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The lessons of space catastrophes


The end of January is the time of mourning for NASA. Their disasters are very “heap” at the end of January-beginning of February. In the entire history of space exploration, five cosmic catastrophes occurred, twenty-one people died in them. And the saddest thing about these disasters is that they could not have all of them. None of them occurred due to the action of an irresistible external force, accident or the guilt of the crew.

Introduction


In order to avoid disputes about what a “cosmic catastrophe” is, in this article I will understand the incident with the death of cosmonauts / astronauts, which occurred during the operation of space technology in space flight or in preparation for it. There are five such incidents in history: Apollo 1, Soyuz 1, Soyuz 11, Challenger STS-51-L, Columbia STS-107.

Apollo 1



From left to right: Ed White, Gus Grissom, Roger Chaffee

The lunar race between the USSR and the USA was in full swing. The United States, thanks to its spy satellites, knew that a new large rocket was being built in the USSR, which could possibly bring Soviet cosmonauts to the moon. Active flights of calm machines also did not add. Therefore, the development of the ships "Apollo" was carried out in great haste. The Apollo command module was made in two versions - Block I for testing in unmanned form and flights in Earth orbit, and Block II, which was to be finalized taking into account the comments on Block I, and would be suitable for flights to the Moon. Two unmanned flights (AS-201 and AS-202) were successfully conducted in 1966, and the first manned mission was planned for the end of February 1967. Began training crew. The module arrived at the cosmodrome not fully ready, engineering changes were made by the hundreds already in the process of preparing for the flight at the cosmodrome. On January 27, the first test was scheduled with a simulation of the work of the command module on-board power. It consisted in verifying the operability of the ship’s instruments and starting at the moment of launch, but without real start-up. The tanks on the service module were not filled, pyrotechnic devices were turned off, so the test was considered safe. The test began at one o'clock. It was difficult enough, there were many problems with communication, the readiness set was going very slowly. At 18:31 a scream “Fire in the cockpit!” Was heard over the intercom. Fifteen seconds later, the module burst, unable to withstand the increase in pressure. Astronauts Gus Grissom, Ed White and Roger Chaffee could not get out of the burning module and died.

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Sequence of events

18:30:54: Voltage surges are recorded by telemetry.
18:31:04: You hear the hey exclamation "Hey!" Chuffey and scrabbling sounds.
18:31:06: White report: “Fire in the cockpit!” On TV you can see the flame moving quickly from left to right, the smoke covers the TV screens.
18: 31: 12: Creek, presumably, Chaffee: "We have a strong fire!" The sound of a bursting command module, cry: "I am burning!"
18:31:21: Audio breaks.
~ 18: 36: Only at this moment the attendants were able to reach the module, break through the smoke and open the module hatches. The module was filled with smoke, the fire as a whole stopped. The bodies of Grissom and White were found at the hatch, the body of Chaffee was in the lodgment. According to the instructions for emergency evacuation, he had to wait for the opening of the hatch and keep in touch. An autopsy revealed that astronauts died from cardiac arrest caused by inhalation of carbon monoxide. Body burns were posthumous.

Causes of disaster

The immediate cause of the accident was a spark or short circuit in the wiring. The exact location of the spark is known only approximately, there are different versions, from the deterioration of the insulation on the wires (from the opening / closing of the technical hatch) to static electricity. However, as in most technical systems, there were several factors that influenced the disaster:
The main reason for the death of astronauts was the inability to quickly leave the command module. The command module hatch consisted of two parts. The upper part opened outward, lower - inward. The increase in pressure from heating in case of fire made the opening of the inner hatch impossible. The reason for choosing such an engineering solution is unequivocally unknown. In the next version, Block II, the hatch was supposed to open to the outside; they wanted to do this in order to simplify the exit to the outside during extravehicular activity and at the end of the flight, the issue of emergency escape of the capsule was not considered. The lack of emergency hatch reset systems was associated with fears of their unauthorized triggering, as happened in 1961 with Gus Grissom, who almost drowned after dropping the capsule due to spontaneous hatching of the hatch.
The effect of the fire was influenced by the fact that there was an atmosphere of pure oxygen in the cabin at a pressure above atmospheric (16 psi or 1.1 atm). In these conditions, even those materials were burned which, under normal conditions, are practically non-combustible. Even aluminum burned. How differently the materials burn in pure oxygen can be seen here . NASA successfully used the atmosphere of pure oxygen on the previous ships - “Mercury” and “Gemini”, it allowed to save the weight of the structure and simplified the life support system. The familiarity of such an atmosphere and the absence of specific problems led to the fact that it was no longer perceived by developers as dangerous. On the contrary, in 1960, the tester almost died while testing a mixed oxygen-nitrogen atmosphere.

