The tale of how the Ukrainian operator had serious problems
Due to a serious mistake in the safety of the life :) operator, it is now possible, by simple frauds, to get the number of any person using the OSS for full use.
This story was told to me by a friend from Ukraine.
')
Take the usual guy Alexey, he has several large communities on VKontakte, Odnoklassniki or Facebook (it doesn't matter). Once he wrote an advertiser Gregory, who wants to buy advertising. Actually, Alexey called Grigoriy and during the conversation the advertiser asked to call him back in half an hour to clarify some details of the deal. Well, he called the second time. Nothing foreshadowed trouble.
But in the evening some unfamiliar girl called him and said that she was offended at him and everything was over, after which she hung up. Alexey called the girl back to find out what it was, if he could help, etc. It rings - on the line is quiet. I called the second time, the girl picked up the phone and said again that she was offended, and then she hung up. Literally an hour later, the phone’s account turned out to be replenished in an unknown way by 20 hryvnia. “Well, the wrong number, with whom it does not happen” - Alex thought.
On these strange events and ended the first day. The next day, SMS arrives that the VKontakte number has been changed to a new one.
How so? How was it possible to lose SIM in your own phone?
It turns out that life :) operator issues a new SIM card, provided that you can name the date of the last refill and the latest numbers that you frequently call. And the frequent numbers, which is paradoxical, are those that you called at least 2 times! Alexey called two numbers twice. This means that the attacker had the date of replenishment (because he had previously set those 20 hryvnias) and the same two frequent numbers. After that, scammers got Simka with Alexey's number.
On the same day, Alexey went to the operator’s office, they confirmed the fact of changing the SIM.
But in order for them to even begin to disassemble this strange fact, you need to write a statement at the legal address. But you must agree, until the letter starts to be disassembled, then everything that is possible will be squeezed out from the SIM card.
So, what do fraudsters do while Alexei is trying to figure out his accountantly? They restore the password from the page, rebind it to their number and throw away an unnecessary SIM card with Alexey's number, after which they demand a ransom for the community. Writing to VKontakte Support is useless, there is no fact of theft. "Regular room ligation" - will answer there. The police said that this is an online fraud, they are not engaged in this. But for $ 1000, they can consider the case of Alexei. In the life :) office, they said again: “Write the application to the legal address”.
This is how you can easily get full access to any SIM card of any subscriber using life :) services.
But the number can be not only VKontakte communities, but also bank accounts, because now some banks allow you to do a lot with the account, if you have access to your number.
This story was told to me by a friend from Ukraine.
')
Take the usual guy Alexey, he has several large communities on VKontakte, Odnoklassniki or Facebook (it doesn't matter). Once he wrote an advertiser Gregory, who wants to buy advertising. Actually, Alexey called Grigoriy and during the conversation the advertiser asked to call him back in half an hour to clarify some details of the deal. Well, he called the second time. Nothing foreshadowed trouble.
But in the evening some unfamiliar girl called him and said that she was offended at him and everything was over, after which she hung up. Alexey called the girl back to find out what it was, if he could help, etc. It rings - on the line is quiet. I called the second time, the girl picked up the phone and said again that she was offended, and then she hung up. Literally an hour later, the phone’s account turned out to be replenished in an unknown way by 20 hryvnia. “Well, the wrong number, with whom it does not happen” - Alex thought.
On these strange events and ended the first day. The next day, SMS arrives that the VKontakte number has been changed to a new one.
How so? How was it possible to lose SIM in your own phone?
It turns out that life :) operator issues a new SIM card, provided that you can name the date of the last refill and the latest numbers that you frequently call. And the frequent numbers, which is paradoxical, are those that you called at least 2 times! Alexey called two numbers twice. This means that the attacker had the date of replenishment (because he had previously set those 20 hryvnias) and the same two frequent numbers. After that, scammers got Simka with Alexey's number.
On the same day, Alexey went to the operator’s office, they confirmed the fact of changing the SIM.
But in order for them to even begin to disassemble this strange fact, you need to write a statement at the legal address. But you must agree, until the letter starts to be disassembled, then everything that is possible will be squeezed out from the SIM card.
So, what do fraudsters do while Alexei is trying to figure out his accountantly? They restore the password from the page, rebind it to their number and throw away an unnecessary SIM card with Alexey's number, after which they demand a ransom for the community. Writing to VKontakte Support is useless, there is no fact of theft. "Regular room ligation" - will answer there. The police said that this is an online fraud, they are not engaged in this. But for $ 1000, they can consider the case of Alexei. In the life :) office, they said again: “Write the application to the legal address”.
This is how you can easily get full access to any SIM card of any subscriber using life :) services.
But the number can be not only VKontakte communities, but also bank accounts, because now some banks allow you to do a lot with the account, if you have access to your number.
Source: https://habr.com/ru/post/197998/
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