How to optimize the vote count on election day
September 8 was the first election for which I worked, and not even an observer, but a whole PWG (member of the election commission with decisive vote). Elections at my site were held using KOIBs - wonderful such machines that make throwing difficult (you can't put a bulletin in a bundle and observers will not give one by one) and give the result printed on a piece of paper at the touch of a button. Excellent, in theory, a thing. But, as everyone who watched the election results knows, the calculations from the sites equipped with KOIBs took almost the entire night after the elections - that is, like in the good old days with manual recalculations. That is why it happened and what can be done about it I want to tell.
Churo Miracle Electoral Technology
The principle of operation of KOIBs is very simple: it reads data from ballots and unloads them onto a special flash drive ( article about software in COIBs ). Before the opening of the polling station at 8 am on the voting day, testing is conducted - does he correctly count the entered ballots; . If the numbers do not converge by more than 3 bulletins, this means a manual recalculation of the results. Then, through the connected printer, COIB prints the results in this form:
')
On the evening of September 8, those who watched the election results live a lot were nervous: it passed hour after hour, but there was no information. It would seem: everything is automatic - so what makes it difficult to quickly calculate the data? Many seriously expected that by 22 o'clock everything will be known. Naive people.
The situation with COIBs is very typical for state innovations and is most easily described by an example of an Excel accountant who recounts all the numbers on the accounts. We should start by saying that the availability of KOIB does not cancel the heaps of manual work: the number of voters who have voted in the books is recalculated, the remaining ballots are recalculated and then extinguished. For example, in my polling station there were 1,900 voters in books + approximately 900 unused ballots remaining after the voting. Error per voter or one ballot - we start all over again. However, I got into a fairly experienced team, so we coped with all the paperwork in a little over an hour, and by half past nine (half an hour before the time when everything was supposedly supposed to be counted), we opened the Cohiba.
Then another hour or two of paperwork filling, packaging of canceled and counted ballots, but this is no longer so interesting. The coolest begins further: the flash drive that was in the COIB comes from there and the PEC chairperson is personally taken to the territorial election commission (TEC) accompanied by a police officer whose responsibility is to deliver this flash drive safely and securely. Then a couple more hours of queue at the TIK to the office where the data is already clogged in the GAS Elections, the acceptance of all the papers by the higher commission - in general, you can finish by two o'clock in the morning.
Where the weak point of the system, from this description, I think, is clear. We have three stages, three weak points of the system:
In addition to unjustified time and labor costs, this system also differs with serious security holes, the most important of which is manual data entry from the COIB in the TEC. Many observers travel with PEC chairpersons to personally monitor data entry - but there are not enough observers, you can remove observers, and indeed it’s a dubious pleasure to go to the TECs after a 15-hour working day.
Replace paper books of voters with electronic ones. Give each member of the netbook commission with a connected tablet, where he will score passport details, and voters sign with a stylus. Publish the filling of books online, with the ability to verify participation in the voting by name and passport number.
It looks like a book of voters now. On average, about 400 voters each
Equip KOIBs with a data transfer terminal in the TEC. As an option, in order not to redo everything from scratch — to supplement the system with special terminals, in which the data from KOIB will be overwhelmed by hand, an ordinary tablet will do. After entering the data are confirmed by the members of the commission with a decisive vote (we are now signing on the printout), members of the commission with an advisory vote (PSG) and observers can leave their comments. The signature technology can be any:
After the protocol is signed by all members of the commission, the data is instantly sent to the TEC and published on the website of the electoral commission.
Voting card in the TEC. Isn't it better to have this sign online?
Benefits:
Of course, further, it will still be necessary to carry the canceled and voted ballots to the TEC, to sign for all the formalities. During this time, KOIBs will remain on (as is happening now - they will turn off only when the TICK received all the documents and gave permission to turn them off: in case something doesn’t converge and a recalculation is required).
Superpowers of our state is that create queues anywhere. In the photo: the chairmen and secretaries of PECs are tramping down the corridor of the TEC, waiting for the queue to enter the data
However, all changes in the results (cancellation, sending for recalculation) will be recorded online, as well as any third-party conversion services connected via API. To increase transparency, you can also set up sending notifications of any changes to observers - but this is already a reinsurance method, since the chances of canceling the results after the protocol has already been published are frankly miserable. Now all the concerns are related to the fact that until data are entered into the GAS Election, only a few people see the results of a particular polling station.
The advantages of the described scheme:
The counting of votes and the implementation of all formal procedures deep into the night are not only a problem for those who follow and participate in elections, but also hard work for observers and commission members. The current system of vote counting is a result of the inertia of our state only. Change it is not difficult - there would be a desire.
The principle of operation of KOIBs is very simple: it reads data from ballots and unloads them onto a special flash drive ( article about software in COIBs ). Before the opening of the polling station at 8 am on the voting day, testing is conducted - does he correctly count the entered ballots; . If the numbers do not converge by more than 3 bulletins, this means a manual recalculation of the results. Then, through the connected printer, COIB prints the results in this form:
')
On the evening of September 8, those who watched the election results live a lot were nervous: it passed hour after hour, but there was no information. It would seem: everything is automatic - so what makes it difficult to quickly calculate the data? Many seriously expected that by 22 o'clock everything will be known. Naive people.
