IB at the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant (production of nuclear fuel)

At the forum on 3DNews, someone who introduced himself as an engineer at the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant (RosAtom) describes the device production. I allowed myself a copy-paste, do not blame me ...

So, friends, laughing and disbelieving. Let's get acquainted: an engineer of the software support group of the workshops for the main production of TT (Fuel Tablets), TVEL (Heat Separating Elements) and TVS (Fuel Separating Assemblies) of Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant, which is part of OAO TVEL and Rosatom State Corporation. In a simple way - these workshops produce the entire process technology, starting from receiving uranium dioxide powder to packaging and sending finished products to consumers. And I maintain the equipment and the process control system in them.
')
So, friends, here are the facts:
I. Development:
1) New automated TVEL assembly lines are running WinCC under Windows.
2) I only serve them - they were developed by the “whole world”, i.e. various workshops, laboratories and departments of our plant, various research institutes of the Novosibirsk Academgorodok, Tomsk and Moscow, colleagues from other plants belonging to the RosAtom Group of Companies, as well as invited “Varang-outsourcers”.
3) Unification is minimal and only between the LSU (local control systems, in other words, installations) and the "upper level", in other words, the process control system, there is a set of interaction algorithms, such a little.
4) ALL LSU differ from each other both in the interface and in the selected hardware. And built on a bunch of systems from the same Step 5/7 to C ++.
5) Whoever learned to code on what he wrote on that one. If the “senior programmer” is soon to retire, he has grandchildren and a summer residence - what do you expect from him, the speedy development of .NET and C #?
6) When developing a project on your WinXP with admin rights, did anyone at least think about the security model, at least use the standard Windows user rights restrictions? No - it is inconvenient.
7) At the same time, each “developer” tried to grab his share of the implementation, and the cost of the lines had already exceeded one billion. And to do something different from the rest is to get a “newness” bablos, even if this is done on FoxPro 2.6 for MS-DOS (this also exists, yes, yes).

Ii. Network operation:
1) On client computers - WinXP, on servers - Win2003.
2) Autologons are set up everywhere, because the developers of the cracks had to re-login at the “setup” stage, and so it was fixed.
3) All these PCs are connected to a network with a domain, in which, apart from these technological PCs, there are others from other sites that control other controllers / processes.
4) The domain user under which the project is running has local administrator rights on ALL PCs.
5) AND ON SERVERS ALSO - for your convenience.
6) On all PCs, INCLUDING SERVERS, RAdmin is installed for convenience. And a viewer for even more convenience. Looped screens are common.
7) Standard terminal terminal and RDS are also available without restrictions. Servers are also in business.
8) The Radmin password consists of the name of the corresponding Siemens product.
9) The password to the project settings consists of a Russian word, written in English letters (not long).
10) On each PC there is a piece of paper with the staff numbers and passwords of workers and supervisors, so as not to disturb people in trifles.
11) USB and DVD are not protected - insert whatever you want. Autorun is not disabled.
12) The project is launched from the usual wind balls. Everyone who mastered deleting files in Windows can tear down the project.

Iii. Service:
1) Until recently (specifically, until the autumn of last year) there was no anti-virus protection on PCs and servers. Totally. Because it seemed to the developers that the antivirus interferes with the work of such an RT-demanding system.
2) After entering and avalanche-like spreading, the kido came to their senses in about a couple of weeks. And for another two months (!) KAV 6.0 was installed everywhere. For it was those who were bought by those who were supposed to buy software (I repeat: autumn 2009).
3) In this case, quite often there are situations when something does not work, then the invited developer simply restores the system from an image where there is no antivirus (I saved myself once on a flash drive) and the kido epic begins again.
4) The developer does not consider it necessary to notify, let alone ask us about it.
5) The clusters of the technological and UBD servers assumed by the project are not used due to the complexity of setup and the lack of relevant specialists; one server is used. Reserve only "cold."
6) Huge grandmas were given for WinCC licenses, which did not solve problems with bugs (version 6), because the transition to 7 costs not too little, but “already paid off”. At the same time, WinCC constantly swears that there is no license for everyone, both PCs and servers. Looks like the "Vikings" are prizazhali. Nobody cares - does not sabotage the work, and that is fine. The window is removed to the side and that's it.
7) Documentation. Somewhere it is. But for some reason we forgot to give it to us. And all the time (for several years of operation) they promise to "see and forward."
8) Windows update server faded out a few years ago. Critical (like from kido) are updated manually, the rest - in any way.

Vi. General facts:
1) Training is not carried out - saving money and at the same time trying to keep the staff, who ten years ago took the fashion to study, get certificates, and then dump them in more bread places. Now there is no learning at all. No
2) Most of the money spent on the cut, on the system itself, even with overvalued hardware and software, it was possible to spend seven times less. Or at ten - this is the most commercial of all secrets.
3) The iron was purchased much in advance, and by the time the operation began (!) It was outdated. As well as software. Now HDD are in full swing.
4) When the lines were signed into trial operation, their parts were not even unpacked from the boxes in which they came from different places of Russia.
5) When the lines were signed into commercial operation, they were not even collected yet.
6) When the service period of the Varangians ended, the lines had not yet begun to operate. So, individual units could demonstrate something like autonomous work. This did not prevent us from accepting any Putin, Ivanov, Olenin and Zyuganovs (!), They were shown the work of the “line” at the beginning of the cycle, and at that moment when the distinguished guests were leaving to “eat” or “rally”, they replaced it with the blanks made on the old soviet equipment elsewhere.
7) By the way, during the visits of the “distinguished guests” they were also substituted by the staff, so that the grimy workers would not leave the guests and, God forbid, they would casually say too much. Those who arrived to the rescue were like one (one) model in snow-white robes, but they had no idea about the work of the lines. But the picture for the news.
8) Now the "Vikings" are ready to eliminate the identified shortcomings (work for trial operation and service), but for a very good loot. Which is not.
9) During the “implementation” of the lines, the plant replaced 3 general directors and a lot of deputies for production, as “failed”. But they are not offended - such great-great-great-great-great-great-grandchildren will be enough.

For those who have already forgotten the beginning of the text - we produce nuclear fuel. Including for the Iranian Bushehr.

As far as these words can be trusted, let everyone judge for himself. For me, it fits in very well with our reality.