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Cyber ​​Warlock - Stuxnet, Duqu, Flame, Gauss and everything, everything, everything ...

Analyzing the “symbolic” threats, it can be noted that since 2010, the following malicious programs with the label “cyber-weapon” were detected:

In addition to them, several smaller samples of caliber:



Brief characteristics
VPOStuxnetDuquFlameGauss
Date of discoveryJuly 2010September 2011May 2012August 2012
The number of infections (according to KSN)about 180 thousandabout 20about 700about 2500
Where were the most infectionsIndia, Indonesia, IranIran, India, Sudan, Vietnam, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Ukraine, Austria, Hungary, Indonesia, United Kingdom (according to Symantec)Iran, IsraelLebanon, Israel, Palestine
Initial infection vectorunknown (possibly USB flash);via a Microsoft Word document, sent by email to interested peopleunknown, there is a distribution method through a fake Windows update mechanism, Microsoft's signature allows installation without warningunknown
Startup method at startupDownloading a signed driver as a service and then loading the main module from an encrypted file; decryption and launch is performed only in memoryDownloading a signed driver as a service and then loading the main module from an encrypted file; decryption and launch is performed only in memorythe main module is registered as the LSA Authentication Packagemodifies the registry entry responsible for loading the wbem subsystem on itself and then calls the original wbem library
Development Environment (language)Visual Studio (core module)Visual Studio, the main module written using the object superstructure above the C languageC ++, part of the code is written in the interpreted language LuaC ++
Using digital signaturesRealtekC-Media (possibly JMicron)Microsoft (certificate created by matching the collision MD5)not
Distinctive featuresthe main module contains several components as resourcescontainer structure - matryoshkalarge size - about 20 Mb, using a large number of third-party codeuse of "payload", decoded only if the computer has a specified path (path)
Functionalsearch and file transfer, implementation into the SCADA system Siemens WinCCsearch and transfer of files, tracking keystrokes, collecting data on network infrastructuresearch and transfer files, record voice information, use bluetooth to intercept information from other devicessearch and transfer of files, interception of passwords of remote banking services of the Middle East, interception of passwords in social networks, mail services and instant messaging systems
purposedisruption of the SCADA system Siemens WinCCespionage and data preparation for subsequent implementation in the network infrastructureespionagesocial impact
Similarity with other VPOthe launch method is similar to that used in Duqu, using the USB infection module of the similar version Flame in version 2009startup method is similar to that in Stuxnetusing a USB infection module similar to Stuxnet version 2009, a lot of modules with OCX extension like Gaussmany modules with OCX extension like Flame
Estimated year of development2009200820062011

Dell SecureWorks experts believe that the similarity of some elements of the Stuxnet and Duqu malware is an accident. Similar methods are used in other samples of malware. The topic of comparison between Stuxnet and Duqu is disclosed here . With a connection Gauss and Flame generally related funny case . Employees of Kaspesky Lab organized a sinkhole router. Simply put, we are talking about creating fake control centers, which are beginning to be perceived by malicious programs as their own. Thus, it becomes possible to estimate the extent of infections and their geographical distribution by analyzing the IP addresses of incoming connections. In some cases, it even allows you to take control and give a command to self-destruct, which, however, is rare. At the sinkhole, the router brought traffic to it from Gauss and Flame. And the specialists of FireEye, finding that Gauss and Flame are accessing the same server, concluded that the same people were behind the development of these malware. A little later, FireEye made a public apology for her mistake and misrepresentation.
Thus, all attempts to link Stuxnet, Duqu, Flame and Gauss to each other are not very impressive. In addition, it would be too costly to develop a new sample of malware for different operations, it would be enough to change the existing one to eliminate the possibility of detection by anti-virus tools and increase the functionality of the modules. It is quite probable that we observe only the tip of the iceberg of events occurring in the Middle East, and the data of VPO are developed by different countries or organizations that are not related to each other. The following key players can be distinguished in the arena of cyberwar: the USA, China, Russia, Israel, South Korea. In addition, it is clear that local players have also connected here - some samples of HVT are written in Deplhi (Madi, Shamoon, Narilam), which is an indicator of insufficient professional work, but they successfully perform their tasks of collecting and deleting information.
Summary:

But in any case, despite all the distortions of antivirus companies, we will follow with interest the development of cyber weapons.

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Source: https://habr.com/ru/post/160973/


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