Taken measures

In order to prevent the recurrence of a catastrophe, the following measures were taken:


Effects

The Apollo program was delayed for twenty months to fix various problems. After the improvements, the ships proved to be very reliable, a very serious accident on the Apollo 13 did not lead to human victims.

Soyuz-1




April 23, 1967 was a difficult day for the staff of the MCC and the developers of the Soyuz ships. The ambitious mission of the "Unions" -1 and -2 was thwarted. According to the plan, the Soyuz-1 with Vladimir Komarov was launched first into orbit. Then the Soyuz-2 was to be launched with cosmonauts Bykovsky, Eliseev, Khrunov. The ships were to dock, and Yeliseyev and Khrunov were to go to the Soyuz-1 through open space. However, immediately after the launch of Soyuz-1, serious problems arose: one of the solar panels did not open, the ionic orientation system was unstable, and the solar-star orientation sensor failed. Asymmetrically opened solar panels shifted the center of mass, it did not work out a spin on the Sun to charge the batteries, there were problems with the operation of the orientation system. The mission had to stop early. With the return to Earth, problems also arose - the failure of the systems and the asymmetry of the center of mass did not allow us to orient the ship to braking. MCC in an emergency order developed a new instruction on the orientation of the ship. Komarov successfully guided the ship manually. The braking impulse was issued correctly, the ship descended from orbit, the compartments were separated, and the descent vehicle was braked in dense layers of the atmosphere. However, a crashed and burning descent vehicle was found at the landing site. Cosmonaut Vladimir Komarov died.


Sequence of events

At an altitude of 9.5 km, the hatch of the main parachute compartment was dropped, and a drag parachute was introduced, which was supposed to pull the main parachute out of the compartment. However, he could not do this, the main parachute remained in the container. At an altitude of 5.5 km, the reserve parachute automatics estimated the speed of descent as unacceptable and activated the reserve parachute. However, it turned out to be shaded by a drag parachute and did not open. With a speed of about 140 km / h, the Soyuz-1 hit the ground. The concentrated hydrogen peroxide remaining in the tanks, which was used in the controlled descent system, caused a very strong fire that made the investigation difficult.


Causes of disaster

The main cause of the accident was the failure of the main parachute. The braking parachute did not have enough effort to pull the main parachute. There are two possible reasons:
  1. Violation of the manufacturing technology of the descent vehicle. In the manufacturing process, the descent vehicle was placed in an autoclave to polymerize the resins of the heat-shielding layer. However, due to the rush cap parachute containers were sent to the shop later, and they were autoclaved separately. The hatches of parachutes were covered with something, but, apparently, they were loose, and the volatile fractions of the plastering fell on the walls of the parachute containers, making them rough, lumpy and sticky. Increased friction made braking parachute effort insufficient.
  2. Error in the design - because of the rush "Union" never before the flight Komarov did not make a normal landing: the unmanned "Cosmos-133" was blown up during the descent because of the risk of landing not in the USSR, the ship 7K-OK №1 landed on the reserve the parachute due to the incorrect response of the emergency rescue system at the start, the Cosmos-140 was unsealed due to the bottom burnout. During normal landing, the increased pressure in the descent vehicle squeezed the container and made the braking parachute effort insufficient.

