How Intel overtook restrictions on the import of cryptographic products in the Russian Federation
Among the documents on the "Cablegate" found another note from the US Embassy in Moscow. The letter of November 9, 2009 concerns negotiations between Intel and the Russian authorities regarding restrictions on the import of encryption tools in the Russian Federation.
According to the current customs legislation, goods with a cryptographic module of any complexity level (whether it be a computer, a processor or a mobile phone, see the full list ) or software are required to obtain a license from the Federal Security Service of Russia for import into Russia. Obtaining a license provides for a six-month examination of the sample of goods in the laboratory of the FSB and must be repeated for each batch of goods .
The FSB does not certify a cryptoalgorithm if it does not support the encryption algorithms listed in the State Standards. For example, PGP does not comply with GOST, so its use in Russia is illegal. Even OpenSSL with GOST support was released only in 2010.
Of course, the US Embassy and Intel disapprove of such draconian import rules. Actually, in 2006, Russia signed a commitment to the United States to simplify these procedures for joining the WTO, but so far the progress is minimal.
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On October 28, 2009, a meeting was held at the US Embassy in Moscow, at which Intel's recent permission to import 1,000 cryptographic "developer kits" containing a cryptographic platform for software development was discussed. Permission was obtained without the need for laboratory analysis and approval by the FSB . Several times after that, the representatives of the Russian authorities tried to present this permission as “a significant breakthrough in Russian policy regarding the import of encryption tools”. However, representatives of the US Embassy explain in a memo that there is no breakthrough here.
Intel managed to get such permission bypassing all accepted practice and for this it was necessary to try a lot. Intel executives, including Craig Barrett, as well as other dignitaries, including Director of the Chamber of Commerce Andrew Somers, convinced President Medvedev that Intel, with more than a thousand local engineers, plays a huge role in the development of the Russian “knowledge economy”. They said that if they could not quickly import this cryptographic equipment, Russian Intel programmers would be left without work and more than 200 people would have to be fired. Moreover, R & D projects from Russia will have to be transferred to India and China.
The Russian authorities have appointed an operational meeting with the participation of the FSB and representatives of Intel. After this meeting, Intel received the necessary permission.
In addition, the permission itself was issued only for one batch of 1000 pieces of a specific product (by code, without the possibility of modification). Additional shipments would need to receive additional permits. In addition, the permitted lot could only be used for R & D purposes; it could not be sold on the market. The Russian authorities insisted that immediately after use the equipment must be destroyed according to the established procedure.
The US Embassy emphasizes that this permission does not speak about the liberalization of Russian rules for the import of encryption tools. The 2006 procedures in Russia remained three years later (we will add, and at the end of 2010, too), no progress was noted. Russia’s proposals to simplify import procedures in fact do not simplify much (as before, each individual consignment of goods must be coordinated).
According to the current customs legislation, goods with a cryptographic module of any complexity level (whether it be a computer, a processor or a mobile phone, see the full list ) or software are required to obtain a license from the Federal Security Service of Russia for import into Russia. Obtaining a license provides for a six-month examination of the sample of goods in the laboratory of the FSB and must be repeated for each batch of goods .
The FSB does not certify a cryptoalgorithm if it does not support the encryption algorithms listed in the State Standards. For example, PGP does not comply with GOST, so its use in Russia is illegal. Even OpenSSL with GOST support was released only in 2010.
Of course, the US Embassy and Intel disapprove of such draconian import rules. Actually, in 2006, Russia signed a commitment to the United States to simplify these procedures for joining the WTO, but so far the progress is minimal.
')
On October 28, 2009, a meeting was held at the US Embassy in Moscow, at which Intel's recent permission to import 1,000 cryptographic "developer kits" containing a cryptographic platform for software development was discussed. Permission was obtained without the need for laboratory analysis and approval by the FSB . Several times after that, the representatives of the Russian authorities tried to present this permission as “a significant breakthrough in Russian policy regarding the import of encryption tools”. However, representatives of the US Embassy explain in a memo that there is no breakthrough here.
Intel managed to get such permission bypassing all accepted practice and for this it was necessary to try a lot. Intel executives, including Craig Barrett, as well as other dignitaries, including Director of the Chamber of Commerce Andrew Somers, convinced President Medvedev that Intel, with more than a thousand local engineers, plays a huge role in the development of the Russian “knowledge economy”. They said that if they could not quickly import this cryptographic equipment, Russian Intel programmers would be left without work and more than 200 people would have to be fired. Moreover, R & D projects from Russia will have to be transferred to India and China.
The Russian authorities have appointed an operational meeting with the participation of the FSB and representatives of Intel. After this meeting, Intel received the necessary permission.
In addition, the permission itself was issued only for one batch of 1000 pieces of a specific product (by code, without the possibility of modification). Additional shipments would need to receive additional permits. In addition, the permitted lot could only be used for R & D purposes; it could not be sold on the market. The Russian authorities insisted that immediately after use the equipment must be destroyed according to the established procedure.
The US Embassy emphasizes that this permission does not speak about the liberalization of Russian rules for the import of encryption tools. The 2006 procedures in Russia remained three years later (we will add, and at the end of 2010, too), no progress was noted. Russia’s proposals to simplify import procedures in fact do not simplify much (as before, each individual consignment of goods must be coordinated).
Source: https://habr.com/ru/post/109460/
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