In fact, no automation in the current system of counting votes and did not smell
The situation with COIBs is very typical for state innovations and is most easily described by an example of an Excel accountant who recounts all the numbers on the accounts. We should start by saying that the availability of KOIB does not cancel the heaps of manual work: the number of voters who have voted in the books is recalculated, the remaining ballots are recalculated and then extinguished. For example, in my polling station there were 1,900 voters in books + approximately 900 unused ballots remaining after the voting. Error per voter or one ballot - we start all over again. However, I got into a fairly experienced team, so we coped with all the paperwork in a little over an hour, and by half past nine (half an hour before the time when everything was supposedly supposed to be counted), we opened the Cohiba.
Then another hour or two of paperwork filling, packaging of canceled and counted ballots, but this is no longer so interesting. The coolest begins further: the flash drive that was in the COIB comes from there and the PEC chairperson is personally taken to the territorial election commission (TEC) accompanied by a police officer whose responsibility is to deliver this flash drive safely and securely. Then a couple more hours of queue at the TIK to the office where the data is already clogged in the GAS Elections, the acceptance of all the papers by the higher commission - in general, you can finish by two o'clock in the morning.
Where the weak point of the system, from this description, I think, is clear. We have three stages, three weak points of the system:
- manual filling of books of voters
- manual delivery of a flash drive to the TEC
- manual data entry in GAS Elections.
In addition to unjustified time and labor costs, this system also differs with serious security holes, the most important of which is manual data entry from the COIB in the TEC. Many observers travel with PEC chairpersons to personally monitor data entry - but there are not enough observers, you can remove observers, and indeed it’s a dubious pleasure to go to the TECs after a 15-hour working day.
What i suggest
Replace paper books of voters with electronic ones. Give each member of the netbook commission with a connected tablet, where he will score passport details, and voters sign with a stylus. Publish the filling of books online, with the ability to verify participation in the voting by name and passport number.
It looks like a book of voters now. On average, about 400 voters each
- speeding up the procedure, minimizing errors: minus half an hour to count the number of those who voted manually
- transparency: every citizen will be able to check on his passport information whether his vote or the voice of his close relatives is taken into account in order to avoid a situation when her grandmother was sitting at home, and her voice was counted in the polling station.
- security: only the fact of voting is taken into account, the secret of the vote remains untouchable.
Equip KOIBs with a data transfer terminal in the TEC. As an option, in order not to redo everything from scratch — to supplement the system with special terminals, in which the data from KOIB will be overwhelmed by hand, an ordinary tablet will do. After entering the data are confirmed by the members of the commission with a decisive vote (we are now signing on the printout), members of the commission with an advisory vote (PSG) and observers can leave their comments. The signature technology can be any:
- the stylus on the screen
- enter a special password
- USB flash drive with EDS (the most confused version and surely the one that will surely choose the CEC, hehe)
After the protocol is signed by all members of the commission, the data is instantly sent to the TEC and published on the website of the electoral commission.
Voting card in the TEC. Isn't it better to have this sign online?
Benefits:
- Simplify the system - no driving with flash drives, manual input
- Acceleration of the calculation - the data will be available online, for recalculation and processing by all those who wish to immediately after their entry - that is, just about 22 hours with manual recalculation of the lists of voters or even an hour earlier if there are electronic books
- Increased security - the risk of loss or damage to the flash drive disappears, the risk of data fraud disappears after the flash drive is delivered to the PEC. Observers can be sure that the territorial, city and central election commission received exactly those data that are counted on the site.
Of course, further, it will still be necessary to carry the canceled and voted ballots to the TEC, to sign for all the formalities. During this time, KOIBs will remain on (as is happening now - they will turn off only when the TICK received all the documents and gave permission to turn them off: in case something doesn’t converge and a recalculation is required).
Superpowers of our state is that create queues anywhere. In the photo: the chairmen and secretaries of PECs are tramping down the corridor of the TEC, waiting for the queue to enter the data
However, all changes in the results (cancellation, sending for recalculation) will be recorded online, as well as any third-party conversion services connected via API. To increase transparency, you can also set up sending notifications of any changes to observers - but this is already a reinsurance method, since the chances of canceling the results after the protocol has already been published are frankly miserable. Now all the concerns are related to the fact that until data are entered into the GAS Election, only a few people see the results of a particular polling station.
The advantages of the described scheme:
- The physical voting process is saved through paper ballots. This is important both from the point of view of transparency and security - the secrecy of the vote.
- Both procedures - replacing paper books of voters with electronic and online data sending to higher election commissions - can be done separately (say, save paper books of voters, but automate the process of sending data to the TEC)
- Ease of incarnation. Ideally, you need to equip the data sending terminals with KOIBs themselves. But to reduce the cost of the process, you can simply give the chairmen of the commission plates in which they will hammer the data with their hands - this will not take much longer, but you will not need to change KOIBs.
The counting of votes and the implementation of all formal procedures deep into the night are not only a problem for those who follow and participate in elections, but also hard work for observers and commission members. The current system of vote counting is a result of the inertia of our state only. Change it is not difficult - there would be a desire.
Source: https://habr.com/ru/post/193542/
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