The cause of the death of the astronaut was the failure of the reserve parachute. Because of the aerodynamic shading of the canopy of the braking parachute, it could not be filled. The investigation revealed that when testing the parachute system, such a failure was not checked.
Ironically, the failure of the solar battery disclosure (caught on the screen-vacuum insulation), which disrupted the flight program, saved the lives of Bykovsky, Eliseev and Khrunov. They had to fly on the same ship with the same fatal flaw.

Taken measures

The design of the main parachute container has been changed. The container was made more rigid, its volume was increased, the shape was changed, and they began to be polished from the inside. In the process of laying the parachute system, each operation began to take pictures.

Effects

The program "Union" was delayed for eighteen months. Until the next manned flight, six developmental unmanned launches were made. Problems with the parachute system no longer arose

Soyuz-11



From left to right: Vladislav Volkov, Georgy Dobrovolsky and Victor Patsayev.

1971 The USSR lost the lunar race, but asymmetrically responded with the creation of orbital stations, where it was possible to stay for weeks, in the long run for months, and engage in science. The first expedition to the first orbital station in the world came to an end. The crew consisting of Georgy Dobrovolsky, Vladislav Volkov and Viktor Patsayev successfully worked in orbit for twenty-three days and prepared for landing. The crew went to the Soyuz-11 and undocked from the station. Braking and landing took place seemingly nominally, however, after the separation of the compartments, communication with the crew was lost. The descent vehicle made a successful landing, but the crew was found without signs of life. Resuscitation events were not crowned with success, astronauts died.

Sequence of events

At 01:47:28 MSK, at a height of 150 km, the separation of the ship’s compartments occurred. At the same time, the vent valve spontaneously opened, which should only open at a height of 2-3 km. The cabin began to fill with fog - the air vapor condensed due to pressure drop. The whistle of the outgoing air was heard. The astronauts turned off the radio equipment so that outside noise would not interfere with the search for a leak. Most likely, they realized that the air leaves the vent valve. Dobrovolsky (according to other data, Patsayev) undid the straps and, according to some sources, managed to close the valve, but not the one. The fact is that there were two valves, and each had its own valve for manual opening / closing. After about twenty seconds, the astronauts lost consciousness. For 115 seconds, the pressure in the cabin dropped to 50 mm. Hg Art. The astronauts died from choking.


Causes of disaster

The immediate cause of the accident was the spontaneous opening of the vent valve at the time of separation of the compartments. The compartments are separated by undermining the pyrobolts, and the process is accompanied by a rather serious shake-up. The reason for the spontaneous opening of the valve is not reliably established. There are several versions:

The cause of the death of astronauts was depressurization. Crash analysis also reveals design system errors:

The charges of the fallen astronauts that “the hole could be plugged with a finger” are groundless. The valve was under the panel, direct access to it was impossible.

Taken measures

On the "Union" returned the spacesuits and put the device with oxygen for them. It cost the third crew member, some time flew together, but the completion of the carrier rocket eventually allowed again to return to the crew of three. Controls were reworked, they became more ergonomic.

Effects

The flight program was stopped for twenty-seven months. Since then, the "Union" has operated for more than forty years and deservedly has a reputation as a very reliable machine.

Challenger STS-51-L



From left to right. Top row: Al Onizuka, Krista Makoliff, Greg Jarvis, Judy Resnick. Bottom row: Mike Smith, Dick Scobi, Ron McNair.

The period 1984-1986 was a real “golden age” for the Space Shuttle program. The first flights on a jetpack, the first repair of a satellite in orbit, the first return of a broken satellite to Earth in the cargo hold, twenty-three satellites and one hundred forty-two tons of payload in two years! In April 1985, the shuttles were launched at an interval of just seventeen days. The Challenger mission STS-51-L should have broken this record, the launch was planned only sixteen days after the STS-61-C mission. Shuttles were preparing for launch at both launch complexes at the same time, and the space center to them. Kennedy was really like a science fiction spaceport. The mission of the "Challenge" was somewhat unusual, as part of the crew was a school teacher. Her task was to conduct a lesson from orbit. The press and the public have lost interest in the NASA space program, and the “teacher in space” program was supposed to revive it. The idea failed - on January 28, 1986, the main TV channels showed only the first seconds of start-up and switched to the standard broadcasting schedule. But after a few minutes they had to go on the air with special releases - “Challenger” was killed along with the crew.

