. These are only preliminary sketches that require clarification, synthesis and refinement.

So, the defense of Russia :

1) Mobile devices : a significant danger lies in the huge number of uncontrolled mobile devices.

Solution: reboot the operating system of devices when crossing the border of Russia. The “external” (“alien”) OS is recorded in the depository of the border control point, replaced with our similar OS. Access to the mobile network is allowed only to "their" devices. The equipment of mobile operators monitors the attempt to access "foreign" devices and immediately gives an alarm. The same with the radio. The same with space communication devices. Access should be only to authorized satellites (at the state level).

2) Built-in devices, including implanted devices, should be subject to mandatory registration when crossing the border of the Russian Federation. All protocols of interaction with the outside world should be transferred to the depository of the Russian special services (special depository). The output on an unregistered (unresolved) protocol should be monitored and signaled about the threat.

3) General purpose computers . The OS reboot solution is not suitable for them. The volume and variety of programs are too large. Solution: on all computers with a "foreign" OS, the first time you enter the network, a filtering program should be installed. All interaction with the outside world, be it wired or wireless networks, goes through the filter. The filter keeps a log of all types of access. In fact, we are talking about placing any “not our” computer in a special “sandbox”.

I note that the filter should not decrypt the transmitted information, but only to register the fact of communication with a non-anonymous correspondent. Communication with an anonymous correspondent must be fully logged, including the content or blocked if the content is encrypted. Opening (decoding) of information should be carried out by a court decision.

4) Creating a depository of all authorized programs - all programs used in the Russian world should be transferred in their original form to a special depository. It is necessary to ensure the simplicity of updating programs in the depository and the possibility of comparison. Naturally, the study of programs and search for built-in "bugs" and "bookmarks" will be conducted only when necessary.

5) Restricting access to national information . There should be a law banning the storage of national information outside the Russian world. For example, all registration data on Russian users of the international social network should be stored only in data centers in Russia. Access to data centers should be organized by our special services and should be guaranteed no access by the special services of other countries.

6) All the highest state bodies of Russia (legislative, executive and judicial branches of government) in the territory of the Russian Federation should be placed in network sandboxes; all their interactions must be logged. The same for the organizations of the diplomatic service of the Russian Federation. The same for foreign-funded organizations (NPOs).

7) The least favored (and trust) regime should be created for all foreign companies that are directly connected with the intelligence services of other countries, primarily for Google, Microsoft and Apple.
Measures can be very different, for example:
- Mandatory requirement for the payment of all taxes in Russia; double taxation;
- additional tax on advertising; advertising for such companies should cost more, money above the price of ordinary advertising should go to the Fund for Technological Development of Russia;
- Mandatory requirement to transfer all source texts to the special services depository. If the texts are not provided and not certified in the Russian Federation - a ban on use in the territory of the Russian Federation.

8) All programs and equipment in Russia must operate in accordance with state standards adopted in Russia . It is necessary to avoid the automatic use of standards adopted by American (European) standards institutes. The standard should be Russian or international. International standards institutes should be protected from the influence of any commercial structures.

9) Russian (Russian-speaking) resources, fundamentally important for the security of the Russian Federation, should be protected by the state ( state protectionism ). It is not only about the aerospace and nuclear industry, not only about the military-industrial complex. Everything is clear with them.

The thing that we all use in everyday life; about services of fundamental importance for the Russian world:
- search services (free search);
- postal services (free email);
- social networks;
- video depositories;
- large electronic publishers.

The state should ensure the continued and uninterrupted operation of these services. Enterprises owning such services should receive state preferences (not only tax) in exchange for control and support from the state. The share of foreign capital in these enterprises should be legally restricted; it is desirable to ban the sale of shares of such enterprises to foreigners altogether.
We need a dedicated social network in which there will be access to officials at any level. I think that this social network should be managed by a private company, but under the control of the state, and have state preferences.

10) The highest responsibility of our counterintelligence structures and absolute confidence in them must be ensured. For the whole world it should be obvious that if Russian counterintelligence decrypts political, diplomatic or business correspondence, then there are good reasons for this. And that no data will not be used for other purposes, of course, except for using them against organizations hostile to us.

As you can see, part of the proposed protection measures are common, and part must be detailed and painted for different spheres of activity and groups of the population.
We can conditionally divide the scope of activities into:
- state activity;
- business;
- science, culture and education;
- other.

Obviously, for different groups need different degrees of protection and different means of protection. Moreover, each such group is also heterogeneous. For example, in the “state activity” it is possible to single out the part that requires extremely high protection:
- special services;
- MFA;
- army;
- space;
- nuclear power.

Similarly, from science and education can be distinguished part that requires a high level of protection, for example, work in the field of robotics, biotechnology, supercomputers, programming technology, encryption. And for them the means of protection must be tougher.

Separately, it is necessary to think over measures and methods of protection for Russians in other countries.

However, I do not pretend to be the ultimate truth. My goal is to draw attention to the topic and get government support for such work. In general, the measures listed above should provide information protection for the country in the era of the Second Cold War (World War I).

Then the question arises - how to get down to business. Obviously, to make protection, you need to achieve information independence , or the information sovereignty of the country.

Providing information sovereignty is a challenge, the adoption of which will lead Russia to a fundamentally different level of development. A quarter of a century ago, our country accepted the Japanese challenge of creating computers of the 5th generation (Fifth Generation). Was created and achieved a lot VNTK "Start". Unfortunately, "Start" worked on the outflow of the Soviet Union and what was then developed, quietly dissolved in museums and private companies.

Now Russia is on the rise, we need to set ourselves transcendent tasks and solve them. Computer science and a huge intellectual human potential can and should become the engine of development and strengthening of the country.

We cannot wait until the state unfolds and creates the necessary structure. We must unite and begin to act!

about the author
Alexey Nedorya - Candidate of Physical and Mathematical Sciences (1994).
Born on January 11, 1962 (Chita). In 1979 he entered the Novosibirsk State University (NSU). In 1982, he became one of the founders of the Intruders Club - an informal computer group of students of the physical and mechanical-mathematical faculties of the NSU. In 1984 he graduated from the NSU (thesis - compiler from the Edison language Per Brinch Hansen for the Elbrus-1 multiprocessor computer complex). In the spring of 1984, he participated in the creation of the legendary group Kronos (the first Soviet 32-bit processor), was the main developer of the Excelsior OS and several compilers from Modula-2 / Oberon-2 languages. From 1985 to 1988 Worked at the “Start” Exhibition (the USSR’s response to the Japanese ambitious fifth-generation computer project). Further, until 1998, at the Institute of Informatics Systems named. A.P. Ershov, Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences. In 1990, he personally met Niklaus Wirth; in 1991, was on probation with professor Wirth at ETH Zurich (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich). In 1991-1994 worked on the XDS multi-purpose instrumental system (Modula-2 and Oberon-2) and program code generation systems for onboard space complexes. Since 1994 - global IT outsourcing and offshore programming. Since 2001 - the development of new programming tools.