Sequence of events

A small channel led the broadcast, and from the point of view of the viewer it looked like this:

T + 0.678 : Black smoke is observed emerging from the right solid-fuel accelerator near the lower mount. The side accelerators were assembled from the parts, and the smoke was coming from the junction of the parts.
T + 3.375: The smoke has stopped
T + 58.788: A video camera captures a torch of fire emanating from the bottom of the right accelerator
T + 64.660: The flame burned through the wall of the external fuel tank, the leakage of liquid hydrogen began, the torch became larger due to the burning liquid hydrogen.
T + 72.284: The lower fastening of the right accelerator was destroyed.
T + 73.124: The bottom bottom of the lower (hydrogen) tank collapsed. The resulting acceleration threw the lower tank up, hitting it on the top (oxygen) tank. At the same time, the right accelerator, turning around the top mount, hit the external fuel tank. The destruction of the external fuel tank, intensified by self-ignition of the spilled fuel components, began.
T + 73.162: The destruction of the orbiter began.
T + 75.237: The orbiter cabin has left a cloud of gases and debris. Astronauts were alive and conscious. It is known that three of the four personal air supply devices were turned on. Some toggle switches were switched in the cockpit, suggesting attempts to return the electricity supply and regain control of the device.
T + 240: The orbiter's cockpit hits the water at a speed of 330 km / h. Astronauts are dying.


Causes of disaster

The immediate cause of the accident is gas leakage through the connection of elements of a solid-fuel accelerator. Problems with the tightness of the joints were known from the second flight of the Space Shuttle (the STS-51-L mission was the twenty-fifth flight). After the first case, the engineers at Thiokol, which produced the side accelerators, carried out the following test: the sealing ring was intentionally damaged more than it did on the STS-2, then it was subjected to three times more pressure than the pressure in the chamber of the operating TTU. The ring held pressure. However, the test was incorrect. Since 1984, out of eighteen missions, only three have had problems with sealing rings. Worse, in nine of the fifteen problematic missions gas breakthrough was recorded through the O-rings. The engineers understood the seriousness of the problem, but they lacked the resources to study and eliminate it in more detail. NASA's brilliant visible success hid the disastrous overload of performers. In the memoirs of the astronaut Mike Mullein, it is told about entire teams, processing for months without a single day off, workers who were pulled out of the house in the evening for an urgent call, and they worked even drunk. The NASA document flow was overwhelmed by the requirements “I need people! Spare parts! Equipment! ”, Which remained unanswered, because there was nothing to acquire the required. The economic calculation of the Space Shuttle program was dangerously erroneous, self-sustaining and did not smell, and the allocated money was not enough. The situation was worsened by information distortions as it moved up the administrative ladder. Managers unreasonably underestimated the likelihood of an accident on the grounds that the shuttles were manned and ignored the warnings coming to them from below. In the evening before the start of Challenger, a conference of representatives from Thiokol and NASA was held. Engineers felt that low temperatures could still worsen the tightness problem of the O-rings, and raised the issue of postponing the launch date to warmer weather. But from NASA managers sounded in response: "God, Thiokol, where do you want to transfer the launch, to April?"
The cause of the death of the astronauts was a blow to the water. The cabin survived the destruction of the orbiter and fell entirely, still with living astronauts. For some unknown reason, when developing the Space Shuttle program, no rescue system was created in the event of an accident during the first two minutes of flight (before the separation of solid-fuel boosters). In the first flights, when the crew consisted of two people, ejection seats were installed, but after the shuttles were declared commissioned, the crew was increased to seven people, and two seats were removed. In general, the Space Shuttle program was distinguished by some engineering overconfidence, which is worth the first flight immediately with the crew.

Taken measures

After the crash, the design of the side accelerators was changed. A third sealing ring and components that increase the stiffness of the joint have been added. A rescue system appeared on the shuttles, archaic and suitable only for emergency escape of the whole and controlled shuttle, which has nowhere to land. Constructively, it reminded of the times of the Second World War - an ordinary parachute and a guide rod so that astronauts do not hit the orbiter wing.

Effects

The flights of the Space Shuttle program were suspended for thirty-two months. The fifth orbiter, Endeavor, was built to replace the dead Challenger. A series of space crashes with unmanned launch vehicles and an error in the design of the Hubble telescope were superimposed on the Challenger disaster, which together led to a serious crisis at NASA. There were even opinions about the need to disband the agency.

Colombia STS-107



From left to right. Top row: David Brown, Laurel Clark, Michael Anderson, Ilan Ramon. Bottom row: Rick Husband, Kalpana Chawla, William McCool

2003 The crisis of the late 80s seems to be overcome. Shuttles are no longer viewed as the only means of putting cargo into orbit. Dashing flights on jetpack canceled as too dangerous. But the Hubble was successfully repaired in orbit. The construction of the ISS is in full swing. Shuttle "Columbia" can not take part in this "construction of the century" - it was built first and too heavy for that. Columbia flies with scientific missions, delivering the SpaceHub module to orbit and conducting various experiments. Start January 16 was apparently successful. It was noticed that a piece of thermal insulation fell off once again. A rather routine mission in orbit was successful and came to an end. The loss of data from the pressure sensors in the tires of the left wing was regarded as the usual minor problems that exist in each mission. And even the loss of communication was not the cause of particularly serious concern. MCC Houston was still trying to reconnect with the shuttle, when one of the employees saw on TV in the rest room a broadcast of a ship disintegrating in the atmosphere.

Sequence of events

January 16, 2003, 83 second flight. A piece of insulating foam from an external fuel tank the size of a suitcase hit the left wing.
February 1, 2003, 8:44:09 EST , EI + 000: Conventional point of entry into the atmosphere, height 120 km.
EI + 404: The ten-minute period of greatest heat loads begins. Speed: 24.1 mach; height: 74 km.
EI + 597: Observers see the first traces of falling off debris. Speed: Mach 22.8; altitude: 70.2 km
EI + 613: According to telemetry, information arrives that at the four temperature sensors in the left wing the values ​​have gone too high. In fact, the sensors or wires leading to them burned out.
EI + 906: Data on pressure in the left chassis is lost by telemetry.
EI + 923: Communication and telemetry disappear.
EI + 969: Amateur footage shows the destruction of the shuttle.
EI + 1710: The MCC receives information that the TV channels broadcast the destruction of the ship.

The combination of video from the earth, telemetry, video from the MCC. It is better to deploy to full screen:


Causes of disaster

The immediate cause of the accident is damage to the front edge of the wing at the site of removal by impact of the heat insulating foam of the external fuel tank. The size and extent of the damage is not known, since none of the engineers were seriously concerned about this problem, and, despite the possibility of inspecting the damage using ground-based telescopes or spy satellites, this was not done. The problem of blows with insulating foam was considered habitual and harmless. Model experiments show a fairly large hole, which definitely doomed the orbiter to death:

The cause of the death of astronauts was the destruction of the orbiter at hypersonic speed.In the book by Mary Roach “The Other Side of Astronautics”, quite deafly it is said about unusual damages of bodies due to the impact of a shock wave on hypersound. There is no rescue system in such conditions at the current level of technology.
Could the crew of the Columbia have been saved? Two scenarios were possible:
  1. By chance the shuttle "Atlantis" was at a high level of readiness for launch. “Columbia” could wait in orbit until February 15, with enough reserves. And "Atlantis" without passing the tests of the systems could be launched already on February 10. There was a reserve in as many as five days to save people and, possibly, an orbiter!
  2. In case of impossibility of the first option, the crew could make a spacewalk to assess and attempt to repair the damage. This is a more dangerous option, the “Columbia” did not have a Canadarm manipulator, which is used when going into space, but the spacesuits were on each shuttle flight, just to be able to correct emergency situations. We cannot confidently say that the orbiter could be repaired, but any attempt would be better than a sure death.

In fact, the findings of the commission investigating the Challenger disaster were ignored. In the case of "Colombia" was the same: there is a potentially dangerous phenomenon, which, however, repeats and does not lead to a catastrophe. They get used to it, the measures taken, if any, are insufficient, and as a result a catastrophe does occur.

Taken measures

The problem of falling off pieces of insulating foam was solved only three years after the death of "Colombia". At this time, several shuttle flights took place, in which the foam continued to fall off. Only an X-ray of the tank being filled revealed the appearance of cracks, which led to the falling off of the pieces of foam. And even in 2006, on the STS-121 mission, individual pieces of foam were still falling off. For the Shuttle missions, a special maneuver was added to the ISS: the shuttle hung from the ISS and rolled over. The crew of the ISS at this time was photographing the tiles of thermal protection.

Effects

Shuttle flights were stopped for twenty-nine months. In fact, the Columbia disaster put an end to the Space Shuttle program. After this disaster, the shuttles completed only the absolutely necessary missions for assembling the ISS and those. service Hubble, and their flights were stopped.

Conclusion


I added “project management” and “testing” hubs, because I believe that the space industry is not so different from IT. Chertok's “Missiles and People” are read as easily as the “Target” by Elijah Goldratt, and it recognizes bugs, packs and deadlines in their “cosmic” form. I want people who died in space to die for good reason, and the bitter experience was used not only in the space program, but also in the field of IT.

Bitter cosmic disaster lessons


The familiar danger does not become safer. The danger that we know well requires the same careful attention as an unusual one.
Correcting one problem, think about not getting into the opposite. Measures to eliminate one problem may lead to the risk of the opposite problem.
If you require people to work faster, do not be surprised that they will break the technology secretly from you. Hurry is a very large load on quality.
The desire to have time can lead to a very large loss of time to eliminate the consequences of the disaster. This is a very serious argument to "hurry slowly."
Laziness in risk management or the preparation of test cases can lead to very unpleasant losses.A missed risk or a case can hurt very badly when operating the system.
Thinking, very similar to “this is not a bug, this is a feature,” killed fourteen people in space. If the system does not behave as designed, but a catastrophe does not happen, it does not give any guarantee that a catastrophe will not happen later.
Not learning from your mistakes means repeating them again and again.

List of sources used:
  1. Wikipedia and the sources specified in its articles.
  2. Boris Chertok, “Rockets and People” in 4 books - materials on the catastrophes “Soyuz-1”, “Soyuz-11”
  3. Kamanin Nikolai Petrovich, “Hidden Space”, diaries in 4 books - materials on catastrophes “Soyuz-1”, “Soyuz-11”
  4. Richard Feynman, “What do you care about what others think?” - an investigation into the Challenger disaster
  5. Mullane Mike, "Riding Rockets: The Outrageous Tales of a Space Shuttle Astronaut" - Astronaut's Look at the Challenger Disaster
  6. Lovell Jim and Kluger Jeffrey, "Lost Moon: The Perilous Voyage of Apollo 13" - Astronaut's Look at the Apollo 1 Disaster
  7. Roach Mary, "The Other Side of Cosmonautics" - Colombian Disaster
  8. Moon Machines, Science Channel, series, 2008 - Apollo 1 crash
  9. "When We Left Earth", Discovery Channel, serial, 2008 - disasters "Apollo 1", "Challenger", "Columbia"
  10. “From the Earth to the Moon”, HBO, TV series, 1998 - Apollo 1 crash


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Source: https://habr.com/ru/post/210254/

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